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CASE LAW ON AMERICAN INDIANS:
AUGUST 2015—AUGUST 2016
By Thomas P. Schlosser*
I. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
A. 2016 Cases
1.

Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin v. United States

No. 14-510, 136 S. Ct. 750, 193 L. Ed. 2d 652, 2016 U.S.
LEXIS 971, 84 U.S.L.W. 4081, 25 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 604
(U.S. 2016). Decided: Jan 25, 2016. Case below: Menominee
Indian Tribe of Wisconsin v. U.S. 765 F.3d 1010. Holdings:
Equitable tolling does not apply to the presentment of petitioner’s
claims. (a) To be entitled to equitable tolling of a statute of
limitations, a litigant must establish “(1) that he has been pursuing
his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance
stood in his way and prevented timely filing.” Holland v. Florida,
560 U. S. 631, 649.
The Tribe argued that diligence and extraordinary
circumstances should be considered together as factors in a unitary
test, and it faults the Court of Appeals for declining to consider the
Tribe’s diligence in connection with its finding that no
*

THOMAS P. SCHLOSSER. Mr. Schlosser represents Tribes in fisheries,
timber, water, energy, cultural resources, contracting, tax and federal breach of
trust. He is a director of Morisset, Schlosser, Jozwiak & Somerville, where he
specializes in federal litigation, natural resources, and Indian tribal property
issues. He is also frequently involved in tribal economic development and
environmental regulation. In 1970s, Tom represented tribes in the Stevens’
Treaty Puget Sound fishing rights proceedings. Tom has a B.A. from the
University of Washington and a J.D. from the University of Virginia Law
School. Tom is a founding member of the Indian Law Section of the
Washington State Bar Association and also served on the WSBA Bar Examiners
Committee. Tom is a frequent CLE speaker and moderates an American Indian
Law discussion group for lawyers at
http://forums.delphiforums.com/IndianLaw/messages. He is a part-time lecturer
at the University of Washington School of Law.
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extraordinary circumstances existed. But this Court has expressly
characterized these two components as “elements,” not merely
factors of indeterminate or commensurable weight, Pace v.
DiGuglielmo, 544 U. S. 408, 418, and has treated them as such in
practice, see Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U. S. 327, 336–337. The
Tribe also objects to the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of the
“extraordinary circumstances” prong as requiring the showing of
an “external obstacle” to timely filing.
This Court reaffirmed that this prong is met only where the
circumstances that caused a litigant’s delay are both extraordinary
and beyond its control. None of the Tribe’s excuses satisfy the
“extraordinary circumstances” prong of the test. The Tribe had
unilateral authority to present its claims in a timely manner. Its
claimed obstacles, namely, a mistaken reliance on a putative class
action and a belief that presentment was futile, were not outside the
Tribe’s control. And the significant risk and expense associated
with presenting and litigating its claims are far from extraordinary.
Finally, the special relationship between the United States and
Indian tribes, as articulated in the ISDA, does not override clear
statutory language. 764 F. 3d 51, affirmed. Alito, J., delivered the
opinion for a unanimous Court.
2.

Nebraska v. Parker

No. 14-1406, 2016 U.S. LEXIS 2132 (U.S. Mar. 22, 2016). An
1882 Act opening Indian reservation land to settlement by nonIndians did not diminish the reservation to preclude application of
the Indian tribe’s liquor laws to non-tribal retailers in the opened
land, since the language of the Act only opening the land for
settlement did not establish a clear intent of Congress to diminish
the reservation. Neither conflicting legislative history nor changed
demographic history based on the tribe’s absence from the opened
land for a substantial period could overcome the conclusion that
Congress did not intend to diminish the reservation. Judgment
affirmed. Unanimous decision.
3.

Sturgeon v. Frost

No. 14-1209, 136 S. Ct. 1061, 2016 U.S. LEXIS 2135 (U.S.
Mar. 22, 2016). Issues: Does Section 103(c) of the 1980 Alaska
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National Interest Lands Conservation Act prohibit the National
Park Service from exercising regulatory control over state, native
corporation and private Alaska land physically located within the
boundaries of the National Park System?
Holdings: The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of Section 103(c) is
inconsistent with both the text and context of ANILCA.
(a) The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of Section 103(c) violates
“a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a
statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place
in the overall statutory scheme,” Roberts v. Sea-Land Services,
Inc., 566 U. S. ___, (2012). ANILCA repeatedly recognized that
Alaska is different, and ANILCA itself accordingly carves out
numerous Alaska-specific exceptions to the Park Service’s general
authority over federally managed preservation areas. Those
Alaska-specific provisions reflect the simple truth that Alaska is
often the exception, not the rule. Yet the reading below would
prevent the Park Service from recognizing Alaska’s unique
conditions. Under that reading, the Park Service could regulate
“non-public” lands in Alaska only through rules applicable outside
Alaska as well. The Court concluded that, whatever the reach of
the Park Service’s authority under ANILCA, Section 103(c) did
not adopt such a “topsy-turvy” approach. Pp. 12–14.
(b) Moreover, it is clear that Section 103(c) draws a distinction
between “public” and “non-public” lands within the boundaries of
conservation system units in Alaska. And yet, according to the
court below, if the Park Service wanted to differentiate between
that “public” and “non-public” land in an Alaska-specific way, it
would have to regulate the “non-public” land pursuant to rules
applicable outside Alaska, and the “public” land pursuant
to Alaska-specific provisions. Assuming the Park Service has
authority over “non-public” land in Alaska (an issue the Court does
not decide), the Court concludes that this is an implausible reading
of the statute. The Court therefore rejects the interpretation of
Section 103(c) adopted by the court below. Pp. 14–15.
(c) The Court does not reach the remainder of the parties’
arguments. In particular, it does not decide whether the Nation
River qualifies as “public land” for purposes of ANILCA. It also
does not decide whether the Park Service has authority under
Section 100751(b) to regulate Sturgeon’s activities on the Nation
River, even if the river is not “public” land, or whether—as
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Sturgeon argues—any such authority is limited by ANILCA.
Finally, the Court does not consider whether the Park Service has
authority under ANILCA over both “public” and “non-public”
lands within the boundaries of conservation system units in Alaska,
to the extent a regulation is written to apply specifically to both
types of land. 768 F. 3d 1066, vacated and remanded.
4.

United States v. Bryant

No. 15-420, 195 L. Ed. 2d 317, 2016 U.S. LEXIS 3775 (U.S.
Jun. 13, 2016). Respondent Michael Bryant, Jr., has multiple
tribal-court convictions for domestic assault. When convicted,
Bryant was indigent and was not appointed counsel. For most of
his convictions, he was sentenced to terms of imprisonment not
exceeding one year’s duration. Because of his short prison terms,
the prior tribal-court proceedings complied with ICRA, and his
convictions were therefore valid when entered. Based on domestic
assaults he committed in 2011, Bryant was indicted on two counts
of domestic assault by a habitual offender, in violation of § 117(a).
Represented in federal court by appointed counsel, he
contended that the Sixth Amendment precluded use of his prior,
uncounseled, tribal-court misdemeanor convictions to satisfy
§ 117(a)’s predicate-offense element and moved to dismiss the
indictment. The District Court denied the motion; Bryant pleaded
guilty, reserving the right to appeal. The Ninth Circuit reversed the
conviction and directed dismissal of the indictment.
It comprehended that Bryant’s uncounseled tribal-court
convictions were valid when entered because the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel does not apply in tribal-court
proceedings. It held, however, that Bryant’s tribal court
convictions could not be used as predicate convictions within
§ 117(a)’s compass because they would have violated the Sixth
Amendment had they been rendered in state or federal court.
Holdings: (1) Indian tribal court convictions for domestic
assault were sufficient to convict a defendant of the federal felony
offense of domestic assault in Indian country by an habitual
offender, even though the defendant had no right to the assistance
of counsel in the tribal court based on his limited terms of
imprisonment, since the convictions were valid under tribal law
and remained valid when invoked to convict and sentence the

381

American Indian Law Journal

[Vol. 5:308

defendant as an habitual offender in the subsequent proceeding.
(2) Invoking the tribal court convictions did not constitute a denial
of due process since the tribal court accorded the defendant
specific procedural safeguards, and proceedings in compliance
with tribal civil rights sufficiently ensured reliability of tribal court
convictions. Judgment reversed.
5.

Dollar General Corporation v. Mississippi Band of
Choctaw Indians

No. 13-1496, 2016 U.S. LEXIS 4056 (U.S. Jun. 26, 2016). The
judgment was affirmed by an equally divided Court on June 26,
2016. Issues: Do Indian tribal courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate
civil tort claims against non-members, including as a means of
regulating the conduct of non-members who enter into consensual
relationships with a tribe or its members? Holding Below:
Dolgencorp, Inc. v. the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 746
F.3d 167.
The court affirmed the district court’s judgment that the
corporation’s consensual relationship with John Doe gives rise to
tribal court jurisdiction over Doe’s tort claims under Montana v.
United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981). In Montana, the United States
Supreme Court recognized that a tribe may regulate the activities
of nonmembers who enter into consensual relationships with the
tribe or its members through commercial dealing, contracts, leases
or other arrangements. It is surely within the tribe’s regulatory
authority to insist that a child working for a local business not be
sexually assaulted by the employees of the business. The fact that
the regulation takes the form of a tort duty that may be vindicated
by individual tribe members in tribal court makes no difference.
II. OTHER COURTS
A. Administrative Law
1.

County of Amador v. United States Dept. of the Interior, et
al.

No. 2:12-01710, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133482 (E.D. Cal.
Sept. 29, 2015). The matter was before the Court on Cross Motions
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for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiff County of Amador
(“Plaintiff”); Defendants the United States Department of the
Interior (the “Department”), S.M.R. Jewell, and Kevin Washburn;
and the Ione Band of Miwok Indians (“Defendant Intervenors”).
This lawsuit presented a challenge to the Record of Decision
(“ROD”), issued on May 24, 2012, by Donald Laverdure, Acting
Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs, Department of the Interior,
concerning the acquisition of the Plymouth Parcels property in
trust for the Ione Band of Miwok Indians, in anticipation of the
construction of a gaming-resort complex.
Plaintiff challenged: the Department’s determination to take
the Plymouth Parcels into trust; the determination that the Ione
Band is a “recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction,”
25 U.S.C. § 479; and the determination that the trust acquisition
constitutes the “restoration of lands for an Indian tribe that is
restored to Federal recognition,” 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(B), such
that the property is gaming-eligible. Defendants and Defendant
Intervenors responded that the ROD is procedurally and
substantively valid. The complaint contained four causes of action.
Claims one and two sought declaratory and injunctive relief under
the Indian Reorganization Act that the Department’s determination
– that the Ione Band was “under federal jurisdiction” in June 1934
– constitutes an abuse of discretion and is arbitrary, capricious, and
contrary to law. Claims three and four sought declaratory and
injunctive relief under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act that the
Department’s “Indians Lands” determination – including that the
“restored lands for a restored tribe provision” is met – constitutes
an abuse of discretion and is arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to
law.
The court found that the ROD demonstrates consideration was
given to the applicable statutory and regulatory framework, and to
the Ione Band’s relationship with the federal government
throughout the 20th century, in reaching the determination that the
restored lands provision is met. The Court did not find the
Department’s conclusion – that the acquisition constitutes the
“restoration of lands for an Indian tribe that is restored to Federal
recognition,” 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(B)(iii) – was arbitrary,
capricious, unlawful, or an abuse of discretion. The court denied
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and granted both

383

American Indian Law Journal

[Vol. 5:308

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendant
Intervenors’ Motion for Summary Judgment.
2.

Alto, et al. v. Jewell

No. 11-cv-2276, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133540 (S.D. Cal.
Sept. 30, 2015). This action arose from the approval of a
recommendation from the Enrollment Committee of the San
Pasqual Band of Diegueño Mission Indians (“San Pasqual Band”
or “Band”) to disenroll the named plaintiffs from the Band’s
membership roll. Pending before the Court were the parties’ crossmotions for summary judgment. Plaintiffs filed a complaint
seeking, among other things, judicial review of the Assistant
Secretary’s 2011 Decision under the APA and the arbitrary-andcapricious standard.
Shortly after the action began, the Court granted Plaintiffs’
motion for a preliminary injunction, restraining and enjoining
Defendants from removing Plaintiffs from the San Pasqual Band’s
membership roll and from taking any further action to implement
the Assistant Secretary’s 2011 Decision for the duration of this
lawsuit. The Court also enjoined the Assistant Secretary from
issuing certain interim orders. In the First Amended Complaint
(“FAC”), Plaintiffs asserted five claims to set aside the Assistant
Secretary’s 2011 Decision: (1) declaratory relief based upon the
doctrine of res judicata; (2) declaratory relief on the basis that
Defendant Echo Hawk violated the enrolled Plaintiffs’ right to
procedural due process; (3) declaratory relief and reversal of the
2011 Decision based upon the arbitrary-and-capricious standard;
(4) “federal agency action unlawfully withheld and request for
preliminary injunctive relief”; and (5) “declaratory and injunctive
relief by all Plaintiffs against all Defendants[.]”
After the Court granted the San Pasqual Band the limited right
to intervene, the Band pursued an interlocutory appeal to the Ninth
Circuit. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the Court’s determination that
it had jurisdiction to review the Assistant Secretary’s disenrollment
decision and that the San Pasqual Band is not an indispensable
party. Alto v. Black, 738 F.3d 1111, 1131 (9th Cir. 2013). The
Ninth Circuit also remanded to “allow the district court formally to
clarify the original injunction to conform with the [Ninth Circuit’s]
understanding of the injunction,” which was eventually resolved
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by the parties. The court found that the record strongly suggests
that the San Pasqual Band has engaged in a relentless battle to
disenroll Marcus Alto, Sr. and his descendants from the very
beginning. For the most part, that battle appeared to be one that
Plaintiffs were winning all the way up to the Regional Director’s
November 2008 decision. Then suddenly, in a complete about face,
the Assistant Secretary reversed the Regional Director’s decision,
found in favor of the Band, and followed the recommendation to
disenroll Marcus Alto, Sr.’s descendants. However, the Court’s
role in this situation is “not to substitute its judgment for that of the
agency,” but rather to examine whether there is a “rational
connection between the facts found and the choice made” by the
agency. Bonneville Power, 477 F.3d at 687 (quoting State Farm,
463 U.S. at 43).
Plaintiffs expended considerable effort to identify facts in the
record either unmentioned, potentially ignored, or devalued, but as
the Court has repeatedly stated, it “must defer to a reasonable
agency action ‘even if the administrative record contains evidence
for and against its decision.’” Modesto Irrigation, 619 F.3d at 1036
(quoting Trout Unlimited, 559 F.3d at 958). The failure to address
the substantial deference afforded to agency decisions, particularly
for factual determinations, was a recurring flaw in Plaintiffs’
reasoning. See Arkansas, 503 U.S. at 112; Melkonian, 320 F.3d at
1065. Under the standard prescribed by 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A),
which is highly deferential to the agency, Plaintiffs failed to meet
their burden to demonstrate that the Assistant Secretary’s decision
is in any way “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law.” See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A);
San Luis & Delta-Mendota, 747 F.3d at 601.
Plaintiffs also failed to demonstrate that the Assistant
Secretary’s decision is not supported by “substantial evidence.”
See Love Korean Church, 549 F.3d at 754; Bear Lake Watch, 324
F.3d at 1076. Upon the Court’s review of the 2011 Decision, the
Court found that the Assistant Secretary articulated a rational
relationship between his factual findings and conclusions. See
Fence Creek Cattle, 602 F.3d at 1132.
In light of the foregoing, the Court denied Plaintiffs’ motion
for summary judgment, and granted Defendants’ cross-motion for
summary judgment. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Assistant
Secretary’s 2011 Decision “revers[ing] the decision made by the
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Pacific Regional Director on November 26, 2008” and concluding
that “the enrollment of the Marcus Alto Sr.[] descendants was
based on information subsequently determined to be inaccurate
and, as a result, their names must be deleted from the Band’s roll.”
3.

No Casino in Plymouth v. Jewell

No. 2:12-cv-01748, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134375 (E.D. Cal.
Sept. 30, 2015). The matter was before the Court on cross motions
for summary judgment brought by Plaintiffs No Casino in
Plymouth and Citizens Equal Rights Alliance’s (“Plaintiffs”);
Federal Defendants John Rydzik, the United States Department of
Interior, Amy Dutschke, Tracie Stevens, Kevin Washburn, the
National Indian Gaming Commission, Paula Hart, and Sally Jewell
(“Defendants”); and Defendant Intervenors the Ione Band of
Miwok Indians (“Defendant Intervenors”).
This lawsuit presents a challenge to the Record of Decision
(“ROD”), issued by Donald Laverdure, Acting Assistant Secretary
of Indian Affairs, concerning the acquisition of the Plymouth
Parcels property in trust for the Ione Band of Miwok Indians, in
anticipation of the construction of a gaming-resort complex.
Claim 1 in the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) alleged that
the Secretary of the Interior lacks the authority to take land into
trust for the Ione Band because it was not a “recognized tribe now
under Federal jurisdiction” in 1934 when the IRA was enacted. 25
U.S.C. § 479. Claim 2 in the FAC alleged that the Department
failed to comply with its regulations, 25 C.F.R. §§ 151.10, 151.11,
and 151.13, when it reviewed and approved the ROD. Claim 4
stated that: Lands taken in trust acquired after October 17, 1988,
are not gaming eligible, 25 U.S.C. § 2719, unless an enumerated
exception applies. Here, the exception relied upon by the
Department is § 2719(b)(1)(B)(iii): “the restoration of lands for an
Indian tribe that is restored to Federal recognition.” Plaintiffs argue
simply that this exception is not applicable in this case. The Court
has considered this issue in its Order on the cross motions for
summary judgment, Case No. 1710 — particularly the “restored
tribe” part of section 2719(b)(1)(B)(iii) — and incorporates by
reference its analysis from that Order. Claim 5 in the FAC alleged
that the Department failed to comply with NEPA when it reviewed
and approved the fee-to-trust transfer and the casino project.
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Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged the Department did not adequately
consider the traffic, water quality, and air quality of the proposed
project. These negative impacts include: increases in traffic
congestion and safety concerns on rural road in the area, increases
in air pollution, increases in water pollution, the overuse of limited
water resources, and potential increase in crime. Plaintiff also
alleged the Final Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”)
wrongfully assumed that non-Indian interests did not require equal
consideration against the interests of the Ione Band when
considering the environmental impacts of the proposed project.
The Court found: With respect to the First Amended
Complaint, Claim 1, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment is
denied; Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is granted;
and Defendant Intervenors’ Motion for Summary Judgment is
granted. With respect to the First Amended Complaint, Claims 2
through 5, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is granted;
and Defendant Intervenors’ Motion for Summary Judgment is
granted.
4.

Hammond v. Jewell

No. 1:15-00391, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137141 (E.D. Cal.
Oct. 7, 2015). Plaintiff alleged he was ousted from the leadership
of the Picayune Rancheria of Chukchansi Indians Tribe in
violation of tribal law, and brought this suit against numerous
federal defendants seeking reinstatement to the Tribal Council.
Before the court was defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1), and for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6).
Plaintiff was elected to the Tribal Council of the Picayune
Rancheria of Chukchansi Indians Tribe in December 2008. After
initially suspending plaintiff from the Tribal Council for alleged
violations of the tribal Ethics Ordinance, the Tribal Council
permanently removed him on June 17, 2011 after a hearing.
Following the December 3, 2011 election, three factions were
embroiled in a power struggle over tribal leadership, resulting in
legal disputes in the Tribal Court and even violence. Plaintiff was
not a member of any of the factions and it does not appear that
their leadership disputes were related to plaintiff’s removal from
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the Tribal Council. Asserting conflicting claims of leadership, all
three factions submitted contracts under the Indian SelfDetermination and Education Assistance Act (“ISDEAA”) to the
Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”).
The BIA Superintendent returned the contract requests from all
three factions and concluded it would recognize the results of the
disputed December 1, 2012 election. All three factions appealed
the Superintendent’s decision and the BIA Regional Director
affirmed the decision to return all three contract requests, but
vacated the decision to recognize the results of the disputed
election because the BIA did not have “the authority to determine
which of the opposing factions[‘] interpretation of the Tribe’s law
is correct.” The Regional Director determined that “recognition of
a government is essential for the purpose of contracting under the
ISDEAA and that the BIA “will conduct business, on an interim
basis, with the last uncontested Tribal Council elected December
2010.” The Regional Director did not identify plaintiff as a
member of that Tribal Council because “[t]he record reflects that
Nokomis Hernandez was appointed by the Tribal Council to
replace Patrick Hammond, III.”
Two factions and plaintiff appealed that decision to the BIA
Office of Hearings and Appeals and a two-judge panel concluded
that exigent circumstances justified making the Regional
Director’s decision to recognize the 2010 Tribal Council “for
government-to-government purposes” effective immediately.
Although plaintiff had appealed “the Regional Director’s
acceptance of his subsequent removal from the Council and
replacement,” the panel did not address the merits of that dispute in
its decision.
The court found that a plaintiff cannot simply sue the federal
government in an attempt to avoid tribal immunity with respect to
intra-tribal affairs; and that the Tribal Council removed plaintiff
from his leadership position and plaintiff’s avenue to challenge
that action remains with the Tribe. Since the court lacks
jurisdiction to hear plaintiff’s § 1983 and ICRA claims, and
plaintiff failed to allege a cognizable claim under the APA over
which the court could exercise jurisdiction, the court granted
defendants’ motion to dismiss.
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Tohono O’odham Nation v. City of Glendale

No. 11-16811, No. 11-16833, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 19407
(9th Cir. Nov. 6, 2015). This appeal involved a dispute concerning
135 acres of unincorporated land within Maricopa County, Arizona
that was purchased by Plaintiff, the Tohono O’odham Nation (the
Nation). The Nation filed suit against the City of Glendale and the
State of Arizona (collectively, Defendants), challenging the
constitutionality of H.B. 2534, a law passed by the Arizona
legislature that allows a city or town within populous counties to
annex certain surrounding, unincorporated lands.
The Nation alleged that H.B. 2534 was enacted to block the
federal government from taking the 135 acres it purchased into
trust on behalf of the Nation—a process that would render the land
part of the Nation’s reservation pursuant to the Gila Bend Indian
Reservation Lands Replacement Act, Pub. L. No. 99-503, 100 Stat.
1798 (1986) (the Act). The Nation asserted that H.B. 2534 is
preempted by the Act, violates the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses of the United States and Arizona Constitutions,
and violates the Arizona Constitution’s prohibition against special
legislation. The parties filed cross summary judgment motions.
The district court ruled in favor of the Nation as to the federal
preemption claim, and ruled in favor of Defendants as to the
remaining claims. The appellate court found that the district court
properly concluded that H.B. 2534, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 9-471.04 was
preempted by the Gila Bend Indian Reservation Lands
Replacement Act (Act). At the very moment the Tohono O’odham
Nation filed an application with the Secretary of the Interior to take
any of the Replacement Lands into trust, the city was permitted,
pursuant to H.B. 2534, to annex the same land by either a majority
vote of the governing body or by two-thirds vote of the governing
body, in which case the annexation became immediately operative.
The city had the authority, at the point when the Nation filed a trust
application, to preemptively annex unincorporated land and
effectively block the trust application, and this barred the Nation’s
effort to incorporate purchased land into tribal land. Judgment
affirmed.
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Tuttle v. Jewell

No. 13-365, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31398 (D.D.C. Mar. 11,
2016). Plaintiff William Tuttle leased restricted Indian land in
Riverside County, California, for a term of 50 years. The land is
owned by the United States in trust for the Colorado River Indian
Tribes. In 2010, the Bureau of Indian Affairs terminated the lease,
finding that Mr. Tuttle had violated several of its provisions. The
termination decision was affirmed by the Interior Board of Indian
Appeals. The Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Interior Board of
Indian Appeals are constituent agencies of the Department of
Interior. Plaintiff sued the Secretary of the Interior, in her official
capacity, complaining that the agency’s decision to terminate was
arbitrary and capricious, in violation of both the Indian Long-Term
Leasing Act and the terms of the Lease itself. The Court concluded
that the agency acted reasonably on the record before it and within
its authority. The Secretary’s motion for summary judgment was
granted.
7.

Bruette v. Jewell

No. 15-2897, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 5827 (7th Cir. Mar. 30,
2016). Felix Bruette appealed from a dismissal of his suit for lack
of jurisdiction. Bruette’s complaint alleged that as a great-greatgrandson of Gardner, he was entitled to his share of benefits that
Congress promised to Gardner in the 1893 statute. The Department
is disregarding that Act, the complaint continues, and is thereby
breaching its fiduciary duties by not establishing an official list of
tribe beneficiaries. At a hearing Bruette expanded these
allegations. He explained that he represents descendants of those
who signed the 1856 Treaty, but whom Congress excluded from its
benefits under a law enacted 15 years later. Congress, Bruette
continued, recognized that it had wrongly excluded many who
signed the 1856 Treaty from receiving tribal benefits required by
the Treaty. It therefore passed in 1893 an act to remedy that
situation. But, Bruette concluded, the Department never completed
the required tribal membership “roll” that would have treated
Gardner’s descendants as members of the tribe contemplated by
the 1856 Treaty.
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Bruette sought an order requiring that the Department of the
Interior follow an 1893 law involving the Stockbridge and Munsee
Indians. At a hearing Bruette clarified his principal demand: He
wants the Department to recognize that descendants (including
him) of Stephen Gardner, a signor of an 1856 Treaty between the
Stockbridge and Munsee Indians and the United States, belong to
the tribe recognized in the Treaty. The district court dismissed the
suit based on several incurable defects. Because Bruette had not
developed an argument to disturb the district court’s decision, we
dismiss his appeal.
8.

Timbisha Shoshone Tribe v. United States DOI

No. 13-16182, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 9713 (9th Cir. May 27,
2016). An appeal of decisions made by the Department of the
Interior regarding a leadership dispute among factions of the
Timbisha Shoshone Tribe was mooted by the Tribe’s adoption of a
new constitution. There was no possibility that the agency would
change its decision that certain members were improperly excluded
from the Tribe, as the disenrolled members clearly qualified for
membership under the new constitution. Appeal dismissed.
9.

Caddo Nation of Okla. v. Wichita & Affiliated Tribes

No. CIV-16-0559, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70554 (W.D. Okla.
May 31, 2016). Plaintiff Caddo Nation of Oklahoma (“Caddo
Nation”) filed this action against defendants Wichita and Affiliated
Tribes (“Wichita Tribe), Terri Parton, President of the Wichita
Tribe, and other elected officials of the Wichita Tribe, seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiff’s claims are based on its
concerns that defendant is building a history center on a site that
Caddo elders believe may hold the remains of Caddo ancestors and
cultural artifacts. Plaintiff asserted the land on which the center is
being built is held jointly in trust by the United States for the
Caddo Nation, the Wichita Tribe and the Delaware Nation. It
contended defendants have violated the Administrative Procedures
Act, the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), and the
National Historic Preservation Act (“NHPA”). A hearing on the
motion was held on May 27, 2016, at which plaintiff argued that
defendants failed to comply with obligations under NEPA and
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NHPA. Plaintiff also asserted that defendants had begun to pour
the concrete floor for the history center and claimed that, once
completed, the concrete would prevent it from being able to
conduct the ground-penetrating radar tests required to determine
whether any human remains, funerary objects or cultural items are
located at the building site.
The court concluded at the end of the hearing that, due to the
unusual circumstances presented by the case, a short TRO was
warranted to maintain the status quo for a brief period. The parties
were directed to file a statement regarding the status of the
construction site. Because the pouring of the floor has not been
completed, it appears the testing plaintiff sought to perform is still
possible. Based on the record before it, the court concluded that the
Wichita Tribe fulfilled its consultation responsibilities under
NHPA. Plaintiff did not meet its burden of showing a violation of
the Act. Having concluded that plaintiff failed to demonstrate it is
likely to succeed on the merits of its claim that defendants violated
the APA by their noncompliance with NEPA or NHPA, the court
vacated the TRO previously entered and denied plaintiff’s motion
for TRO.
10.

Cayuga Nation v. Tanner

Nos. 15-1667 and 15-1937, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 10007 (2d
Cir. Jun. 2, 2016). Plaintiffs-Appellants, the Cayuga Nation, a
federally recognized Indian tribe, and individual officers,
employees, and representatives of the Cayuga Nation, filed this
action in the District Court against the Village of Union Springs,
the Board of Trustees of the Village, and individual Village
officials, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs
contend that the federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C.
§§ 2701-2721, preempts the defendants’ efforts to enforce a local
anti-gambling ordinance against a gaming facility located on land
owned by Cayuga Nation.
The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that it
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case because it could
not determine, in light of an ongoing leadership dispute within
Cayuga Nation, whether the lawsuit was authorized as a matter of
tribal law. Following a motion for reconsideration, the district
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court additionally held that the individual plaintiffs lacked
Article III standing to sue in their own right.
On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the district court had
jurisdiction because the Bureau of Indian Affairs had recognized
Clint Halftown, who initiated this suit, as the Cayuga Nation’s
“federal representative,” thereby relieving the court of the need to
resolve questions of tribal law, and because the individual
plaintiffs had standing to challenge the anti-gaming ordinance. We
agree and therefore vacate the district court’s order dismissing the
complaint and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
11.

Akiachak Native Cmty. v. United States DOI

No. 13-5360, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 12121 (D.C. Cir. Jul. 1,
2016). Holdings: (1) Where several Indian Tribes sued the United
States Department of Interior challenging a regulation
implementing certain settled land claims staked by descendants of
Alaskan aboriginal Tribes, and where after a district court held that
the Department’s interpretation was contrary to law, the
Department, following notice and comment, revised its regulations
and dismissed its appeal, the appeal of the State of Alaska, which
had intervened in the district court as a party defendant but brought
no independent claim for relief, was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction because the controversy between the Tribes and the
Department was moot. (2) The underlying controversy was moot
under U.S. Const. art. III, § 2 because the Department’s new
regulation resolved the underlying claim by removing the Alaska
exception from its land-into-trust regulations and there was no
longer a live controversy. Decision vacated; appeal dismissed.
12.

Aguayo v. Jewell

No. 14-56909, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 12587 (9th Cir. Jul. 8,
2016). The Pala Band is a federally-recognized Indian tribe located
in northern San Diego County. The Secretary of the Interior
created the Pala Reservation in the late nineteenth century,
pursuant to the Mission Indian Relief Act of 1891.
Notwithstanding its decision to vote against the Indian
Reorganization Act in 1934, the Pala Band chose to organize its
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government. In 1960, it adopted Articles of Association as the
Band’s governing document. The Articles created an Executive
Committee, comprised of six elected officers, and a General
Council, which included all adult members of the tribe. The
Articles granted the General Council the power “[t]o enact
ordinances . . . governing future membership, loss of membership
and adoption of members into the Band.”
Shortly thereafter, the General Council enacted a membership
ordinance (the 1961 Ordinance), pursuant to the authority granted
to it in the Articles. Under the 1961 Ordinance, a person seeking
membership in the Band would apply to the Executive Committee,
which would make a report and recommendation to the Regional
Director of the BIA. In other words, pursuant to the Articles of
Association and the 1961 Ordinance, the Executive Committee
made recommendations, but the BIA was granted ultimate
authority over whether an applicant was enrolled.
Plaintiffs are descendants of Margarita Britten (Margarita), a
Pala Indian who was born in 1856. Their eligibility to be enrolled
as members of the Pala Band depends on whether Margarita was a
full- or half-blooded Pala Indian. Margarita was originally
considered to be one-half Pala Indian, and thus her great-greatgrandchildren did not have the minimum 1/16 blood quantum to be
eligible for membership in the Band.
The first eligibility dispute regarding Margarita’s descendants
proceeded pursuant to the 1961 Ordinance. In 1984, the General
Council concluded that the evidence suggesting that Margarita was
actually a full-blooded Pala Indian was more accurate, and voted to
change her status accordingly. The General Council’s
recommendation was sent to a BIA Regional Director, Tom
Dowell, who recommended against enrolling her descendants
because there was insufficient evidence to establish Margarita’s
blood quantum. Director Dowell’s decision was appealed to the
Assistant Secretary-Indian Affairs in 1989, who reversed that
finding and concluded that Margarita should be considered a fullblooded Pala Indian. Pursuant to the 1961 Ordinance, the
Executive Committee was then compelled to add Margarita’s
great-great-grandchildren, with the requisite 1/16 blood quantum,
to the Band’s membership rolls.
In subsequent proceedings, based on new evidence, the
Assistant Secretary-Indian Affairs concluded that Margarita was
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one-half Pala, leading to disenrollment. But the AS-IA aptly noted
that “in the exercise of sovereignty and self-governance, tribes
have the right, like other governments, to make good decisions,
bad decisions, and decisions with which others may disagree.” The
federal government does not interfere in those decisions in the
absence of specific authority to do so. The district court’s grant of
summary judgment, upholding the decision of the AS-IA, is
affirmed.

13.

Patchak v. Jewell

No. 15-5200, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 12984 (D.C. Cir. Jul. 15,
2016). David Patchak brought this suit under the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 705, challenging the authority of
the Department of the Interior to take title to a particular tract of
land under the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), 25 U.S.C. § 465.
The land, called the Bradley Property, had been put into trust for
the use of the Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi
Indians in Michigan, otherwise known as the Gun Lake Band or
the Gun Lake Tribe.
Following the Supreme Court’s determination in 2012 that Mr.
Patchak had prudential standing to bring this lawsuit, see Match-EBe-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 132
S. Ct. 2199, 2212, 183 L. Ed. 2d 211 (2012), Congress passed the
Gun Lake Trust Land Reaffirmation Act (the Gun Lake Act), Pub.
L. No. 113-179, 128 Stat. 1913 (2014), a stand-alone statute
reaffirming the Department of the Interior’s decision to take the
land in question into trust for the Gun Lake Tribe, and removing
jurisdiction from the federal courts over any actions relating to that
property. Taking into account this new legal landscape, the District
Court determined on summary judgment that it was stripped of its
jurisdiction to consider Mr. Patchak’s claim. Holding additionally
that the Act was not constitutionally infirm, as Mr. Patchak
contended, the District Court dismissed the case.
Mr. Patchak now appeals the dismissal of his suit. The court
held that: (1) Appellant landowner’s suit contesting appellee
Department of the Interior’s (Department) taking of land in trust
for appellee tribe failed because the Gun Lake Trust Land
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Reaffirmation Act (Act), Pub. L. No. 113-179, 128 Stat. 1913
(2014), permissibly removed federal jurisdiction, as the Act
constitutionally exercised Congress’s power to legislate as to
Indian tribes; (2) The Act did not violate the landowner’s right to
petition because Congress could withhold federal jurisdiction;
(3) The Act did not violate his due process rights because the
legislation provided all process that was due; (4) The Act was not a
U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 bill of attainder because its means were
rationally designed to meet its legitimate nonpunitive goals. The
Court granted the Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Judgment on
the Pleadings and denied the motions for preliminary injunctive
relief. Judgment affirmed.
14.

Mackinac Tribe v. Jewell

No. 15-5118, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 13140 (D.D.C. Jul. 19,
2016). Plaintiff-Appellant Mackinac Tribe brought an action in
federal district court to compel the Secretary of the Interior to
convene an election allowing the Tribe to organize under the
Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), 25 U.S.C. § 476(a). Although
the Mackinac Tribe does not appear on the Secretary’s list of
federally acknowledged tribes and has not been acknowledged
through the Secretary’s Part 83 process, the group alleges it is
federally recognized for IRA purposes because it is the historical
successor to a tribe the federal government previously recognized
via treaty. The district court reserved the question of whether
acknowledgment through Part 83 is a necessary prerequisite for
tribal organization under the IRA, finding instead that the
Mackinac Tribe failed to exhaust its administrative remedies by
first seeking acknowledgment through the Part 83 process. The
appellate court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment.
15.

Littlefield v. United States DOI

No. 16-10184, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98732 (D. Mass. Jul. 28,
2016). This case arises out of a decision of the Secretary of the
Department of the Interior (the “Secretary”) to acquire land in trust
for the benefit of the Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe (the
“Mashpees”) under Section 465 of the Indian Reorganization Act
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(“IRA”), 25 U.S.C. § 465. The Plaintiffs are residents of Taunton
who claim they are injured by the acquisition and planned
development of the land at issue. They have filed suit against the
Department of the Interior (the “Department”), the Bureau of
Indian Affairs (the “BIA”), Acting Assistant Secretary of Indian
Affairs Lawrence Roberts, and the United States (together, the
“government”), challenging the Secretary’s decision pursuant to
Section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”),
5 U.S.C. § 702. The parties make cross-motions for summary
judgment on the Plaintiffs’ first cause of action which involves the
Mashpees’ eligibility as beneficiaries under the IRA, and
correspondingly, the authority of the Secretary to take land into
trust for the Mashpees’ benefit.
The Mashpees are a federally recognized tribe that obtained
official acknowledgement from the BIA in 2007. Upon receiving
federal acknowledgement, the Mashpees filed a “fee-to-trust”
application with the BIA requesting that the Department acquire
tracts of land for the Mashpees’ use as a tribal reservation in
Mashpee and Taunton, Massachusetts. Of concern to the Plaintiffs
here is the Taunton site, which Taunton had designated for
economic development purposes. The Mashpees intend to
construct and operate a gaming resort on the Taunton site. On
September 18, 2015, the Secretary issued a written decision (the
“Secretary’s Decision” or “Record of Decision”) granting the
Mashpees’ fee-to-trust application. The Secretary specifically
found that “the Mashpee Tribe qualifies” – i.e., is “eligible to
receive land into trust under the IRA” – pursuant to the second
definition of “Indian” set forth in Section 479 of the IRA. The land
was subsequently taken into trust on November 10, 2015. The
Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the Secretary’s Decision and later
amended their complaint to include additional claims.
The Court rules that the second definition of “Indian” in
Section 479 of the IRA unambiguously incorporates the entire
antecedent phrase – that is, “such members” refers to “members of
any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction.” Thus,
no deference is due the Secretary’s interpretation. In light of the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of “now under Federal jurisdiction”
to mean under Federal jurisdiction in June 1934, the Secretary
lacked the authority to acquire land in trust for the Mashpees, as
they were not then under Federal jurisdiction. The matter is
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remanded to the Secretary for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
16.
Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde Cmty. of Or. v.
Jewell
No. 14-5326 Consolidated with 15-5033, 2016 U.S. App.
LEXIS 13779 (D.C. Cir. Jul. 29, 2016). Holdings: Where
appellants brought challenges under Administrative Procedure Act
to Interior Secretary’s decision to take certain land into trust for
Cowlitz Indian Tribe, Secretary reasonably interpreted and applied
Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) to conclude that Cowlitz was
recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction because
tribe only had to be recognized as of time Department acquired
land into trust. Secretary reasonably determined that Cowlitz met
“initial-reservation” exception to Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
(IGRA) because substantial evidence amply showing that Interior
found Cowlitz parcel to be within broader area of historical
significance to Tribe. Appellants’ remaining claims of error under
the IRA and NEPA based on Secretary’s alleged failure to
independently verify Tribe’s business plan and membership figures
were without merit. Judgment affirmed.
B.
1.

Child Welfare Law and ICWA

Jennifer L. v. State Department of Health and Social
Services

No. S –15646, 357 P.3d 110, 2015 WL 5062023 (Alaska
Aug. 28, 2015). After Office of Children’s Services (OCS) took
three minor children into emergency custody, a standing master
determined that no probable cause existed and recommended that
children be returned to mother’s custody. Following remand from
the Supreme Court, 2014 WL 1888190, the Superior Court rejected
recommendation and determined that probable cause existed.
Mother appealed and Superior Court dismissed underlying case
before State could file brief. The Supreme Court held that:
(1) public interest exception to mootness doctrine applied, and
(2) standing master’s order that children should be returned to
parents was not effective until judicially reviewed.
2.

K.P. v. Michelle T.
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No. D067797, 2015 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 8073 (Cal. App.
4th Dist. Nov. 10, 2015). Michelle T., a member of the Pala Band
of Mission Indians, contended that the juvenile court violated the
Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq. and §
66.26 of the Welfare and Institutions Code under by terminating
her parental rights to her children, K.P. and Kristopher P.
Throughout most of their dependency cases, K.P. and
Kristopher were eligible for membership, or were enrolled, in the
Pala Band of Mission Indians (Pala Band). At the children’s first §
366.26 hearing, the Pala Band did not consent to the children’s
adoption and the juvenile court ordered a plan of guardianship.
Several years later, when the children’s cases proceeded to a
second § 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court learned that the Pala
Band of Mission Indians had disenrolled K.P. and Kristopher, and
others, on the ground that they lacked the blood quantum necessary
for membership.
Michelle argued that in view of a pending appeal in the Ninth
Circuit challenging the validity of the Pala Band’s enrollment
ordinance that resulted in the disenrollment of K.P. and Kristopher
and the others, the juvenile court erred when it found that K.P. and
Kristopher were not Indian children within the meaning of the
ICWA and declined to apply ICWA’s substantive and procedural
protections at the children’s second § 366.26 hearings. Michelle
also argued that enrollment in a tribe is not required to be
considered an Indian child, and that the Pala Band did not provide
written confirmation that enrollment is a prerequisite for Pala Band
membership.
The appellate court concluded that the juvenile court correctly
ruled that the Indian tribe has the sole authority to determine its
own membership and that the juvenile court must defer to the
membership decisions of an Indian tribe. Under federal and state
law, the Indian tribe’s membership determination is conclusive.
The record shows that enrollment is a prerequisite for Pala Band
membership, and that the Pala Band determined that K.P. and
Kristopher are not members of its tribe and that the juvenile court
did not err when it determined that K.P. and Kristopher are not
Indian children within the meaning of the ICWA and terminated
parental rights without applying ICWA’s heightened substantive
and procedural protections. The appellate court affirmed.
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In re K.M.

No. G051656, 2015 WL 7352048 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 20,
2015). In a dependency proceeding, the Superior Court, No.
DP024561, terminated parental rights to child. Mother and father
appealed. While the matter was still pending on appeal, the
Superior Court issued a post-judgment order finding that the
county child welfare agency complied with the Indian Child
Welfare Act (ICWA). The appellate court held that juvenile court
lacked jurisdiction to rule on the ICWA issue following its
termination of parental rights.
4.

Gila River Indian Cmty. v. Dep’t of Child Safety

No. 1 CA-JV 15-0178, 2015 Ariz. App. LEXIS 294, 727 Ariz.
Adv. Rep. 28 (Ariz. Ct. App. Dec. 8, 2015). The Gila River Indian
Community (the Community) appealed the denial of its motion to
change physical custody of a dependent Indian child in foster care.
The Community challenged the juvenile court’s determination that
good cause exists to deviate from placement preferences set forth
in the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The Community argued
the juvenile court erred by refusing to move the child to an
available ICWA-preferred placement. The Community further
contended the good cause determination is not supported by
sufficient evidence.
The appellate court held that good cause to deviate from the
Indian Child Welfare Act placement preferences must be
established by clear and convincing evidence. While the trial court
cited the child’s bond with her foster family and expert opinions in
ordering a deviation from the Act, remand was required because it
was not apparent that the trial court applied the clear and
convincing standard to its good cause determination that deviation
from the Act’s placement preferences was appropriate. Vacated
and remanded.
5.

In re Amy J.

No. A145782, 2016 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1243 (Cal. Ct.
App. Feb. 18, 2016). Amy J., an Indian child and dependent of the
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Humboldt County juvenile court pursuant to Welfare and
Institutions Code section 300, appeals from that court’s order
authorizing respondent Humboldt County Department of Health &
Human Services (Department) to place her as requested by her
Indian tribe with a Butte County family that was caring for, and in
the process of adopting, her sister. Amy, one year old when the
court issued its order, was bonded and thriving with Humboldt
County foster parents who had cared for her since she was two
days old and wanted to adopt her. Amy argues the order must be
reversed for three reasons: (1) regardless of the court’s
characterization of it as a foster care placement order, it was in fact
an order for her adoptive placement and, as such, violated the
Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) adoptive placement preferences;
(2) even if construed as a foster care placement order, it should not
have issued because there was no tribal resolution and because
Amy showed good cause to deviate from the ICWA foster care
placement preferences; and (3) the order violated Amy’s
constitutional liberty interest in her family relationship with her
Humboldt County foster parents.
We conclude the court’s order was not for adoptive placement,
but instead authorized a change in Amy’s foster care placement,
and that Amy does not establish the court erred in issuing it.
Therefore, we affirm the order.
6.

State v. Joseph B. (In re Tavian B.)

No. S-15-129, 292 Neb. 804, 2016 Neb. LEXIS 24 (Neb.
Feb 19, 2016). Tavian B. was found to be a child who lacks proper
parental care by reason of the fault or habits of his parents and to
be in a situation dangerous to life or limb or injurious to his health
or morals. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-247(3)(a) (Reissue 2008).
Approximately 16 months later, the State of Nebraska moved to
terminate the parental rights of both parents. The father then filed a
motion to transfer jurisdiction to the Oglala Sioux Tribal Juvenile
Court (Tribal Court) pursuant to the federal Indian Child Welfare
Act of 1978 (ICWA). See 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq. (2012).
Prior to the juvenile court’s ruling on the father’s motion
to transfer, the State withdrew its motion to terminate parental
rights. The court found that good cause existed to deny the request
to transfer jurisdiction to the tribal court, because the proceedings
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were in “an advanced stage.” The father appeals the juvenile
court’s order overruling his motion to transfer.
For the reasons stated below, we reverse the judgment of the
juvenile court and remand the cause with directions.
7.

State v. Central Council of Tlingit and Haida Indian Tribes
of Alaska

No. S-14935, 2016 WL 1168202 (Alaska Mar. 25, 2016).
Central Council of Tlingit and Haida Indian Tribes filed action
against state, seeking declaratory judgment that its tribal court
system had subject matter jurisdiction over child support matters
and seeking an injunction requiring the state’s child support
enforcement agency to recognize tribal courts’ child support
orders. The Superior Court entered judgment in favor of the tribes.
State appealed. The Supreme Court held that: (1) tribal courts have
inherent, non-territorial subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate
parents’ child support obligations, and (2) the power to set
nonmember parents’ child support obligations is within the
retained powers of membership-based inherent tribal sovereignty.
Affirmed.
8.

State v. Anthony S. (In re Abbie L.)

No. A-15-996, 2016 Neb. App. LEXIS 89 (Neb. Ct. App.
Apr. 26, 2016). In a case in which a father appealed from an order
of the juvenile court granting the continued temporary custody of
his child to the Nebraska Department of Health and Human
Services, the appellate court concluded that there was clearly
reason to believe the child was Indian. Accordingly, the Nebraska
Indian Child Welfare Act and the federal Indian Child Welfare Act
were applicable. Even if active efforts had been made to prevent or
eliminate the need for removal, there was still a deficiency under
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-1505(5) (Reissue 2008 & Supp. 2015).
Because the evidence at the protective custody hearing did not
include testimony of a qualified expert as required by § 431505(5), the juvenile court erred in continuing the child’s out-ofhome placement. Reversed and vacated.
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In re Alexandria P.

No. B270775, 2016 Cal. App. LEXIS 555 (Cal. Ct. App. Jul. 8,
2016). For the third time this case comes before us on the issue of
whether the lower court has correctly ordered an Indian child,
Alexandria P., to be placed with her extended family, Ken R. and
Ginger R. in Utah, after concluding that Alexandria’s foster
parents, de facto parents, Russell P. and Summer P., failed to prove
by clear and convincing evidence that there was good cause to
depart from the adoptive placement preferences set forth in the
Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA).
We have twice remanded the matter because the lower court
used an incorrect standard in assessing good cause. The
dependency court has now correctly applied the law governing
good cause, considering the bond Alexandria has developed over
time with the P.s, as well as a number of other factors related to her
best interests. Those other factors include Alexandria’s relationship
with her extended family and half-siblings; the capacity of her
extended family to maintain and develop her sense of self-identity,
including her cultural identity and connection to the Choctaw tribal
culture; and the P.s’ relative reluctance or resistance to foster
Alexandria’s relationship with her extended family or encourage
exploration of and exposure to her Choctaw cultural identity.
Because substantial evidence supports the court’s finding that
the P.s did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that there
was good cause to depart from the ICWA’s placement preferences,
we affirm.
10.

Renteria v. Shingle Springs Band of Miwok Indians

No. 2:16-cv-1685, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97608 (E.D. Cal. Jul
26, 2016). Through this lawsuit, Plaintiffs Efrim and Talisha
Renteria (“Plaintiffs”) seek to overturn Shingle Springs Band of
Miwok Indians Tribal Court’s ruling which appoints Defendant
Regina Cuellar as the legal guardian of Plaintiffs’ three nieces.
Their Complaint attacks the Tribal Court’s jurisdiction over the
custody proceedings in the first instance, and further alleges that
the Tribal Court custody proceedings violated Plaintiffs’ right to
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due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs are the
maternal great aunt and uncle of three young girls (“AC (older),”
“AC (younger),” and “NC,” collectively, “Minors”). The Minors’
parents were killed in a car accident on December 17, 2015. Their
late father was a member of the Shingle Springs Band of Miwok
Indians (“Tribe”), a federally recognized Indian tribe, but the
Minors resided and were domiciled with their parents in Visalia,
California. They have never resided or been domiciled on tribal
lands.
Plaintiffs cared for the Minors in the weeks following the
accident. On January 5, 2016, members of the children’s paternal
family appeared at Plaintiffs’ house in Visalia, thrust a copy of an
emergency order issued by the Tribal Court of the Shingle Springs
Band of Miwok Indians (“Tribal Court”) into Plaintiffs’ hands, and
forcibly removed AC (younger) and NC. On January 22, 2016, the
Tribal Court held a review hearing regarding guardianship,
appointed Plaintiffs as temporary guardians for the Minors, and
established a schedule of visitations for the paternal family.
Beginning in February 2016, the two older children repeatedly
reported that their paternal step-grandfather (“Joseph”) was
sexually abusing them during their visits. Plaintiffs reported the
abuse to the Visalia Police Department and the Tulare County
Health & Human Services Agency. The two older children
continued to report instances of sexual abuse by Joseph to these
social workers. After Plaintiffs made these reports, the Tribal
Court modified the visitation order such that Joseph was not to
have access to the minors.
On June 3, 2016, the Tribal Court appointed Defendant Regina
Cuellar as the Minors’ guardian effective June 12, 2016. At the
same time, the Tribal Court issued a visitation order that failed to
restrict Joseph’s access to the Minors.
The failure to restrict Joseph’s access to the Minors resulted in
yet another instance of alleged sexual abuse. Plaintiffs are
currently proceeding with a Petition Re Good Cause under
California Penal Code section 278.7 and California Family Code
section 3041 to retain temporary guardianship of the three minor
children in Tulare County Superior Court.
Plaintiffs’ Application for a Temporary Restraining Order is
granted. Defendants are enjoined from enforcing the Tribal Court’s
June 3, 2016 Order Appointing Guardian of Minors, and Plaintiffs
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are appointed temporary guardians of the three minor children who
are the subject of this action.
11.

Villarreal v. Villarreal

No. 04-15-00551-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 8272 (Tex. App.
Aug. 3, 2016). Richard Matthew Villarreal appeals the trial court’s
order dismissing the underlying cause. The trial court dismissed
the cause after finding a final divorce decree entered by a tribal
court divested the trial court of jurisdiction. We reverse the trial
court’s order and remand the cause for further proceedings.
The appellate court held that the trial court erred in concluding
the final divorce decree entered by the tribal court divested the trial
court of jurisdiction to determine custody because the wife filed
the original divorce petition in Texas, the Texas proceeding had
not been terminated and was not stayed, and, as such, the tribal
court could not exercise jurisdiction. The ICWA did not apply to
the Texas divorce proceeding because the definition of child
custody proceeding in the ICWA did not include divorce
proceedings, 25 U.S.C.S. § 1903(1), and, as such, Texas was the
children’s home state, and the trial court had jurisdiction to make
the initial child custody determination. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §
152.201(a). Order reversed; matter remanded.
12.

Gila River Indian Cmty. v Dep’t of Child Safety

No. 1 CA-JV 16-0038, 2016 Ariz. App. LEXIS 187 (Ariz. Ct.
App. Aug. 11, 2016). Following termination of the parental rights
of the biological parents of A.D., an Indian child and eligible
member of the Gila River Indian Community (“the Community”),
the Community moved for an order transferring jurisdiction of the
matter to its Children’s Court. The Maricopa County Juvenile
Court denied the motion, and the Community appealed. The
appellate court held that 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) of the Indian Child
Welfare Act (“ICWA”), which the Community argued requires
transfer, does not allow jurisdiction to be transferred after parental
rights have been terminated. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of
the motion to transfer jurisdiction.
13.

In re Nicholas E.
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No. A146946, 2016 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6132 (Cal. Ct.
App. Aug. 19, 2016). L.E. (mother) appeals from an order after
dispositional hearing removing her son from her custody and
adjudging him a dependent of the court. Mother contends the
Solano County Department of Health and Social Services
(Department) failed to comply with the notice requirements of the
Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.)
because its notice to the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) omitted
available family history information.
The dispositional order is affirmed, and the matter is remanded
to the juvenile court with directions to order the Department to
comply with the notice and inquiry provisions of ICWA. After
proper notice under ICWA, if it is determined that this child is an
Indian child and ICWA applies to these proceedings, mother is
entitled to petition the juvenile court to invalidate orders that
violated ICWA. (See 25 U.S.C. § 1914; Cal. Rules of Court, rule
5.486 (petition to invalidate orders).) Should any of the identified
tribes determine that the child is an Indian child, or other
information show the child to be an Indian child as defined by
ICWA, the juvenile court shall conduct new jurisdiction and
disposition hearings in conformity with ICWA.
14.

M.C. v. Superior Court of Cal. for L.A.

No. B272083, 2016 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6175 (Cal. Ct.
App. Aug. 23, 2016). In this juvenile dependency writ proceeding
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452), M.C. (mother) challenges an
order terminating reunification services and scheduling a hearing
for the selection and implementation of a permanent plan for her
daughter, J.S. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26). Mother’s sole
contention is that the juvenile court erred in terminating
reunification services because the Los Angeles County Department
of Children and Family Services (Department) failed to satisfy the
notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978
(ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.).
At the September 2014 detention hearing, mother declared she
may have Cherokee Indian ancestry and the court ordered the
Department to investigate the claim and provide the court with a
supplemental report.
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In a November 2014 jurisdiction/disposition report, the
Department stated that ICWA “does or may apply.” The
Department also provided a response it received from the
Cherokee Nation, stating that the information the Department
provided was incomplete and requesting that the Department
provide the middle names and dates of birth of both of J.S.’s
parents. The letter stated that “[i]t is impossible to validate or
invalidate this claim without [the requested] information.”
However, there is nothing in the record to confirm what
information, if any, was provided to the Cherokee Nation. The
Department concedes it failed to satisfy ICWA’s notice
requirements, and agrees the matter should be remanded to the
juvenile court to ensure compliance. Accordingly, we grant the
petition and remand with directions to effectuate proper notice
under the ICWA.
15.
In re A.B.
No. D069257, 2016 Cal. App. LEXIS 714 (Cal. Ct. App.
Aug. 24, 2015). Scott R. appeals from an order terminating his
parental rights to his biological daughter, A.B., under Family Code
section 7822 which authorizes the termination of rights of a parent
who “has left the child in the care and custody of the other parent
for a period of one year without any provision for the child’s
support, or without communication . . . with the intent . . . to
abandon the child.” (§ 7822, subd. (a)(3).) He contends that the
one-year statutory period refers only to the year immediately
preceding the filing of the petition for termination of parental
rights, which precludes its application to him. Alternatively, Scott
asserts that reversal is warranted in any event because (1) he
rebutted the presumption that he intended to abandon A.B., (2) the
termination of his rights was not in A.B.’s best interests and (3) the
juvenile court erred in determining that the Indian Child Welfare
Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) did not apply absent proof
that a tribe he identified actually received notice as required under
that statutory scheme.
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During the course of the proceeding, Scott submitted an
ICWA-030 form identifying four separate tribes with which A.B.
might be affiliated. Respondents mailed a copy of the form and
notice of the termination hearing to each of the tribes and filed a
copy of the notice, proof of service and counsel’s declaration with
the court. By the time of the hearing in August 2015, three of the
four tribes had responded, indicating that A.B. was not affiliated
with them.
At the continued hearing, the court was informed that no
response had been received from the United Keetoowah Band and,
with the assent of Scott and A.B., it made a finding that ICWA did
not apply. On appeal, Scott contends the court failed to comply
with ICWA’s notice provisions because there is no evidence the
United Keetoowah Band received actual notice of the proceeding
as the result of an error in the zip code used in sending the notice.
Scott is correct that the date of receipt of an ICWA notice, rather
than the date of its service, is the critical time for determining
whether ICWA applies in the absence of any tribal response.
However, this court has taken judicial notice of evidence that
the United Keetoowah Band actually received notice of these
proceedings several months prior to the termination hearing and
decided not to intervene. Although this evidence was not before
the juvenile court at the time of the continued hearing on the
termination petition and thus the court erred in finding ICWA
inapplicable, it nonetheless establishes that there is no reasonable
probability that Scott would have obtained a more favorable result
in the absence of error, as required to establish reversible error.
The order terminating parental rights is affirmed.
C. Contracting
1.

Grand Canyon Skywalk Dev., LLC v. Cieslak

Nos.2:15-01189 and 2:13-00596, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
107457 (D. Nev. Aug. 13, 2015). This matter was before the Court
on Gallagher & Kennedy, P.A. and The Hualapai Indian Tribe’s
(hereinafter “Gallagher & Kennedy”) Motion to Quash Plaintiff’s
Subpoena to Glen Hallman. This action arose out of a long-running
dispute relating to the Grand Canyon Skywalk (“Skywalk”) in
Case No. 2:13-cv-00596. Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants David

2017]

Case Law on American Indians: 2015-2016

408

John Cieslak, Nicholas Peter Scutari and Scutari & Cieslak Public
Relations, Inc. (hereinafter collectively referred to as “Scutari &
Cieslak”), together with individual members of the Hualapai Tribal
Council, conspired to conduct a public relations/news media
campaign to falsely accuse the Plaintiffs of having breached their
contracts with the Hualapai Tribe. The alleged purpose of the
conspiracy was to gain support for the Tribal Council’s enactment
of an eminent domain ordinance and the subsequent condemnation
of Plaintiffs’ contractual rights. Plaintiffs alleged that the Tribe
hired Scutari & Cieslak to formulate the public relations campaign
against Plaintiffs. As part of this campaign, Scutari & Cieslak, or
Tribal officials following scripts prepared by Scutari & Cieslak,
falsely stated that Plaintiffs breached their contract “to complete
certain critical elements of the Skywalk — including water, sewer
and electricity” when, in fact, it was the Tribe’s responsibility to
provide these elements. Defendants also allegedly made other
statements that impugned the honesty of Plaintiffs. Scutari &
Cieslak alleged as an affirmative defense that they acted in good
faith upon advice of counsel in making the allegedly defamatory
statements.
This Court previously denied Gallagher & Kennedy’s motion
to quash a subpoena duces tecum served by Defendants Scutari &
Cieslak which sought documents relating to communications
between Gallagher & Kennedy and Scutari & Cieslak. Gallagher &
Kennedy filed an objection to that order, which is currently
pending before the District Judge. The instant motion to quash
involves a deposition subpoena that Plaintiffs served on Glen
Hallman, an attorney who was formerly employed by Gallagher &
Kennedy. Plaintiffs stated that they seek only to question Mr.
Hallman about his communications with Scutari & Cieslak. They
do not seek to discover privileged communications between the
Tribe and Mr. Hallman. Gallagher & Kennedy stated that as part of
its representation of the Tribe, it recommended that the Tribe hire
Scutari & Cieslak to manage media contacts in connection with the
litigation. It also stated that Mr. Hallman was “an attorney assisting
the Tribe in carrying out its fundamental sovereign and legislative
powers, including the exercise of eminent domain and because this
role was in the nature of an official function involving matters of
internal governance, the Tribe’s immunity extends to him and the
Court has no jurisdiction to compel compliance with the subpoena.
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Gallagher & Kennedy also argued that Mr. Hallman’s
communications with Scutari & Cieslak are protected from
disclosure by the Tribe’s attorney-client privilege and by the
attorney work-product doctrine. The Court concluded that the
doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity does not preclude the taking
of the deposition of attorney Glen Hallman in regard to his
communications with Scutari & Cieslak.
The Court concluded, however, that confidential
communications in which Mr. Hallman provided legal advice to
Scutari & Cieslak regarding the statements that the latter
subsequently made about Plaintiffs are within the scope of the
Tribe’s attorney-client privilege. At the time such communications
occurred, Scutari & Cieslak was the functional equivalent of a
tribal employee and the legal advice appears to have been provided
with respect to its actions on behalf of the Tribe or its officers.
The factual record is insufficient to support a finding that the
Tribe waived its attorney-client or work-product privileges by
failing to assert them in a timely manner. Nor has this argument
been clearly raised by Plaintiffs or Scutari & Cieslak.
There is no indication that the parties wish to take Mr.
Hallman’s deposition if they cannot inquire into the legal advice he
allegedly gave Scutari & Cieslak with respect to the allegedly
defamatory statements. This order, however, does not preclude the
taking of Mr. Hallman’s deposition with respect to his knowledge
of relevant, non-privileged information.
Accordingly, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that Gallagher & Kennedy, P.A. and the
Hualapai Indian Tribe’s Motion to Quash Plaintiff’s Subpoena to
Glen Hallman (#1) is granted in accordance with the foregoing
provisions of this order. The granting of this motion is without
prejudice to the filing of a motion by Plaintiffs or Scutari &
Cieslak that the Hualapai Tribe waived its privileges by not
asserting them in a timely manner.
2.

Douglas Indian Ass’n v. Cent. Council of Tlingit & Haida
Indian Tribes

No. 1:15-cv-00004, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107844 (D. Alaska
Aug. 17, 2015). Plaintiff, Douglas Indian Association, moved to
remand this case to the Superior Court for the State of Alaska, First
Judicial District. Plaintiff Douglas Indian Association (“DIA”) and
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Defendant Central Council of Tlingit and Haida Indian Tribes of
Alaska (“Central Council”) are federally recognized Indian tribes
located in Juneau, Alaska. Defendants Richard Peterson and
William Ware are, respectively, the President and Tribal
Transportation Manager of Central Council. As federally
recognized tribes, DIA and Central Council were eligible to
receive transportation grants (Tribal Transportation Funds) through
the Indian Reservation Roads (IRR) Program from the United
States government under 25 U.S.C. 458aa-458hh and 25 C.F.R.
parts 170 and 1000 between 2005 and 2012. Multiple tribes are
permitted to form consortia in order to collectively receive and
administer the Tribal Transportation Funds. 25 U.S.C. 458aa; 25
C.F.R. 1000.14.
In a letter dated July 20, 2005, Central Council solicited DIA’s
membership in a consortium of tribes formed by Central Council
for the purpose of receiving and administering Tribal
Transportation Funds. Central Council’s letter specified
expectations for the operation of the consortium, including how the
Tribal Transportation Funds of the individual tribes would be
handled. Central Council went on to form the Southeast Tribal
Department of Transportation (SETDOT) in 2006 to administer the
consortium funds and again sought DIA’s membership in the
consortium in a memorandum of agreement dated May 8, 2006.
This memorandum from SETDOT further detailed the
consortium’s operations and management of tribal funds. DIA
alleged that based on the promises and expectations in this
SETDOT memorandum, they signed and joined the consortium on
August 11, 2006. While SETDOT was dissolved in 2007, the
consortium continued under the direct administration of Central
Council. However, after joining the consortium, DIA alleged that
between 2005 and 2012 no transportation projects were undertaken
or benefit from the funds afforded DIA despite repeated requests to
SETDOT and Central Council.
DIA withdrew from the consortium on January 12, 2012, at
which time they requested Central Council to remit all Tribal
Transportation Funds the consortium had received on behalf of
DIA. DIA filed suit in the Superior Court for the State of Alaska,
First Judicial District at Juneau on April 9, 2015, and Central
Council filed a Notice of Removal to this Court on May 18, 2015,
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pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a). Docket 1
at 2-4.
Central Council asserted that removal to federal court is
supported on two bases. First, Central Council asserted that it was
acting as an agent of the United States by carrying out the IRR
Program for Alaska Natives and American Indians. Second,
Central Council asserted that the matter is based on a federal
question arising under the Indian Self-Determination and
Education Assistance Act of 1975 (“ISDEAA”), Public Law 93638.
The Court did not find any substantial federal issue contested
in this matter. DIA’s complaint alleged claims arising under state
law which do not turn on a question of federal law. The Court also
finds that removal and jurisdiction based on 28 U.S.C. § 1441 is
unsupported. The court granted Plaintiff’s Motion for Remand to
Alaska Superior Court and denied Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
as moot.
3.

United States v. Aubrey

No. 13–10510, 2015 WL 5201800 (9th Cir. Sept. 8, 2015).
Defendant, a general contractor on a tribal construction project,
was convicted of conversion or misapplication of property
belonging to Indian tribal organization by the District Court and he
appealed both his conviction and the sentence imposed. The
appellate court held that: (1) as matter of first impression, tribal
funds disbursed to general contractor on project to construct
housing for members of tribe, even funds that were disbursed for
completed construction work, continued to be “property belonging
to any Indian tribal organization,” as long as tribe maintained title
to, possession of, or control over these funds; (2) evidence was
sufficient to support defendant’s conviction; (3) forensic auditor
who was called as witness to establish foundation for charts
detailing the passage of funds through contractor’s accounts did
not have to be certified as expert; (4) district court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting summary charts; and (5) defendant
occupied “position of trust,” as defined by the abuse-of-trust
Sentencing Guideline. The appellate court affirmed the conviction
and sentence.
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Grand Canyon Skywalk Dev. v. Steele

No.: 2:13-cv-00596, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160906 (D. Nev.
Nov. 30, 2015). Scutari & Cieslak Public Relations, Inc. is a
public-relations firm hired by the Hualapai Indian Tribe of the
Hualapai Indian Reservation to promote the Grand Canyon
Skywalk, a tourist attraction built on tribal land in the Grand
Canyon. When the relationship between the Tribe and the project’s
developer began to fracture, Scutari & Cieslak launched a publicrelations campaign that, the developer claims, was defamatory and
designed to disparage the developer. After the developer sued
Scutari & Cieslak and its principals (collectively S&C) for
defamation and conspiracy, S&C filed third-party claims against
the Tribe for indemnity and contribution.
The Tribe moved to dismiss S&C’s claims, arguing that the
court lacks jurisdiction over the third-party claims because the
Tribe has not waived its sovereign immunity from suit in federal
court. The Court granted the Tribe’s motion to dismiss and denied
as moot S&C’s motion to sever the third party claims and its two
requests for oral argument.
5.

Walker River Paiute Tribe v. United States HUD

No. 3:08-CV-0627, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166979 (D. Nev.
Dec. 14, 2015). Before the court were defendants the United States
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD); Julian
Castro, the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development; and
Jemine A. Bryon’s, General Deputy Assistant for Public and
Indian Housing, (collectively defendants) motion for partial
reconsideration of the court’s December 15, 2014 order granting
in-part and denying in-part plaintiff Walker River Paiute Tribe’s
(WRPT) motion for summary judgment and defendants’ countermotion for summary judgment.
WRPT filed the underlying declaratory and injunctive relief
action alleging that defendants improperly offset the amount of
federal block grant funding WRPT received in fiscal year 2009 in
violation of the Native American Housing Assistance and SelfDetermination Act (NAHASDA). In particular, WRPT challenged
HUD’s allocation of annual Indian Housing Block Grants (IHBG)
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pursuant to the funding allocation formula codified at 24 C.F.R.
§§ 1000.304 - 1000.340.
In early 2008, HUD conducted an audit of WRPT’s Indian
Housing Block Grant (IHBG) funding. In the audit, HUD
determined that WRPT had been overfunded in fiscal year 2008 in
the amount of $110,444 due to an inflated Formula Current
Assisted Stock (FCAS) calculation. HUD then reduced WRPT’s
grant for fiscal year 2009 by $110,444 in order to recapture the
overpaid funds.
WRPT initiated the present action against HUD under the
Administrative Procedures Act (APA), seeking a determination
that HUD’s promulgation and interpretation of 24 C.F.R. §
1000.318 was arbitrary and capricious. WRPT filed an amended
complaint contending that the exclusion of dwelling units from the
block grant formula pursuant to § 1000.318 was in violation of the
specific pre-amendment statutory language of NAHASDA. In
response to WRPT’s amended complaint, both parties filed crossmotions for summary judgment.
The court found that HUD’s promulgation of 24 C.F.R. §
1000.318 was within NAHASDA’s mandate, and as such, was an
appropriate exercise of HUD’s funding authority. However, the
court also found that HUD’s interpretation of § 1000.318 to
exclude certain housing units from a tribe’s FCAS calculation
simply because the underlying leases had passed their initial 25year term was an arbitrary and capricious interpretation of the
regulation. Thereafter, defendants filed the present motion for
reconsideration of the court’s order. The Court denied defendants’
motion for reconsideration.
6.

Meyer & Associates, Inc. v. Coushatta Tribe of Louisiana

Nos. 14–1109, 14-1114, 2016 WL 385308 (La. Ct. App. Jan.
27, 2016). Engineering firm hired by Indian tribe in connection
with capital improvement project at casino facility brought action
against tribe for breach of contract when newly elected tribal
council suspended project sanctioned by the former administration.
The District Court, No. 2006-2683, denied tribe’s exceptions of lis
pendens and lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Tribe filed writ
application. The appellate court, 965 So. 2d 930, granted writ and
ordered a stay to allow tribal court to decide whether tribe had

2017]

Case Law on American Indians: 2015-2016

414

waived its sovereign immunity. Granting certiorari, the Supreme
Court, 992 So. 2d 446, reversed and remanded. On remand, the
tribe answered and filed reconventional demand, asserting breach
of contract, breach of fiduciary duties, fraud and failure to provide
an accounting. The district court entered a number of judgments
having the ultimate effect of awarding firm $10,998,250.00 in
contractual damages, $5,585,573.00 in attorney fees, and
$57,662.34 in court costs. Parties appealed.
The appellate court held that: (1) the trial court improperly
granted relief not prayed for when it found that tribe violated
fiduciary duties it owed to firm; (2) the firm failed to present
sufficient evidence to demonstrate the absence of factual support
for one or more elements essential to tribe’s fraud and
misrepresentation claims; and (3) fact questions precluded
summary judgment in favor of firm on breach of contract claim.
Reversed and remanded.
7.

Maniilaq Ass’n v. Burwell

No. 15-152, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36605 (D.D.C. Mar. 22,
2016). For more than twenty years, the Secretary of Health and
Human Services has allocated $30,921 a year in federal funds
toward renting health clinic space in the Native American village
of Kivalina, Alaska. Maniilaq Association, a regional health
corporation that now owns and operates the clinic in Kivalina,
believes that amount is insufficient to assure adequate healthcare in
that community. In an attempt to remedy the Kivalina clinic’s
chronic underfunding, Maniilaq submitted a lease proposal based
on section 105(l) of the Indian Self-Determination and Education
Assistance Act. That section, Maniilaq argued, requires the
Secretary to rent its Kivalina clinic space and pay it compensation,
based on the clinic’s operating costs, of $249,842 a year. But the
Secretary declined Maniilaq’s proposal, arguing that it must pay
Maniilaq no more than the $30,921 it has provided previously.
Maniilaq sued. The Court granted summary judgment for
Maniilaq, and directed the parties to enter into discussions
regarding Maniilaq’s Kivalina lease proposal consistent with this
opinion.
8.

Navajo Nation v. DOI
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No. 14-cv-1909, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42242 (D.D.C.
Mar. 30, 2016). Plaintiff Navajo Nation (the “Nation”) alleged that
the Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”), an agency within the United
States Department of the Interior (“DOI”), violated the Indian SelfDetermination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. § 450 et
seq. (the “ISDEAA”), by failing to disperse calendar year (“CY”)
2014 funding to the Nation according to the Nation’s proposed CY
2014 annual funding agreement (the “Proposal”). Specifically, the
Nation contended that DOI Secretary Sally Jewell (the
“Secretary”) failed to approve or decline the Proposal within the
statutorily-mandated 90-day window for doing so and that, as a
result, the Proposal must be deemed approved as a matter of law.
The parties have each moved for summary judgment. Upon
consideration of the parties’ motions and supporting briefs, and for
the reasons set forth below, the Nation’s motion for summary
judgment is hereby denied, and DOI’s cross-motion for summary
judgment is hereby granted.
9.

Swinomish Indian Tribal Cmty. v. BNSF Ry. Co.

No. C15-0543RSL, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60547 (W.D.
Wash. May 6, 2016). This matter came before the Court on “BNSF
Railway Company’s Motion to Compel Discovery.” BNSF served
discovery on the Tribe in November 2015 seeking a wide array of
information, including “[a]ll documents related to BNSF running
trains across the Tribe’s reservation” and “[a]ll internal
communications related to the Easement.” To the extent BNSF
sought documents protected by a privilege and/or documents
created after this action was filed, the Tribe objected. On March
10, 2016, the Tribe filed a motion for summary judgment regarding
BNSF’s contention that this lawsuit is preempted by the Interstate
Commerce Commission Termination Act (“ICCTA”) because
enforcement of the Easement Agreement negotiated between the
parties in 1990 would impede BNSF’s ability to satisfy its common
carrier obligations. The Tribe argues that a railway’s voluntary
contractual commitments are enforceable, that the terms of the
Easement Agreement are clear, that the ICCTA cannot preempt the
Indian Right-of-Way Act (“IRWA”) that governs this case, and
that BNSF is estopped from asserting a preemption defense. In
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support of the first and fourth arguments, the Tribe discusses the
intent of the parties and asserts that it had no reason to suspect that
BNSF would later claim that the limitations contained in the
agreement were unenforceable due to its status as a common
carrier. The Tribe provided details regarding the course of the
negotiations between the parties and the chronology of events that
resulted in the Easement Agreement. In addition, it submitted the
declaration of Allan Olson, its current General Manager and the
Tribe’s in-house attorney at the time the Easement Agreement was
executed. Mr. Olson states in relevant part: “The specific terms and
conditions contained in the Easement Agreement were very
important to the Tribe. Absent those conditions, the Tribe would
not have given its consent for a right-of-way grant to BN. Instead,
the Tribe would have continued with the litigation of its trespass
claims. Had the Tribe known that BNSF would later take the
position that the Easement Agreement conditions were
unenforceable due to BNSF’s common carrier obligations, the
Tribe never would have consented to the Right-of-Way.”
BNSF argues that the Tribe has put its otherwise privileged
communications at issue and should be compelled to turn over any
and all communications with counsel that analyze or discuss
BNSF’s common carrier obligations and the impact they could
have on enforcement of the Easement Agreement. The Court finds
as follows: Privileged Documents and Communications: If the
Tribe chooses to withdraw paragraph 6 of the Olson Declaration,
its attorney-client privileged communications will not be at issue
and there will be no need for the discovery sought by BNSF. If,
however, the Tribe continues to rely on the declaration of counsel
regarding what the Tribe knew regarding the impact of BNSF’s
common carrier status and the importance of the negotiated
limitations to the Tribe’s decision making, a waiver will have
occurred, and the motion to compel will be granted.
10.

Snoqualmie Indian Tribe v. City of Snoqualmie

No. C15-1936, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64350 (W.D. Wash.
May 16, 2016). Before the court was Defendants City of
Snoqualmie (“the City”) motion to dismiss Plaintiff Snoqualmie
Indian Tribe’s (“the Tribe”) amended complaint. Defendants
argued that the court should dismiss the Tribe’s 42 U.S.C. § 1981
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claim as not plausibly pleaded and decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the Tribe’s remaining state law
claims. This case arose out of a dispute regarding municipal
services that the City provides to the Tribe and, more specifically,
to the casino that the Tribe operates (“the Casino”). The Casino is
located outside City limits but within the City’s urban growth area
(“UGA”). The City provides sewer and other municipal services
pursuant to the “Agreement Between the City of Snoqualmie and
the Snoqualmie Tribe for the Provision of Police, Fire and
Emergency Medical Services to the Snoqualmie Hills Project and
Sewer Utility Service to the Tribe’s Initial Reservation” (“the
Agreement”) that the Tribe and the City entered into on April 26,
2004, with an initial term of seven years after the opening of the
Casino, after which the Agreement automatically renews for five
additional periods of seven years unless either the Tribe or the City
gives written notice of termination at least six months prior to the
expiration of the initial term or any renewal term.
Under the Agreement, the City agreed to accept up to
360 equivalent residential units (“ERU”) of wastewater effluent
per day. The Tribe paid the City approximately $1,270,440 for
sewer capacity at the time of connection, and approximately
$3,000,000 for sewer services from 2008 through 2015.
In June 2014, the City enacted Ordinance 1133, which raised
sewer rates for all customers outside City limits to 150% of the
rates for those inside City limits effective July 1, 2014. Prior to
that, the City had not established a differential rate for in-and outof-City sewer users; rather, the prior City ordinance—Ordinance
994—had set one rate for in-City users and provided that out-ofCity users’ rates were set by contract. The City’s decision to create
a different rate for customers outside City limits caused the sewer
rates for the Casino and other out-of-City users to go up by
50 percent.
The Agreement was to reach the end of its first term in
November 2015, and in July 2015, the City and the Tribe met to
discuss amending the Agreement before that time. At that meeting,
the Tribe expressed its desire for a one-year extension to allow the
parties time to negotiate a long-term solution. In an August 25,
2015, letter, the City threatened to cease providing services to the
Casino upon expiration of the Agreement. On October 15, 2015,
the City signed the Tribe’s proposed amendment, which renewed

2017]

Case Law on American Indians: 2015-2016

418

the Agreement for one year. Accompanying the City’s October
15, 2015, acceptance was a letter from Mayor Larson informing
the Tribe that the City Council had voted to discontinue sewer
services to the Tribe by November 30, 2016. Further, the City has
opposed the Tribe taking land into trust for the construction of
sewer and water facilities.
The Tribe alleged that the City has likewise interfered with its
efforts to obtain replacement fire and emergency medical services.
The Tribe had explored obtaining those services from Eastside Fire
& Rescue (“EF&R”). The City, however, had told EF&R that the
Agreement does not permit an alternative arrangement and has
submitted a public records request to EF&R regarding EF&R’s
communications with the Tribe. The Tribe alleged that these
actions may increase the cost of fire and emergency medical
services as the Tribe must indemnify EF&R in the event the City
sues EF&R regarding its agreement with the Tribe.
The Tribe contended that the City has undertaken these actions
out of racial animus. In support of that contention, the Tribe
alleged that “Defendants’ decision to refuse services to the
Plaintiff denies Plaintiff a basic utility service that the City holds
out and offers to non-Indians within the City of Snoqualmie and
within its UGA.” The Tribe also alleged that the City “is
overcharging the Tribe for sewer services,” and that “the City has
not terminated or threatened termination of sewer utility service of
any other paying customer within City limits and the City’s UGA.”
In its amended complaint, the Tribe asserted causes of action for
racial discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981,
unreasonable refusal to provide sewer services in violation of
RCW 35.67.31, and tortious interference with contractual relations
and business expectancies.
Defendants moved to dismiss the Tribe’s Section 1981 claim
on the basis that the Tribe has alleged insufficient facts to support
that claim. Although Defendants moved for dismissal under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), they had already filed an
answer to the Tribe’s amended complaint, and the Tribe had filed
an answer to Defendants’ counterclaims. Accordingly, the court
treated Defendants’ motion as a motion for judgment on the
pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c).
Defendants’ motion was before the court.
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The court granted in part and denied in part Defendants’
motion. The court dismissed the Tribe’s § 1981 claim but granted
the Tribe leave to amend its complaint concerning that claim
within 20 days of the date of this order. The Court denied without
prejudice Defendants’ request that the court decline supplemental
jurisdiction over and dismiss the Tribe’s state law claims.
11.

Wells Fargo Bank v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indian

No. E060447, 2016 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4417 (Cal. Ct.
App. Jun. 15, 2016). In 2006, plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank loaned
$56,570,000 to the Cabazon Band of Mission Indians (Tribe) to
build a new parking garage for a casino, which was operated by
East Valley Tourist Development Authority (EVTDA), an
instrumentality of the Tribe. The loan agreement included a
provision that payments would be made to the Bank from a
custodial bank account, into which EVTDA deposited the Tribe’s
net income from the casino, resort and golf course, which were
operated by EVTDA. In August 2007, EVTDA was indebted under
a bridge loan from Merrill Lynch and others in the amount of more
than $180 million relating to the improvement and operation of the
casino, resort and golf course on tribal land. The bridge loan
included terms limiting amounts payable to the Tribe.
Due to the recession of 2008, revenues from the casino and
resort declined, so the Tribe and EVTDA restructured their loans,
with the Tribe executing a supplemental trust indenture in favor of
Bank, and EVTDA executed an amended bridge loan agreement
with its lenders. In April 2012, the Tribe and EVTDA informed
their respective lenders that they could not continue payments and
wished to restructure the loans. EVTDA’s lenders agreed to
restructure its loans, but Bank notified the Tribe it was in default.
The Bank filed a lawsuit for breach of contract and for
injunctive relief to compel EVTDA to deposit funds into the
custodial account. Cross motions for summary adjudication were
filed by the Bank and the Tribe. The lower court granted Bank’s
motion for summary adjudication as to the breach of contract
action, and granted the Tribe’s motion for summary adjudication as
to the cause of action for injunctive relief. Both parties appealed.
On appeal, the Tribe argued that the trial court erred in granting
summary adjudication on the breach of contract cause of action on
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the ground it violated the Indian Gaming Act and erred in its
calculation of damages. On cross-appeal, the Bank argued the
court erred in denying injunctive relief and attorney’s fees. The
appellate court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in finding that the Bank did not prevail on the breach of contract
claim, notwithstanding the judgment. The judgment was affirmed.
Each party was to bear its own costs.
12.

Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of Mich. v. Blue Cross
Blue Shield of Mich.

No. 16-10317, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101610 (E.D. Mich.
Aug. 3, 2016). The Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of Michigan
and its Employee Welfare Plan (collectively, “Plaintiff” or
“Tribe”) sued Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan (“BCBSM”)
over the manner in which BCBSM has administered Plaintiff’s
“self-insured employee benefit Plan” and the health-benefit
portions of that Plan. Plaintiff brought a nine-count complaint
alleging that BCBSM breached its fiduciary duty to Plaintiff under
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) when it
did not authorize payment of Medicare-like Rates (“MLRs”) for
certain health services (Count I), that BCBSM engaged in
prohibited transactions under ERISA when it charged Plaintiff
hidden fees (Count II), and seven state law claims (Count III-IX).
BCBSM moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims that it violated its
fiduciary duty to Plaintiff by not paying MLRs for certain health
services procured by Plan members. It also moved to dismiss
Plaintiff’s state law claims.
Plaintiff and BCBSM entered into Administrative Service
Contracts which set out the terms of the parties’ relationship. On
July 5, 2007, the Department of Health and Human Services
implemented regulations governing the payment amounts that
health-care providers may accept from Indians for medical services
rendered. 42 C.F.R. § 136.30. The regulations cap the amount a
hospital or health-care provider may accept at the same rate that
would be paid under Medicare for the same service. From the time
the regulation was enacted, BCBSM did not ensure that it
processed claims for payment at the MLR for the applicable
service. Thus, BCBSM often paid healthcare provider’s rates for
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services that were in excess of what would otherwise have been
paid under Medicaid.
Because Plaintiff cannot establish that BCBSM had a fiduciary
duty under ERISA to ensure payment of MLRs for healthcare
services obtained by eligible plan participants, Plaintiff’s MLR
claims will be dismissed. Plaintiff’s state law claims are
completely preempted by ERISA. Plaintiff’s state law claims will
be dismissed. The court dismissed with prejudice Counts I & IIIIX of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, ECF No. 7 and Count II on
the extent it alleges any claims related to Defendant BCBSM’s
obligation to ensure the Plan paid Medicare-like Rates for
healthcare claims.
13.

Sprint Communications Co., L.P. v. Crow Creek Sioux
Tribal Court

No. 4:10-CV-04110, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102257 (D.S.D.
Aug. 4, 2016). The issue before the court was whether defendant,
Native American Telecom, LLC. (NAT), is entitled to collect
access service charges that it billed to plaintiff, Sprint
Communications Company, L.P. Sprint provides nationwide longdistance telephone services and is known under the
telecommunications regulatory framework as an interexchange
carrier (IXC). Sprint delivers long-distance calls to a local
exchange carrier (LEC) for termination to end-users. Under the
FCC’s current regulatory framework, Sprint pays the LEC a
terminating access charge based on the LEC’s interstate access
tariff, which is filed with the FCC.
In October 2008, the Crow Creek Sioux Tribal authority
authorized NAT to provide telecommunications services on the
Crow Creek Reservation subject to the tribe’s laws. Pursuant to the
2008 approval order, NAT began to operate as a LEC. NAT also
operates a free conference calling system (used for conference
calling, chat-lines, and similar services) in connection with Free
Conferencing Corporation. A party using NAT’s services does not
pay NAT for the conference call, but rather is assessed charges by
the party’s telecommunications provider. NAT then bills the
telecommunications provider an access fee as defined in its
interstate tariff.
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NAT’s access charges that were billed to Sprint for conference
calls are at issue here. After paying two of NAT’s bills for charges
connected to conference calls, Sprint ceased paying NAT’s
terminating access tariffs because Sprint believed that NAT was
involved in a traffic-pumping scheme, otherwise known as access
stimulation, to generate traffic from free conference calls and chat
services. Sprint filed suit against NAT alleging a breach of the
Federal Communications Act (FCA) and a state-law unjust
enrichment claim.
On November 29, 2011, the FCC released its Connect America
Fund final rule that addresses access stimulation and traffic
pumping. See Connect America Fund; A National Broadband Plan
for Our Future; Establishing Just and Reasonable Rates for Local
Exchange Carriers; High-Cost Universal Service Support, 76 Fed.
Reg. 73,830 (Nov. 29, 2011). This court issued an order directing
the parties to discuss what effect, if any, the FCC’s Connect
America Fund final rule had on the issues presented in this case.
The court concluded that NAT’s interstate tariffs numbers 1 and 2
were unenforceable, and granted summary judgment in Sprint’s
favor. The court could not, however, determine summarily whether
NAT’s tariff number 3 was enforceable. The NAT-Free
Conferencing relationship does not resemble a normal carriercustomer relationship. Rather, it resembles a relationship between
business partners attempting to operate in a manner only
superficially consistent with the FCC’s rules and regulations.
Consequently, because Free Conferencing was not an “end user” or
“customer” as defined in NAT’s interstate tariff number 3, NAT
did not properly bill Sprint for switched access services regarding
calls delivered to Free Conferencing. Thus, it was ordered that
judgment will be entered in favor of Sprint and against NAT in
accordance with this memorandum opinion and order.
D. Employment
1.

Coppe v. Sac & Fox Casino Healthcare Plan

No. 2:14-cv-02598, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150319 (D. Kan.
Nov. 5, 2015). In her complaint, Plaintiff claimed benefits under
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (part of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974) (hereinafter “ERISA”). Before the
Court was Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. Pursuant to Fed. R.
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Civ. P. 12(b)(2), it asserted a defense that the Court lacks
jurisdiction of the subject matter of this case, because Defendant
has tribal sovereign immunity and can be sued only in its own
tribal court. The motion also asserted that ERISA does not waive
sovereign immunity as a defense for the claims of Plaintiff.
Plaintiff argued that the Motion to Dismiss should be denied
for three reasons: First, Congress has indicated that ERISA is
applicable to the tribal plans at issue in this dispute. Second,
Defendants waived tribal immunity contractually. Third, the Sac
and Fox Nation is not the Defendant, only The Sac and Fox Casino
Healthcare Plan, which does not have the defense of sovereign
immunity.
The Court found that because of the unequivocal Congressional
abrogation of sovereign immunity under 29 U.S.C. § 1002(32) and
the Plan’s clear contractual waiver of sovereign immunity, it has
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. The Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss was denied.
2.

Sanders v. Anoatubby

No. 15-6116, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 20268 (10th Cir. Nov. 23,
2015). Sanders, a citizen of the Chickasaw Nation (Nation), was
employed as a Housing Specialist in the Nation’s Division of
Housing (Division). While so employed, her supervisors and other
employees allegedly treated her unfairly, called her names, made
derogatory comments about her personal life, and failed to follow
tribal policies and procedures with respect to her employment. She
also claimed to have been wrongfully discharged because, contrary
to tribal policy, she was not provided a statement of reasons for her
termination.
Sanders also filed applications for housing assistance with the
Division. Her applications indicated that her daughter and
grandchildren would be living with her in the home, but they were
processed as if she was the lone applicant, thereby relegating her to
the lowest priority. Sanders claimed the reason was retaliation for
her having filed a grievance against the Executive Director and one
of her supervisors.
Sanders’ complaint against the Division, Tribal Governor Bill
Anoatubby, and various tribal officers was for (1) Wrongful
Termination, Abuse of Authority, Non-Compliance of Several
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Chickasaw Policies and Procedures, Hostile Work Environment,
Homeowner’s Application Discrimination, Non-Compliance of
NAHASDA (Native American Housing Assistance and SelfDetermination Act of 1996). Defendants moved to dismiss under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) arguing, the Division and the individual
defendants were entitled to tribal sovereign immunity.
The appellate court held that (1) Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 did not abrogate tribal sovereign immunity so as to
allow a former employee to bring discrimination claims against
tribal housing officials; 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e(b) specifically
exempted Indian tribes from the Title VII definition of “employer.”
(2) Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not permit the
employee to bring housing discrimination claims, as 25 U.S.C.S. §
4131(b)(6) exempted tribes and their housing divisions from the
reach of Title VI. (3) The Ex Parte Young doctrine was
inapplicable because the employee did not allege an ongoing
violation of federal law and did not seek injunctive or declaratory
relief. Judgment affirmed.

3.

Nawls v. Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Cmty.Gaming
Enters.-Mystic Lake Casino

No. 15-2769, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17902 (D. Minn. Feb. 12,
2016). On February 11, 2016, the undersigned United States
District Judge heard oral argument on Defendant Shakopee
Mdewakanton Sioux Community Gaming Enterprise’s (“Gaming
Enterprise”) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. Plaintiffs
Annette and Adrian Nawls (the “Nawls”) oppose the Motion. The
Nawls asserted claims under Title VII against the Gaming
Enterprise. “It is well-settled that the plaintiff bears the burden of
establishing subject matter jurisdiction.” Nucor Corp v. Neb. Pub.
Power Dist., 891 F.2d 1343, 1346 (8th Cir. 1989). Here, the Nawls
have failed to satisfy this burden for two reasons. First, Title VII
does not apply to Indian tribes, nor their gaming operations.
Second, the Gaming Enterprise is immune from suit in federal
court. Accordingly, the Complaint must be dismissed.
Indian tribes, such as the Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux
Community, are excluded from Title VII’s definition of the term
“employer.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). In Ferguson v. SMSC Gaming
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Enterprise, the court addressed the very question presented here—
whether a Title VII claim can be brought against the Gaming
Enterprise. 475 F. Supp. 2d 929, 931 (D. Minn. 2007). The court
concluded that a Title VII claim could not be asserted against the
Gaming Enterprise because “Title VII claims cannot be brought
against Indian tribes or their agencies or businesses.” Id. at 931.
Indeed, the Eighth Circuit has recognized that the Gaming
Enterprise’s predecessor, Little Six Inc., is exempt from Title VII.
Charland v. Little Six, Inc., 198 F.3d 249 (8th Cir. 1999). The
Nawls’ Title VII claims therefore cannot be asserted against the
Gaming Enterprise and no federal question is presented to this
Court.
Additionally, the Gaming Enterprise is immune from suit under
the doctrine of sovereign immunity. “[T]ribal sovereign immunity
is a threshold jurisdictional question.” Amerind Risk Mgmt. Corp.
v. Malaterre, 633 F.3d 680, 684 (8th Cir. 2011). The Shakopee
Mdewakanton Sioux Community is a federally recognized Indian
tribe and possesses sovereign immunity from suit. Smith v. Babbitt,
100 F.3d 556 (8th Cir. 1996). The Gaming Enterprise is “a branch
of the sovereign tribal government.” Prescott v. Little Six, Inc., 387
F.3d 753, 757 (8th Cir. 2004). As such, because the Gaming
Enterprise has not waived its right to immunity, it is immune from
suit. See Charland, 198 F.3d 249; see also Ferguson, 475 F. Supp.
2d at 931.
Finally, the Court notes that Mr. Nawls’ Title VII claims fail
for the additional reason that they were not filed within the
statutory 90-day timeline. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
Accordingly, Mr. Nawls’ claims are time barred. Williams v.
Thomson Corp., 383 F.3d 789, 790 (8th Cir. 2004). For all these
reasons, the Gaming Enterprise’s Motion to Dismiss is granted and
the Nawls’ Complaint is dismissed.
4.

Longo v. Seminole Indian Casino-Immokalee

No. 15–12460, 2016 WL 722526 (11th Cir. Feb. 24, 2016).
Former employee of tribe-owned casino brought action against
casino, alleging claims under Title VII and Florida Civil Rights
Act. In October 2008, Defendant hired Plaintiff to serve as a
security guard at its casino. Plaintiff enjoyed success in this
position until January 2013, when a patron of the casino started to
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sexually harass, stalk, and physically touch him on a continual
basis. Because these actions created a hostile work environment,
Plaintiff sought to remedy this situation by reporting the incidents
to Defendant. But Defendant failed to take any corrective action.
Instead, Defendant terminated Plaintiff’s employment one month
later, stating that Plaintiff “was ‘discourteous to team members.”
Casino moved to dismiss. The district court, 110 F. Supp. 3d 1252,
granted motion. Former employee appealed. The appellate court of
Appeals held that: (1) in a matter of first impression, Seminole
Tribe of Florida, which owned and operated casino, was federally
recognized Indian tribe, and thus it was entitled to sovereign
immunity, and (2) sanctions and double costs were not warranted
against former employee for frivolous appeal. Affirmed.
5.

Anderson v. Coushatta Casino Resort

No. 2:15-01203, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49416 (W.D. La.
Apr. 12, 2016). Before the court was a “Motion for Dismissal of
Defendant, the Coushatta Tribe of Louisiana” wherein the movant
sought to have the instant matter dismissed (1) for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, (2) as
time-barred and (3) because plaintiff did not set forth any factual
bases or allegations for wrongful or illegal termination under
federal or state law. Plaintiff, Larry Anderson, worked in the
Terrace Restaurant at the Coushatta Casino Resort in Kinder,
Louisiana. In his complaint, Mr. Anderson alleges he was
terminated on December 18, 2012 for insubordination and failure
to comply with a supervisor’s request. Plaintiff sought
compensatory damages, attorney fees and court costs. Plaintiff has
not provided this court with any authority for the Tribe’s waiver of
this sovereign immunity which would allow him to bring his
claims in this court. The court found that it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over this suit and therefore will grant the defendant’s
motion because the defendant has not waived its sovereign
immunity.
6.

Paskenta Band of Nomlaki Indians v. Crosby

No. 2:15-cv-00538, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53145 (E.D. Cal.
Apr. 20, 2016). Defendants sought dismissal of claims alleged in
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Plaintiffs Paskenta Band of Nomlaki Indians and Paskenta
Enterprises Corporation’s (collectively “Plaintiffs”) Second
Amended Complaint (“SAC”) under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6). For the reasons set forth below, the
dismissal motions are granted in part and denied in part.
The Paskenta Band of Nomlaki Indians (“the Tribe”) employed
Ines Crosby, John Crosby, Leslie Lohse and Larry Lohse
(collectively, the “Employee Defendants”) in executive positions
for more than a decade. Plaintiffs contended that the Employee
Defendants used their positions to embezzle millions of dollars
from the Tribe and its principal business entity, the Paskenta
Enterprises Corporation (“PEC”). According to Plaintiffs, the
Employee Defendants stole these funds from Plaintiffs’ bank
accounts at Umpqua Bank and Cornerstone Bank by withdrawing
large sums for their personal use. Plaintiffs further alleged that the
Employee Defendants caused the Tribe to invest in two
unauthorized retirement plans for the Employee Defendants’
personal benefit: a defined benefit plan (“Tribal Pension Plan”)
and a 401(k) (“Tribal 401(k)”) (collectively “Tribal Retirement
Plans”). The Employee Defendants allegedly kept their activities
hidden from Plaintiffs through inter alia, harassment, intimidation,
and cyber-attacks on the Tribe’s computers.
Plaintiffs went on to assert that the Umpqua Defendants,
Cornerstone Defendants, and APC knowingly assisted the
Employee Defendants in aspects of their scheme. They contended
that the Umpqua Defendants and the Cornerstone Defendants
controlled banks where Plaintiffs maintained accounts, and, despite
knowing the Employee Defendants were withdrawing money from
these accounts for their personal benefit, permitted the Employee
Defendants to continue making withdrawals and failed to notify
Plaintiffs of the Employee Defendants’ actions. APC, as the thirdparty administrator for the Tribal Retirement Plans, assisted the
Employee Defendants in setting up and administering
the unauthorized Tribal Retirement Plans. Cornerstone
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is granted with leave to amend as
to Plaintiffs’ common law negligence claim; denied as
to Plaintiffs’ breach of contract and aiding and abetting claim; and
granted with prejudice as to Plaintiffs’ restitution claim. APC’s
Motion to Dismiss is granted with leave to amend as to Plaintiffs’
common law negligence claim, aiding and abetting claim, and
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punitive damages prayer and granted with prejudice as to
Plaintiffs’ restitution claim. Umpqua Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss is granted with leave to amend as to Plaintiffs’ common
law negligence, breach of contract, and aiding and abetting claim
and granted with prejudice as to Plaintiffs’ restitution claim.
Plaintiffs are granted thirty (30) days leave from the date on which
this order is filed to file a Third Amended Complaint addressing
the deficiencies in the aforementioned dismissed claims that were
granted with leave to amend.
7.

Rapada v. Nooksack Indian Tribe

No. 74116-1-I, 2016 Wash. App. LEXIS 1471 (Wash. Ct. App.
Jun. 20, 2016). Nadene Rapada was the accounting director for the
Nooksack Indian Tribe (NIT). NIT terminated Rapada for
processing a mileage reimbursement request without first having
the request approved as required by NIT’s written accounting
policy. Rapada did not dispute that she violated NIT’s official
policy. She argued that after-the-fact approval was common
practice at NIT and following that practice, rather than the official
policy, was a good faith error in judgment.
The Employment Security Department (ESD) initially decided
that Rapada was eligible for unemployment benefits. On NIT’s
appeal of this decision, the ESD commissioner reversed
concluding that Rapada was discharged for misconduct that
amounted to wanton disregard of the employer’s interest and was
thus ineligible for unemployment benefits. Rapada appealed to the
superior court which reversed the commissioner’s decision.
The court concluded that, on the facts of this case, Rapada
made an error in judgment in failing to verify the status of her
reimbursement with Ames before cashing the check. A good faith
error in judgment is not misconduct that disqualifies a claimant
from receiving unemployment benefits. Because the court reversed
the commissioner’s ruling, the superior court judgment was
affirmed. Rapada requested attorney fees pursuant to RCW
50.32.160. Under RCW 50.32.160, a claimant is entitled to
reasonable attorney fees when an appellate court reverses the
decision of the commissioner. Because she prevailed here, Rapada
was entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal under RCW
50.32.160, assuming compliance with RAP 18.1(d). Affirmed.
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Environmental Regulations

Cascadia Windlands v. Bureau of Indian Affairs

No. 14–35553, 2015 WL 5306321 (9th Cir. Sept. 11, 2015).
Environmental organizations brought action against Bureau of
Indian Affairs (BIA) challenging approval of timber sale in
national forest under the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) and the Coquille Restoration Act (CRA), which Indian
Tribe intervened in as a defendant. The District Court, 2014 WL
2872008, granted summary judgment to BIA and tribe.
Environmental organizations appealed.
The appellate court held that: (1) it was permissible for BIA to
aggregate past and reasonably foreseeable future actions to create
baseline from which to consider incremental impact of project, and
(2) objective listed in forest management plan, to protect an
endangered species, was not a standard or guideline that BIA was
required to comply with pursuant to CRA, and thus BIA did not
violate CRA by failing to ensure project was consistent with
recovery plan for endangered species.
2.

Citizens for a Better Way, et al. v. United States Dept. of
the Interior, et al.

No. 2:12-cv-3021, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128745 (E.D. Cal.
Sept. 23, 2015). This matter was before the Court pursuant to
Plaintiffs’ Motions for Summary Judgment and Defendants’
Motions for Summary Judgment. This case involved the
interrelated actions that Defendants took in connection with a
proposed gaming facility and hotel fee-to-trust acquisition project.
The Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”) reviews and approves tribal
applications pursuant to the Indian Reorganization Act (“IRA”). In
2002, Defendant Enterprise submitted an application to the BIA
requesting that the Department of the Interior (“DOI”) accept trust
title to a piece of land in Yuba County. Defendant Enterprise
planned to build a gaming facility, hotel, and parking facilities on
the land in Yuba County (“Yuba Site”). The proposed trust
acquisition was analyzed in an Environmental Impact Statement
(“EIS”) prepared under the direction and supervision of the BIA.
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The Draft EIS was issued for public review and comments on
March 21, 2008. After the comment period, a public hearing, and
consideration and incorporation of comments received, the BIA
issued the Final EIS (“FEIS”) on August 6, 2010. The BIA issued a
Record of Decision (“ROD”) in November 2012 finding that a
gaming establishment on the Yuba Site would be in the best
interest of Enterprise and its members and would not be
detrimental to the surrounding community.
Plaintiffs alleged that BIA violated the National Environmental
Protection Act (“NEPA”) by: (1) narrowing the purpose of the
proposed action in order to dismiss viable alternatives; (2) failing
to take a “hard look” at Plaintiff United Auburn Indian
Community’s socioeconomic interests and other interests; and
(3) violated NEPA’s conflict-of-interest provisions by giving
undue weight to one of Enterprise’s consultants; by not
considering an adequate number of alternatives; and contended that
the agency failed to take a “hard look” at the environmental
impacts of the proposed casino.
Plaintiffs argued that Defendants violated the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act (“IGRA”) which generally prohibits gaming on
lands acquired in trust after 1988, unless it fits an exception under
25 U.S.C. § 2719(a) and (b) or the Secretarial Determination
Exception. However, the Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs
determined that gaming on the proposed Yuba site would be in the
best interest of the Tribe and its citizens and would not be
detrimental to the surrounding community. In addition, the
Governor concurred with this determination.
Plaintiffs alleged that the Clean Air Act was violated since the
Secretary failed to conduct a conformity determination. Plaintiffs
argued that Defendants failed to accurately identify and describe
the parcel of land to be taken into trust, alleging that Defendants
used two land descriptions interchangeably. Plaintiffs argued that
by failing to comply with NEPA and the IGRA, Defendants’
actions violated the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).
The Court was not convinced that Defendants violated NEPA
or the IGRA and did not find that Defendants acted arbitrarily or
capriciously. Therefore, the Court found that Defendants did not
violate the APA. The Court granted Defendants’ and Intervenor
Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment. The Court denied
Plaintiffs’ Motions for Summary Judgment.
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Alaska Oil and Gas Ass’n v. Jewell

Nos. 13–35619, 13–35666, 13–35662, 13-35667, 13-35669,
2016 WL 766855 (9th Cir. Feb. 29, 2016). State of Alaska, oil and
gas trade associations, and Alaska Native corporations and villages
brought actions against Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), seeking
invalidation of final rule in which FWS designated critical habitat
for polar bears under Endangered Species Act (ESA).
Environmental groups intervened. The District Court, 916 F. Supp.
2d 974, granted summary judgment to plaintiffs on some of their
claims, and vacated the final rule. FWS and environmental groups
appealed, and plaintiffs cross-appealed.
The appellate court held that: (1) FWS was not required to
identify where each component part of each primary constituent
element (PCE) was located within each habitat by using scientific
data establishing current use by existing polar bears; (2) five–mile
increment measurement inland from the coast, to define the area of
designation, was not arbitrary and capricious; (3) inclusion of area
that was primarily an industrial staging area for oil and gas
operations was not arbitrary and capricious; (4) as a matter of first
impression for the circuit, compliance with procedural
requirements for providing written justification to State was
judicially reviewable; and (5) FWS complied with procedural
requirements for written justification. Affirmed in part, reversed in
part, and remanded.
4.

Alaska Dept. of Natural Resources v. U.S.

No. 14–35051, 2016 WL 946917 (9th Cir. Mar. 14, 2016).
State of Alaska brought action against landowners, who were
Alaska natives, to quiet title to rights-of-way for four public trails
that crossed their land, and seeking a declaratory judgment and a
claim seeking to condemn for public use whatever portions of the
rights-of-way the State did not already own. The district court
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. State appealed.
The appellate court held that: (1) federal court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over action to quiet title to rights-of-way, and
(2) federal court had jurisdiction over state’s condemnation action.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.
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Wyoming v. United States DOI

Case No. 2:15-CV-043 (Lead Case); Case No. 2:15-CV-041,
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82132 (D. Wyo. Jun. 21. 2016). This
matter was before the Court on the Petitions for Review of Final
Agency Action filed separately in each of the consolidated actions,
challenging the Bureau of Land Management’s issuance of
regulations applying to hydraulic fracturing on federal and Indian
lands. On March 26, 2015, the Bureau of Land Management
(“BLM”) issued the final version of its regulations applying to
hydraulic fracturing on federal and Indian lands. 80 Fed. Reg.
16,128-16,222 (Mar. 26, 2015) (“Fracking Rule”).
The Court preliminarily enjoined the BLM from enforcing the
Fracking Rule. Purportedly in response to “public concern about
whether fracturing can lead to or cause the contamination of
underground water sources,” and “increased calls for stronger
regulation and safety protocols,” the BLM undertook rulemaking
to implement “additional regulatory effort and oversight” of this
practice. The BLM ultimately published its final rule regulating
hydraulic fracturing on federal and Indian lands on March 26,
2015. The BLM determined the Fracking Rule fulfills the goals of
the initial proposed rules: “[t]o ensure that wells are properly
constructed to protect water supplies, to make certain that the
fluids that flow back to the surface as a result of hydraulic
fracturing operations are managed in an environmentally
responsible way, and to provide public disclosure of the chemicals
used in hydraulic fracturing fluids.” The Industry Petitioners and
the States of Wyoming and Colorado filed separate Petitions for
Review of Final Agency Action, seeking judicial review of the
Fracking Rule pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA). The States of North Dakota and Utah, and the Ute Indian
Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation, later intervened in the
States’ action as Petitioners and various environmental groups
intervened as Respondents, and the Court granted the parties’
motion to consolidate the two separate actions. Petitioners contend
the Fracking Rule should be set aside because it is arbitrary, not in
accordance with law, and in excess of the BLM’s statutory
jurisdiction and authority. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) & (C). The

433

American Indian Law Journal

[Vol. 5:308

Ute Indian Tribe additionally contends the Fracking Rule is
contrary to the Federal trust obligation to Indian tribes.
Congress has not delegated to the Department of Interior the
authority to regulate hydraulic fracturing. The BLM’s effort to do
so through the Fracking Rule is in excess of its statutory authority
and contrary to law. As this finding is dispositive as to each of the
Petitions for Review, the Court need not address the other points
raised in support of setting aside the Fracking Rule. Therefore, the
Court holds the Fracking Rule is unlawful, and it is ordered that
the BLM’s final rule related to hydraulic fracturing on federal and
Indian lands, 80 Fed, Reg. 16,128 (Mar. 26, 2015), is hereby set
aside.

6.

Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd.

No. CV-04-256, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82610 (E.D. Wash.
Jun. 24, 2016). Defendant asked the court to reconsider its April 1,
2016 “Order Re Reconsideration” in which it sua sponte
reconsidered its “Order Granting Motion For Summary
Adjudication, In Part” and found the Plaintiff Confederated Tribes
Of The Colville Reservation (“Tribes”) could recover response
costs for “enforcement activities” related to “removal” and/or
“remedial action.”
In its “Order Re Reconsideration,” this court rhetorically asked
why the phrase “enforcement activities” in 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25) is
not sufficient to provide for an award of private litigants’
attorney’s fees associated with bringing a cost recovery action
under § 9607(a)(4)(B), but should be sufficient when a State or an
Indian tribe brings a cost recovery action under § 9607(a)(4)(A).
This court’s answer was: “It makes sense simply because these are
governmental entities with inherent enforcement authority, unlike
private parties. This is recognized by the fact that governmental
entities are entitled to “all costs of removal or remedial action . . .
not inconsistent with the national contingency plan (“NCP”),”
whereas private parties are entitled only to “necessary costs of
response . . . consistent with the national contingency plan.” It is
presumed that “all costs” incurred by a governmental entity are
consistent with the NCP and a defendant has the burden of proving
to the contrary. On the other hand, a private party has the burden of
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proving not only that its costs were “necessary,” but that they are
also consistent with the NCP. Governmental entities and private
entities are clearly treated differently under § 9607 and that
difference is sufficient to justify awarding States and Indian tribes
response costs for “enforcement activities,” even though unlike the
federal government (EPA), they are not acting pursuant to § 9604
or some other specific statutory provision of CERCLA.
Defendant contends the court clearly erred in concluding the
Tribes have “inherent authority” to enforce CERCLA. According
to Defendant, “the Tribes do not possess inherent authority to
enforce a federal statute such as CERCLA” and § 9601(25) “does
not convey enforcement authority to Indian tribes any more than it
conveys such authority to other public entities or private parties.”
The court did not clearly err in concluding in its “Order Re
Reconsideration” that the Tribes can recover response costs for
“enforcement activities” related to removal and/or remedial action.
This includes attorney’s fees and litigation costs related to removal
and/or remedial action. Defendants’ Motion For Reconsideration is
denied.
F.
1.

Fisheries, Water, FERC, BOR

In re the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water
in the Big Horn River System

No. S–14–0257, 2015 WL 5439947 (Wyo. Sept. 16, 2015). In
action involving ongoing general adjudication of water rights in
river system, landowner filed objections to special master’s report
and recommendation, which recommended partial reinstatement of
cattle company’s expired permit, which conveyed water through
ditch that ran through landowner’s property. The District Court
adopted special master’s report and recommendation and entered
its final order in general adjudication. Landowner appealed. The
Supreme Court held that: (1) special master did not improperly
place burden of proof on landowner, and (2) evidence
was sufficient to support findings required to reinstate permit.
2.

Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa
Indians, et al. v. State of Wisconsin, et al.
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No. 74-313, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139294 (W.D. Wis.
Oct. 13, 2015). Plaintiffs Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake
Superior Chippewa Indians; Red Cliff Band of Lake Superior
Chippewa Indians; Sokaogan Chippewa Indian Community, Mole
Lake Band of Wisconsin; Bad River Band of The Lake Superior
Chippewa Indians; and Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior
Chippewa Indians want to modify the final judgment entered in
this litigation in 1991 insofar as it bars tribal members from
engaging in night deer hunting outside their reservations on public
lands and privately-owned managed forest lands in northern
Wisconsin.
Plaintiffs’ motion for Rule 60(b)(5) relief was denied by this
court in earlier proceedings, but the ruling was reversed on appeal.
Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v.
State of Wisconsin, 769 F.3d 543, 546 (7th Cir. 2014). The court of
appeals found that the 1991 judgment forbidding night hunting of
deer by tribal members had been rendered obsolete by the passage
of time and the state’s greater experience with night hunting of
deer since 1991. Beginning in the late 1990s, the state had used
state employees and private contractors to kill deer at night in
many areas of the state to reduce the increase in the deer
population and to prevent the spread of chronic wasting disease in
deer. The program showed that night hunting was not as risky as it
had seemed, as did the record of on-reservation tribal night
hunting, which is not subject to state regulation. Accordingly, the
court of appeals saw no reason to prohibit the tribes’ members
from engaging in such hunting within the ceded territory, “given
sensible regulations governing such hunting.”
Plaintiffs’ retained their hunting rights, including the right to
hunt at night, when they ceded thousands of acres of northern
Wisconsin to the United States in the early part of the nineteenth
century. Their right to hunt deer at night throughout the ceded
territory was prohibited in the final judgment entered in 1991 only
because the court found then that the state defendants had shown
such hunting to be a hazard to public safety, that the particular
regulation was necessary to prevent the hazard and that it was the
least restrictive alternative to the accomplish the safety purpose.
Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians, 740
F. Supp. 1400, 1423 (W.D. Wis. 1990). Now, the tribes have been
able to show that the prohibition on off-reservation night deer
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hunting is no longer necessary for public safety purposes, when
properly regulated. It remains plaintiffs’ right, as well as its
responsibility, to promulgate and enforce the regulations; not
defendants’.
Defendants’ role is limited to showing that plaintiffs’
regulations are inadequate. Defendants have focused on five areas
in which they think plaintiffs’ proposed regulations are inadequate
to protect public safety: (1) the “adequate backdrop” regulation;
(2) notice; (3) pre-scouting; (4) the need for a spotter; and (5) the
proposed start date for off-reservation night hunting. The
objections of defendants State of Wisconsin, et al. to plaintiffs’
regulations for night hunting are denied as either discriminatory or
unnecessary to prevent or ameliorate any substantial risk posed by
tribal night hunting.
3.

Penobscot Nation v. Mills

No. 1:12-cv-254, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169342 (D. Me. Dec.
16, 2015). Before the Court were three motions for summary
judgment: (1) the State Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment, or in the Alternative, for Dismissal for Failure to Join
Indispensable Parties; (2) the United States’ Motion for Summary
Judgment; and (3) the Motion for Summary Judgment by Plaintiff
Penobscot Nation.
Plaintiff Penobscot Nation, which is a federally recognized
American Indian tribe in Maine, filed this action seeking to resolve
ongoing disputes between the tribe and the State of Maine
regarding a section of the Penobscot River. The Court allowed the
United States to intervene as a plaintiff on its own behalf and as a
trustee for the Penobscot Nation. The Penobscot Nation asserted
that it was prompted to file this case in response to the August 8,
2012 Opinion issued by then-Maine Attorney General William J.
Schneider regarding the respective regulatory jurisdiction of the . .
. Penobscot Nation and the State of Maine relating to hunting and
fishing on the main stem of the Penobscot River.
The Penobscot Nation and the United States (together,
Plaintiffs) maintain that the 2012 Attorney General Opinion
reflected a misinterpretation of the law governing the boundaries
of their reservation and their rights to engage in sustenance fishing.
Thus, Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment clarifying both
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those boundaries and tribal fishing rights within the Penobscot
River.
The Court held that: (1) The plain language of the Maine
Implementing Act (MIA) and the Maine Indian Claims Settlement
Act (MICSA) is not ambiguous and does not suggest that any of
the waters of the Main Stem section of the Penobscot River are
included within the boundaries of the Penobscot Indian
Reservation; (2) The Penobscot Indian Reservation as defined in
MIA, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 30, § 6203(8), and the MICSA,
25 U.S.C.S. § 1722(i), includes the islands of the Main Stem, but
not the waters of the Main Stem; (3) The language of Me. Rev.
Stat. Ann. tit. 30, § 6207(4) is ambiguous; (4) Interpreting
§ 6207(4) to reflect the expressed legislative will and in
accordance with the special tribal canons of statutory construction,
sustenance fishing rights provided in § 6207(4) allow the
Penobscot Nation to take fish for individual sustenance in the
entirety of the Main Stem section.
The Court ordered that declaratory judgment enter as follows:
(1) in favor of the State Defendants to the extent that the Court
hereby declares that the Penobscot Indian Reservation as defined
in MIA, 30 M.R.S.A. § 6203(8), and MICSA, 25 U.S.C. § 1722(i),
includes the islands of the Main Stem, but not the waters of the
Main Stem; and (2) in favor of the Penobscot Nation and the
United States to the extent that the Court hereby declares that the
sustenance fishing rights provided in section 30 M.R.S.A. §
6207(4) allows the Penobscot Nation to take fish for individual
sustenance in the entirety of the Main Stem section of the
Penobscot River.
4.

New Mexico v. Trujillo

No. 15–2047, 2016 WL 683831 (10th Cir. Feb. 19, 2016). New
Mexico filed suit regarding water rights. The District Court entered
order that adjudicated individual’s water rights based on special
master’s summary judgment order. Individual property owner
appealed. The appellate court held that: (1) district court’s
certification of order as final appealable judgment did not clearly
articulate “finality” or “no just reason for delay,” and therefore
order fell short of proper certification; (2) order addressing
individual’s water rights could not be considered final, as required
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to be certified as final appealable order; (3) danger of injustice did
not outweigh inconvenience and costs of piecemeal review, and
thus order could not be reviewed under pragmatic finality doctrine;
(4) order describing individual’s water rights expressly granted
State’s request for injunction, and thus Court of Appeals could
exercise jurisdiction to review it; and (5) individual inadequately
presented argument on appeal that she was entitled to irrigate her
land, and thus Court of Appeals declined to address it. Affirmed.
5.

Turunen v. Creagh

No. 2:13-CV-106, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43158 (W.D. Mich.
Mar. 31, 2016). Plaintiff, Brenda Turunen, is a member of the
Keweenaw Bay Indian Community (KBIC), a federally recognized
Indian tribe in Michigan’s Upper Peninsula that is the successorin-interest to the L’Anse and Ontonagon bands of the Lake
Superior Chippewa Indians. In 1842, the Lake Superior Chippewa
Indians signed a treaty with the United States of America, 7 Stat.
591 (the 1842 Treaty), in which the Indian signatories ceded large
portions of the western Upper Peninsula of Michigan, but reserved
“the right of hunting on the ceded territory, with the other usual
privileges of occupancy.” 7 Stat. 591.
Plaintiff owned property that is within the “ceded territory” at
issue in the 1842 Treaty. Plaintiff asserted that “the usual
privileges of occupancy” reserved by the KBIC on the ceded
territory included commercial farming and animal husbandry.
Based on that interpretation of the 1842 Treaty, Plaintiff sought a
declaration that she may—as a member of the KBIC—raise
animals free from state regulation on her property within the ceded
territory. Plaintiff’s claim rests on the twin propositions that the
KBIC retained certain rights in the 1842 Treaty, and that she may
exercise such rights based on her membership in the KBIC.
Although the Court was required to determine the scope of the
rights retained by the KBIC to resolve Plaintiff’s claim, the KBIC
was not a party to this action. Thus, the Court previously sought
briefing from the parties regarding whether the KBIC should be
joined pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19, and whether
the case should be dismissed if the KBIC could not be joined.
After the parties responded, the Court—at Plaintiff’s urging—
ordered Plaintiff to notify the KBIC of the pending action and the
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opportunity to intervene. The KBIC followed up to that
notification with a letter to the Court stating that it would not
intervene in the action, and further urging that the action be
dismissed under Rule 19.
The Court concluded that the KBIC was a required party to this
action and that joinder of the KBIC was not feasible. The Court
further found that the first three factors under Rule 19(b) weigh in
favor of dismissal. Although the fourth factor weighs against
dismissal, such factor is not dispositive, particularly in light of the
interests presented by the KBIC’s invocation of its sovereign
immunity. Accordingly, the Court concluded this action should be
dismissed pursuant to Rule 19.
6. Ninilchik Traditional Council v. Towarak
No. 3:15-cv-00205, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51370 (D. Alaska
Apr. 17, 2016). Defendants Tim Towarak (Chairman of the Federal
Subsistence Board), Sally Jewell (Secretary of Interior), and Tom
Vilsack (Secretary of Agriculture) (Defendants) moved to dismiss
the complaint of plaintiff Ninilchik Traditional Council (NTC)
pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6).
NTC’s two-count complaint, filed in October 2015, alleged that
Defendants’ actions violate Section 804 of ANILCA and the
Administrative Procedure Act in relation to three events: (1) the
Board’s 2002 delegation of authority to the in-season manager;
(2) Jeffry Anderson’s (during all relevant times, the in-season
fishery manager) 2015 subsistence fishery closure; and
(3) Defendants’ implementation of the Kenai river gillnet fishery
regulation.
The plaintiff was NTC, the governing body of Ninilchik
Village, a federally-recognized Indian tribe whose members have a
customary and traditional use of all fish in the Kasilof and Kenai
River drainages. Although Ninilchik Village members share “in an
annual subsistence allocation of salmon from three federal fisheries
on the Kenai River,” they alleged that they have “been unable to
harvest this subsistence salmon allocation” due to “restrictive
federal subsistence regulations limiting methods and means of
harvest, and restrictive and arbitrary federal in-season subsistence
management actions.”
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In March 2014, NTC submitted two proposed regulations that
would authorize residents of Ninilchik to operate two community
subsistence gillnets: one in the Kenai River and the other in the
Kasilof River. The Southcentral Regional Advisory Council, which
is a regional advisory council established under Section 805 of
ANILCA to provide opinions and recommendations to the Board
on subsistence matters, considered NTC’s two gillnet fishery
proposals and recommended that the Board adopt both. The Board
voted to adopt NTC’s proposals and, after a five-month notice and
comment period, promulgated final regulations authorizing the two
gillnet fisheries.
On May 27, 2015, NTC submitted to Anderson an operational
plan for the Kenai and Kasilof gillnet fisheries. Before deciding
either submission, Anderson issued an emergency special action
closing the federal subsistence fishery from June 18 until August
15 for early-run Chinook salmon in all federal public waters in the
Kenai River downstream of Skilak Lake.
On July 13, “less than a month before the closure of the 2015
federal subsistence fishing season,” Anderson approved NTC’s
operational plan for the Kasilof River gillnet and issued a permit to
NTC. But Anderson still did not act on NTC’s request for a Kenai
River gillnet permit. In a July 16 letter explained that he did not
anticipate approving a Kenai River permit for the 2015 fishing
season “because of the urgent need to protect early-run Chinook
[s]almon.”
In late July NTC wrote two letters to the Board seeking relief.
The Board convened on July 28 and considered NTC’s requests.
After hearing testimony, the Board voted not to grant NTC any of
the relief it had requested. Defendants’ motion to dismiss is
granted in part and denied in part as follows: Defendants’ motion
to dismiss NTC’s claim that the Board violated 50 C.F.R. §
100.10(d)(6) by not establishing “frameworks” to guide the
delegation of its authority is DENIED; Defendants’ motion to
dismiss NTC’s claim that the in-season manager’s failure to decide
its Kenai gillnet permit application based on the merits of the
operational plan violates 50 C.F.R. § 100.27(e)(10)(iv)(J) is
denied; in all other respects, Defendants’ motion is granted.
7. United States v. Washington
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No. C70-9213, Subproceeding No. 14-02, 2016 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 78661 (W.D. Wash. Jun. 15, 2016). This matter was before
the Court on Nisqually Indian Tribe’s (“Nisqually”) and Squaxin
Indian Tribe’s (“Squaxin”) Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment.
The Nisqually and Squaxin asked the Court to interpret the Usual
and Accustomed fishing grounds and stations (“U&A”) of the
Squaxin pursuant to Paragraph 25(a)(1) of the permanent
injunction. Specifically, Nisqually sought a determination that
Squaxin has no adjudicated U&A east of a line running from
Johnson Point to Devils Head, including the waters of the
Nisqually Reach and around Anderson Island (“Subproceeding
Area” or “disputed waters”). Nisqually also asked the Court to
clarify the previous language of the Court concerning Squaxin’s
U&A, and enjoin Squaxin from future fishing or fisheriesmanagement actions in the Subproceeding Area. Squaxin argued
that Judge Boldt did not intend to exclude the disputed waters, as
demonstrated by the evidence before him at the time he made his
decision, and sought a determination that the Squaxin U&A
included those waters. The Court hereby finds and orders: (1)
Nisqually Indian Tribe’s Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.
(2) Squaxin Indian Tribe’s Motion for Summary Judgment is
granted. This Court has determined that there is no evidence that
Judge Boldt intended to exclude the disputed waters from the
Squaxin U&A, and there is evidence in the record supporting that
the Squaxin regularly fished in those waters.
8. United States v. Washington
No. 13-35474, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 11709 (9th Cir. Jun. 27,
2016). Holdings:(1) The record supported the district court’s
determination that barrier culverts the State of Washington used
when it laid roads over streams in the State violated the Stevens
Treaties the United States entered with Indian tribes because they
hindered salmon from swimming upstream to spawn, and the court
did not exceed its powers when it ordered the State to prepare a list
of state-owned barrier culverts within areas covered by the treaties
and to fix or remove them. (2) There was no merit to the State’s
claim that the United States waived its right to represent the tribes
because it led the State to believe that its barrier culverts did not
violate the treaties. (3) The court did not err when it dismissed the
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State’s claim that the United States had to fix barrier culverts it
installed on federal land in Washington before the State could be
required to repair or remove its culverts. The court of appeals
affirmed the district court’s order.
G.
1.

Gaming

Alabama v. PCI Gaming Auth.

2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 15692 (11th Cir. Ala. Sept. 3, 2015).
Alabama sued under state and federal law to enjoin gaming at
casinos owned by the Poarch Band of Creek Indians (the “Tribe”)
and located on Indian lands within the state’s borders. As the Tribe
itself was unquestionably immune from suit, Alabama instead
named as defendants PCI Gaming Authority (“PCI”), an entity
wholly owned by the Tribe that operates the casinos, and tribal
officials in their official capacity.
Alabama claimed that the gaming at the casinos constitutes a
public nuisance under Alabama law and should be enjoined. It put
forth two novel theories to explain why its state law applies to the
Tribe’s casinos. First, Alabama asserted that the Secretary of the
Interior lacked authority to take land into trust for the Tribe;
therefore, the Tribe’s casinos were not located on Indian lands, and
Alabama may regulate the gaming there. Second, Alabama
contended that by incorporating state laws governing gambling
into federal law, 18 U.S.C. § 1166 creates a right of action for a
state to sue in federal court to enforce its laws on Indian lands.
The district court rejected these arguments and dismissed the
action on the grounds that the defendants were entitled to tribal
immunity on nearly all of Alabama’s claims and Alabama failed to
state a claim for relief. The appellate court upheld the judgment of
the district court finding that the Tribe was entitled to sovereign
immunity as to all of Alabama’s claims as the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act, 18 U.S.C.S. § 1166, gives states no right of action
to sue. The appellate court held that Congress did not intend to
create an implied right of action in § 1166. The court also held that
the individual defendants were entitled to sovereign immunity as to
Alabama’s state law claim. Judgment affirmed.
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Citizens Against Casino Gambling v. Jonodey Osceola
Chauduri

Nos. 11-5171, 11-5466, 13-2339, 13-2777, 2015 U.S. App.
LEXIS 16439 (2d Cir. Sept. 15, 2015). The plaintiffs-appellants
(“plaintiffs”) were organizations and individuals that oppose the
operation of a casino in Buffalo, New York, by the Seneca Nation
of Indians. They brought three successive lawsuits in the United
States District Court for the Western District of New York against
the National Indian Gaming Commission (“NIGC”), its Chairman,
the United States Department of the Interior (“DOI”), and the
Secretary of the Interior. In the three actions, the plaintiffs argued
that the NIGC did not act in accordance with federal law in
approving an ordinance and subsequent amendments to that
ordinance that permitted the Seneca Nation to operate a class III
gaming facility, a casino, on land owned by the Seneca Nation in
Buffalo (“the Buffalo Parcel”). In the third lawsuit (“CACGEC
III”), which addressed the NIGC’s approval of the most recent
version of the ordinance, the district court denied the plaintiffs’
motion for summary judgment and entered judgment dismissing
the case.
The appellate court held that the district court correctly
dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint in CACGEC III because the
DOI and the NIGC’s determination that the Buffalo Parcel is
eligible for class III gaming under the Indian Gaming Regulatory
Act (“IGRA”), 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721, was not arbitrary or
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or in violation of law. The court
further held that Congress intended the Buffalo Parcel to be subject
to tribal jurisdiction, as required for the land to be eligible for
gaming under IGRA. Finally, the court held that IGRA Section
20’s prohibition of gaming on trust lands acquired after IGRA’s
enactment in 1988, 25 U.S.C. § 2719(a), does not apply to the
Buffalo Parcel. Because the gaming ordinances at issue in the first
two lawsuits (“CACGEC I” and “CACGEC II”) have been
superseded by the most recent amended ordinance, the appeals of
CACGEC I and CACGEC II are moot. Accordingly, the court
affirmed the judgment of the district court in CACGEC III and
dismissed the appeals of CACGEC I and CACGEC II.
3.

San Pasqual Band of Mission Indians v. State
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No. B254870, 2015 WL 6438536 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 5, 2015).
Tribe brought action against the state and Gambling Control
Commission seeking damages for breach of Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act compact. The Superior Court granted summary
judgment for state and Commission. Tribe appealed. The appellate
court ruled that compact barred tribe from recovering damages as a
remedy for breach. Affirmed.
4.

Pauma Band of Luiseno Mission Indians of the Pauma &
Yuima Reservation v. California

Nos. 14–56104, 14–56105, 2015 WL 6445610 (9th Cir.
Oct. 26, 2015). Indian tribe brought suit against California,
asserting claims of mistake and misrepresentation regarding
amendment to tribal-state gaming compact entered under Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), and seeking injunctive relief.
Indian tribe moved for summary judgment. The District Court
granted motion on misrepresentation claim. Tribe moved to vacate
to request further relief, which was denied. California appealed,
and tribe cross-appealed.
The appellate court held that: (1) California misrepresented to
tribe that no further licenses were available; (2) amendment was
voidable and appropriate remedy was rescission and restitution;
(3) California was not entitled to setoff for profits tribe gained
from operating machines it would not have had absent amendment;
(4) California’s misrepresentation was innocent not fraudulent;
(5) California waived sovereign immunity; and (6) language of
IGRA precluded bad faith claim against California.
5.

Massachusetts v. Wampanoag Tribe of Gay Head (Aquinnah)

No. 13-13286, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153935 (D. Mass. Nov.
13, 2015). Prior History: Massachusetts v. Wampanoag Tribe of
Gay Head (Aquinnah), 36 F. Supp. 3d 229, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
89460 (D. Mass., 2014). This lawsuit involved a dispute over
gaming on Indian lands on Martha’s Vineyard. The Wampanoag
Tribe of Gay Head (Aquinnah) and related entities have taken steps
to commence commercial gaming operations on tribal lands in the
town of Aquinnah. The Tribe does not have a state gaming license.
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The Commonwealth of Massachusetts contends that operating
gaming facilities without such a license would violate a 1983
agreement, approved by Congress in 1987, that subjects the lands
in question to state civil and criminal jurisdiction (and specifically
to state laws regulating gaming). Count 1 of the complaint alleged
breach of contract, and Count 2 sought a declaratory judgment.
The Commonwealth, the Town of Aquinnah, the
Aquinnah/Gay Head Community Association (AGHCA), and the
Tribe have all moved for summary judgment. This case presented
two fairly narrow issues. The first was whether a statute passed by
Congress in 1988 (the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, or IGRA)
applies to the lands in question, which in turn raises the questions
whether the Tribe exercises “jurisdiction” and “governmental
power” over the lands. The second was whether IGRA repealed, by
implication, the statute passed by Congress in 1987 (the act that
approved the 1983 agreement). If the 1988 law (IGRA) controls,
the Tribe can build a gaming facility in Aquinnah. If the 1987 law
controlled, it cannot.
The complaint asserted a claim for breach of contract and
requested a declaratory judgment that the Settlement Agreement
allowed the Commonwealth to prohibit the Tribe from conducting
gaming on the Settlement Lands. The Tribe removed the action to
this Court on grounds of federal-question and supplemental
jurisdiction. The Commonwealth moved to remand the action to
state court, which the Court denied. Both the AGHCA and the
Town filed motions to intervene. The Court granted those motions.
The Tribe moved to dismiss the AGHCA complaint on the grounds
of sovereign immunity and failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. The Tribe separately moved to dismiss all
three complaints, with leave to amend, for failure to join the
United States, which it asserted was a required party under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 19. The Tribe filed an amended answer to the
Commonwealth’s complaint which included counterclaims against
the Commonwealth and claims against three third-party
defendants, all of whom are government officials of the
Commonwealth sued in their official capacity.
The Court denied the Tribe’s motions to dismiss and granted
the motion by the Commonwealth to dismiss the counterclaims
against it. Remaining are the claims by the Commonwealth, the
AGHCA, and the Town against the Tribe, and the Tribe’s
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counterclaims
against
the government
officials.
The
Commonwealth, the Town, the AGHCA, and the Tribe all moved
for summary judgment.
The Court found that the Tribe has not met its burden of
demonstrating that it exercises sufficient “governmental power”
over the Settlement Lands, and therefore IGRA does not apply and
it is clear that IGRA did not repeal by implication the
Massachusetts Settlement Act. Accordingly, the Tribe cannot build
a gaming facility on the Settlement Lands without complying with
the laws and regulations of the Commonwealth and the Town. The
Court granted the motions for summary judgment of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the Town of Aquinnah, and the
Aquinnah/Gay Head Community Association, Inc. and denied the
Tribe’s motion for summary judgment.
6.

North Fork Rancheria of Mono Indians v. California

No. 1:15-cv-00419, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154729 (E.D. Cal.
Nov. 13, 2015). Prior History: N. Fork Rancheria of Mono Indians
of Cal. v. California, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113424 (E.D. Cal.
Aug. 26, 2015). Plaintiff North Fork Rancheria of Mono Indians of
California (“North Fork” or “the Tribe”) had brought suit against
the State of California (“State” or “California”) based on an
alleged failure of the State to negotiate in good faith for the
purpose of entering into a Tribal-State compact governing the
conduct of class III gaming activities as required by the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act (“IGRA”). See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A).
The parties have filed competing motions for judgment on the
pleadings. This case revolved around a Tribal-State compact which
was approved by the Governor and ratified by the legislature
before the issue was certified for referendum vote in the November
2014 election. The people of the State of California voted “No,”
overturning the legislative ratification of the Tribal-State compact.
North Fork is a federally recognized Indian tribe, listed in the
Federal Register. Prior to the initiation of the plan to build a
gaming facility, the Tribe possessed only a 61.5-acre parcel in
North Fork, California (which lies within the Sierra National
Forest), held in trust by the United States for development of a
community center, a youth center, and homes. In 2004, the Tribe
put into action its plan to build a gaming facility by starting down
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the path to acquisition of land in Madera County. A lengthy
environmental impact study (“EIS”), with opportunity provided for
public notice and comment, was conducted and the results
published on August 6, 2010.
After reviewing the results of the EIS, the submissions of state
and local officials and surrounding Indian tribes, and the likely
economic impact on North Fork and the surrounding communities,
the BIA recommended approval of (and requested the California
Governor’s concurrence with) the Tribe’s bid for acquisition in
trust of an approximately 305 acre plot of land in Madera County
(“Madera parcel”) for the benefit of North Fork pursuant to the
Indian Reorganization Act (“IRA”), 25 U.S.C. § 465, in
anticipation of North Fork’s construction of a C class III gaming
facility as contemplated by IGRA. California’s Governor, Edmund
Brown, Jr., gave his concurrence with the BIA recommendation on
August 30, 2012.
On February 5, 2013, the federal government took the Madera
parcel into trust for North Fork pursuant to the Indian
Reorganization Act (“IRA”), 25 U.S.C. § 465, in anticipation of
North Fork’s construction of a class III gaming facility as
contemplated by IGRA. After discussions with representatives of
the then-Governor, Arnold Schwarzenegger, regarding framing of
a Tribal-State compact, Governor Schwarzenegger and the Tribe
executed a gaming compact (“2008 Compact”). However, because
the acquisition of the Madera parcel was stalled due to the lengthy
EIS process, the 2008 Tribal-State compact was never presented to
the legislature.
A second draft of the Tribal-State compact prepared by the
Governor’s office and the Tribe was presented to Governor Brown.
On the same date that the Governor gave his concurrence to the
BIA recommendation for taking the Madera parcel into trust, his
office executed a Tribal-State compact with North Fork and
forwarded that compact to the legislature for ratification. The
California Assembly and Senate passed AB 277 and the Governor
approved it and the bill was filed with the Secretary of State. At
some time shortly thereafter, the California’s Secretary of State
forwarded the compact to the Secretary of the Interior for review
and approval pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(8). The Assistant
Secretary of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, issued notice
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that the compact between the State and North Fork was approved
(to the extent that it was consistent with IGRA).
On November 4, 2014, California voters rejected Indian
Gaming Compacts Referendum, labeled Proposition 48, to ratify
the North Fork Tribe compact. Based on that referendum vote, the
State of California refuses to recognize the existence of a valid
Tribal-State compact with North Fork. The validity of the
referendum and compact is the subject of litigation now pending
before the California Fifth District Court of Appeal. After the 2014
referendum, the State refused to enter into negotiations with North
Fork regarding a new Tribal-State compact, concluding that any
attempt at negotiation of a compact regarding the Madera parcel
would be futile. On that basis, North Fork brings the instant action,
contending that the State’s failure to negotiate triggers the remedial
provisions of IGRA.
The Court concluded that the State failed to enter into
negotiations with North Fork for the purpose of entering into a
Tribal-State compact within the meaning of § 2710. Accordingly,
the parties were ordered to conclude a compact within 60 days of
the date of this order.
7.

Bettor Racing, Inc. v. Nat’l Indian Gaming Comm’n

No. 15-1335, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 1456, 812 F.3d 648 (8th
Cir. Jan. 29, 2016). The National Indian Gaming Commission
(NIGC) permissibly interpreted the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
as not requiring scienter for a violation under 25 U.S.C.S. § 2713.
Absent a scienter requirement, the undisputed facts established that
a contractor violated the Act by operating a pari-mutuel betting
business at a tribe’s casino without an NIGC-approved contract, by
modifying the contract without NIGC approval, and by holding the
sole proprietary interest in the gaming operations. The $5 million
fine imposed on the contractor did not violate the Eighth
Amendment. Among other factors, the fine was less than the
statutory maximum under § 2713(a)(1). Granting summary
judgment without a hearing did not violate due process. Judgment
affirmed.
8.

Estom Yumeka Maidu Tribe of the Enter. Rancheria of Cal. v.
California
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No. 2:14-cv-01939, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19330 (E.D. Cal.
Feb. 16, 2016). The matter was before the Court on cross motions
for judgment on the pleadings by Plaintiff the Estom Yumeka
Maidu Tribe (hereinafter “Plaintiff”) and Defendant the State of
California (hereinafter “Defendant”). Under the federal Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act (“IGRA”), an Indian tribe seeking to
conduct casino-style gaming on Indian land must request that the
state enter into good faith negotiations to conclude a gaming
compact. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3). Under California law, the
governor is tasked with negotiating a compact, and the legislature
is tasked with ratifying it. Cal. Const., Art. IV, § 19(f). In this case,
Plaintiff negotiated and signed a compact (the “Compact”) with
Governor Jerry Brown in 2012. However, the legislature
essentially took no further action and did not hold a vote on
ratification. The Compact eventually expired on its own terms in
July 2014.
Plaintiff’s immediate remedy under the IGRA was to bring
suit. After Plaintiff had introduced evidence that the state had not
negotiated toward a compact in good faith, it is the state’s burden
to show it has negotiated in good faith. Otherwise, the state is
subject to a court order compelling it to conclude a compact within
60 days, with additional remedies should the state continue to
reject the compact. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B). Defendant’s
position was that the legislature’s inaction cannot form the basis
for suit under the IGRA, because only the governor negotiated the
instant Compact. Plaintiff’s position was that the IGRA’s
negotiation mandate extends to activities by the legislature. Both
parties have moved for judgment on the pleadings on the issue of
whether Defendant has negotiated the instant Compact in good
faith, and thus whether Plaintiff was entitled to relief under the
IGRA. The Court had carefully considered the factual and legal
issues presented in the parties’ filings, and the arguments raised in
the amicus brief submitted by the California legislature. The Court
granted Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, and
Denied Defendant’s motion.
9.

Amador Cnty. v. Jewell
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No. 05-00658, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33791 (D.D.C. Mar. 16,
2016). At the center of this dispute was a proposed gaming
operation on the Buena Vista Rancheria of the Me-Wuk Tribe
located in Amador County, California. In 2000, pursuant to the
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (“IGRA”), 25 U.S.C. §§ 27012721, the Secretary of the United States Department of the Interior
(the “Secretary”), approved a gaming compact between the Me
Wuk Tribe and the State of California. The gaming compact was
later amended in 2004 to provide for an expanded gaming
operation. Although it had not challenged the 2000 gaming
compact, Plaintiff, Amador County, challenged the Secretary’s
approval of the amended compact, claiming that the Buena Vista
Rancheria did not qualify as “Indian land” – a requirement under
the IGRA.
Before the Court were cross-motions for summary judgment.
The Secretary argued that her approval of the amended gaming
compact must be upheld because it was in accordance with the
IGRA. First, the Secretary contends that Amador County was
barred from contesting the Rancheria’s reservation status under the
IGRA because the County stipulated to the Rancheria’s status as
such in a settlement judgment in an earlier lawsuit between the
County and the Me-Wuk Tribe. Second, the Secretary argued that
even if this Court were to determine that the stipulated judgment
does not have preclusive effect in this lawsuit, her approval of the
amended compact still must be upheld because Congress granted
her the authority to determine what lands qualify as reservations
for purposes of the IGRA. Amador County, on the other hand,
requested that this Court declare that the Buena Vista Rancheria
was not Indian land under the IGRA and set aside the Secretary’s
approval of the amended compact. The County contends that it did
not, and indeed could not, stipulate to the Rancheria’s reservation
status. It further argued that even if it did stipulate to the
Rancheria’s reservation status, the stipulation dis not have
preclusive effect on the present litigation. Lastly, the County
argues the term “reservation” as it was used in the IGRA is
narrowly defined and the Buena Vista Rancheria does not fit
within that narrow definition.
Having reviewed the parties’ submissions, the record of the
case, and the relevant legal authority, the Court concluded that: (1)
Amador County stipulated that it would treat the Buena Vista
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Rancheria as a reservation; (2) Amador County is barred from
arguing in this litigation that the Rancheria is not a reservation;
and, alternatively, (3) the Secretary is authorized to declare that the
Rancheria is a reservation for purposes of the IGRA. Therefore, the
Court will deny Amador County’s motion for summary judgment
and grant the Secretary’s cross-motion.
10.

Arizona v. Tohono O’odham Nation

No. 13-16517, No. 13-16519, and No. 13-16520, 2016 U.S.
App. LEXIS 5766 (9th Cir. Mar. 29, 2016). The Nation’s plan to
build a casino and conduct Class III gaming on a certain parcel of
land did not violate a gaming compact between the Nation and the
State of Arizona. The land acquired and taken into trust pursuant to
the Gila Bend Indian Reservation Lands Replacement Act was
land taken into trust as part of a settlement of a land claim under
§ 2719 of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C.S.
§ 2719, and thus, IGRA did not bar the Nation from gaming on the
parcel. The district court properly granted summary judgment in
favor of the Nation on breach of Compact claims because the
Compact specifically authorized Class III gaming on Indian lands
that qualified for gaming under IGRA § 2719. The district court
properly held that tribal sovereign immunity barred non-Compactbased claims for promissory estoppel, fraud in the inducement, and
material misrepresentation. Orders affirmed.
11. Tohono O’odham Nation v. Ducey
No. CV-15-01135, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42410 (D. Ariz.
Mar. 30, 2016). In May 2013, this Court ruled that the Gaming
Compact between the State of Arizona and the Tohono O’odham
Nation did not prohibit the Nation from building a new casino in
the Phoenix metropolitan area. Arizona v. Tohono O’Odham
Nation, 944 F. Supp. 2d 748 (D. Ariz. 2013) (“Tohono O’odham
II”). Subsequently, the Nation began constructing a casino known
as the West Valley Resort in Glendale, Arizona, a suburb of
Phoenix. In April 2015, while construction was ongoing, the
Director of the Arizona Department of Gaming (“ADG”), wrote a
letter to the Nation reiterating the Department’s position that the
Nation engaged in fraud during the formation of the Compact, and
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asserting authority to withhold certification from the Resort’s
vendors and employees based on this conduct. In response, the
Nation brought this lawsuit, claiming that federal law preempts any
state-law authority ADG might have to withhold these
certifications.
The Director had asserted counterclaims against the Nation for
promissory estoppel, fraudulent inducement, and material
misrepresentation. The Director sought a variety of relief,
including (1) a declaration that “ADG is not obligated to certify or
authorize the Nation’s proposed class III gaming facility on the
Glendale property or any other Nation-owned or operated class III
gaming facility in the Phoenix metropolitan area”; (2) a judgment
that “the Nation is estopped from opening any class III gaming
facilities in the Phoenix metropolitan area”; (3) a declaration or
injunction that the Nation is prohibited from conducting class III
gaming activities on the Glendale property; (4) a declaration that
the Compact is voidable and unenforceable and subject to
rescission; and (5) reformation of the compact. The Nation moves
to dismiss these counterclaims.
The court: (1) granted the Nation’s motion to dismiss with
respect to the Director’s counterclaim for promissory estoppel;
(2) struck the Director’s demands for reformation of the Compact
and declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to casinos other
than the West Valley Resort; (3) otherwise denied the Nation’s
motion to dismiss.
12. Jamul Action Comm. V. Chaudhuri
No. 15-16021, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 13104 (9th Cir. Jul. 15,
2016, Amended Opinion). This case was about an Indian gaming
casino in Jamul, California. The Jamul Indian Village, a federally
recognized Indian tribe and a non-party to this suit (“Tribe”), was
building a casino in Jamul. A sub-group of tribal members and
organizations, including the Jamul Action Committee, the Jamul
Community Church, and four residents of rural Jamul (collectively
“JAC”), opposed the casino. This lawsuit was JAC’s most recent
effort to stop its construction. JAC contended that the National
Indian Gaming Commission (“NIGC”) violated the National
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) when it approved the Tribe’s
gaming ordinance (“GO”) without first conducting a NEPA
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environmental review. JAC petitioned the district court for a writ
of mandamus under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”),
arguing that the NEPA environmental review was “agency action
unlawfully withheld.” The district court denied relief. The
appellate court held that contrary to JAC’s arguments, NIGC’s
approval of the Tribe’s gaming ordinance without conducting a
NEPA environmental review did not violate NIGC’s obligations
under NEPA because “where a clear and unavoidable conflict in
statutory authority exists, NEPA must give way.” Flint Ridge Dev.
Co. v. Scenic Rivers Assn. 426 U.S. 776 (1976) at 788. Though the
district court relied on other grounds, we affirm its denial of
plaintiff’s requested writ of mandamus. The decision of the district
court was affirmed.
13. Jamul Action Comm. V. Chaudhuri
No. 2:13-cv-01920, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104359 (E.D. Cal.
Aug. 8, 2016). The plaintiffs in this action were a group of
individuals, a non-profit association, and a community church from
Jamul, California, together, the Jamul Action Committee (JAC).
The JAC asked the court to stop construction of a casino on the
Jamul Indian Village’s land, among related requests for declaratory
relief. In short, the JAC alleged the casino was illegal because it
was being constructed on land that federal law does not make
eligible for gambling.
The defendants, who include federal officials, members of the
Jamul Indian Village, and private corporations tasked with the
construction and eventual management of the casino, move to
dismiss the case on a number of jurisdictional and other grounds.
The Jamul Indian Village itself is not a party.
The National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC) published a
notice in the Federal Register in April 2013, which stated that the
NIGC would prepare a statement on the environmental impacts of
an agreement between the Tribe and defendant San Diego Gaming
Ventures, LLC (SDGV). 78 Fed. Reg. 21,398 (Apr. 10, 2013).
According to the NIGC’s notice, SDGV would manage a casino
the Tribe planned for construction outside Jamul, California. See
78 Fed. Reg. 21,399. The notice also explained that the casino
would be constructed “on the Tribe’s Reservation.” Id. In a
previous notice published in the Federal Register more than a

2017]

Case Law on American Indians: 2015-2016

454

decade earlier, the NIGC and Bureau of Indian Affairs had not
referred to this land as the Tribe’s “Reservation.” See Notice of
Intent, 67 Fed. Reg. 15,582 (Apr. 2, 2002); see also Notice, 68
Fed. Reg. 1,475 (Jan. 10, 2003).
The JAC understood the NIGC’s April 2013 notice as a formal
declaration that the Tribe “has a Reservation that qualifies as
‘Indian lands’ eligible for gaming” under the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act (IGRA). In the JAC’s view, this determination runs
counter to federal law, because although the Tribe may have a
beneficial interest in the land in question, that land “is not a
reservation or trust land” as defined by IGRA.
The court found that the JAC’s first, second, third, fourth, and
sixth claims must be dismissed because the Tribe is a necessary
party and has not been joined. The JAC’s fifth claim must be
restricted to its allegation that the federal defendants approved the
Tribe’s gaming ordinance without conducting the review
procedure required by NEPA. The court granted the tribally
affiliated defendants’ motion to dismiss without leave to amend.
The court granted in part the federal defendants’ motion without
leave to amend as to claims one, two, three, four and six. The court
converted the federal defendants’ motion to dismiss claim five into
one for summary judgment to allow consideration of evidence on
the limited question of whether the Tribe’s gaming management
contract has been approved.
14. North Fork Rancheria v. California
No. 1:15-cv-00419, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105825 (E.D. Cal.
Aug. 10, 2016). Plaintiff North Fork Rancheria of Mono Indians of
California (“North Fork”) had obtained judgment on the pleadings
against the State of California (“State” or ”California”) based on
the failure of the State to negotiate with the tribe for the purpose of
entering into a Tribal-State compact governing the conduct of class
III gaming activities as required by the Indian Gaming Rights Act
(“IGRA”), see 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A), after the California
electorate voted down Proposition 48, the referendum that would
have ratified the gaming compact between North Fork and
California. In response to issues highlighted by the Picayune
Rancheria of Chukchansi Indians (“Chukchansi”) in its motion to
intervene, the Court ordered additional briefing from the parties
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regarding whether a decision in one of the other actions regarding
the proposed North Fork gaming site might impact this Court’s
jurisdiction over this case. North Fork and the State agreed that this
matter is justiciable regardless of the outcome of the other actions.
They also agreed that no stay should be imposed. Chukchansi
submitted briefing as amicus curiae, wherein it argues that this
matter could be rendered non-justiciable by decisions in other
proceedings. The Court declined to issue a stay and terminated the
action in its entirety.
15.

Frank’s Landing Indian Cmty. v. Nat’l Indian Gaming
Comm’n

No. C15-5828, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108581(W.D. Wash.
Aug. 15, 2016). This matter came before the Court on Defendants
National Indian Gaming Commission (“NIGC”) and Jonodev
Chaudhuri’s, in his official capacity as Chairman of the NIGC
(“Chairman”), motion to dismiss. The Court grants the motion for
the reasons stated herein.
The Community is a federally-recognized self-governing
dependent Indian community located along the Nisqually River
near Olympia, Washington. In 1987, Congress recognized the
Community’s members “as eligible for the special programs and
services provided by the United States to Indians because of their
status as Indians” and “as eligible to contract, and to receive
grants, under the Indian Self-Determination and Education
Assistance Act for such services.” Pub. L. No. 100-153, § 10,
101 Stat. 886, 889 (1987). In 1994, Congress amended the law to
state that the Community is recognized “as a self-governing
dependent Indian community that is not subject to the jurisdiction
of any federally recognized tribe.” Pub. L. No. 103-435, § 8,
108 Stat. 4566, 4569 (1994). This amendment stated that
“[n]othing in this section may be construed to constitute
the recognition by the United States that the Frank’s Landing
Indian Community is a federally recognized Indian tribe.” Id. The
section also noted that “notwithstanding any other provision of
law,” the Community “shall not engage in any class III gaming
activity” under the IGRA. Id.
On December 9, 2014, the Community submitted a purported
Class II gaming ordinance to the NIGC for the Chairman’s review
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and approval along with a resolution from the Community’s
governing body, enacting the ordinance. The NIGC referred the
matter to Interior’s Office of the Solicitor, requesting an opinion
on whether the Community is a tribe within the meaning of the
IGRA, who referred the matter to the Assistant Secretary — Indian
Affairs (“AS-IA”), Kevin Washburn. On March 6, 2015, the ASIA issued a memorandum to the NIGC Chairman conveying
Interior’s conclusion that the Community is not an Indian tribe
within the meaning of the IGRA because it is not a federallyrecognized Indian tribe.
While it is possible for the Community to challenge the
Secretary’s refusal to include the Community on the list of
federally recognized tribes published yearly in the federal register,
see Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma v. Babbitt, 117 F.3d 1489, 326
U.S. App. D.C. 139 (D.C. Cir. 1997), the Community’s instant
dispute is with the Secretary and not the NIGC. In fact, any ruling
that the NIGC had the authority to approve a gaming license for a
community that the Secretary had not recognized would effectively
convey more authority on the NIGC than Congress explicitly
intended in the IGRA. Therefore, the Court granted Defendants’
motion to dismiss because the Community had failed to state a
legally cognizable claim against the NGIC and the Chairman.

H.
1.

Jurisdiction, Federal

United States v. Osage Wind, LLC

No. 14-CV-704, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132480 (N.D. Okla.
Sept. 30, 2015). Before the Court were Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss or for Summary Judgment and Plaintiff’s Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment as to Counts I and II of the Amended
Complaint. Plaintiff, the United States of America filed this action
on November 21, 2014. In the First Amended Complaint for
Declaratory Judgment and Damages, Plaintiff alleged the
Defendants’ construction activities interfere with the Osage
Nation’s reserved mineral rights, and Defendants failed to obtain
the necessary prior approvals before excavating the turbine
foundations for the Project. Specifically, Plaintiff asserted that
Defendants violated 25 C.F.R. § 211.48, which prohibits
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“exploration, drilling, or mining operations on Indian land”
without obtaining permission from the Secretary of the Interior,
and 25 C.F.R. § 214.7, which forbids “mining or work of any
nature” on reserved Osage County land unless a mineral lease
covering such land is approved by the Secretary. Plaintiff alleged
“Defendants initiated excavation work and substantial disturbance
and invasion of the mineral estate” without obtaining the required
prior approvals or appropriate lease.
The First Amended Complaint alleged five counts, all of which
hinge on whether the Defendants violated 25 C.F.R. § 211 and/or
25 C.F.R. § 214. Count I sought a declaration regarding the
applicability and violation of 25 C.F.R. § 211 as to Defendants’
construction activities. Count II sought a declaration regarding the
applicability and violation of 25 C.F.R. § 214 as to Defendants’
construction activities.
Plaintiff filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to
Counts I and II of the Amended Complaint, along with a Motion
for Expedited Consideration. Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss
or for Summary Judgment. Defendants filed a Notice of
Supplemental Authority, which Plaintiff moved to strike as
improperly filed. Defendants filed a Notice to the Court, advising
construction of the Osage Wind Farm has been completed and the
Wind Farm has commenced commercial operation. The Court
concluded that Plaintiff’s claims fail as a matter of law.
Accordingly, the court granted Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment and denied Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment. Further, the Court denied Plaintiff’s Motion for
Expedited Consideration and Plaintiff’s Motions to Strike.
2.

Shingle Springs Band of Miwok Indians v. Caballero

No. 13-15411, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 20094 (9th Cir. Nov. 19,
2015). Plaintiff-Appellee Shingle Springs Band of Miwok Indians
(Tribe) alleged that Cesar Caballero infringed various trademarks
related to the Tribe and a casino it owns and operates, the Red
Hawk Casino, in violation of the Lanham Act, the California
Business and Professions Code, and common law, and that
Caballero cybersquatted on related domain names. The district
court granted summary judgment to the Tribe on those claims and
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permanently enjoined Caballero from using the marks in any way.
Caballero appealed the district court’s judgment.
The trademarks allegedly infringed by Caballero fall into two
categories: (1) marks related to the Tribe and its Rancheria (the
Tribal Marks); and (2) the “Red Hawk Casino Mark.” The latter
mark is registered with the United States Patent and Trademark
Office; the Tribal Marks are not.
This evidence fails to carry the Tribe’s burden on summary
judgment. There is insufficient evidence in the record to prove that
Caballero offered “association services” within the meaning of the
Lanham Act. Caballero’s own vague and conclusory statements are
insufficient to establish that Caballero or his tribe provided or
offered any services. The only remaining factual support for the
Tribe’s allegations is a snapshot of Caballero’s website depicting a
contact email address for those with “Enrollment Questions,”
which, standing on its own, does not support the grant of summary
judgment. Even if the “Enrollment Questions” heading on his
website could be construed as constituting an offer of membership,
what Caballero refers to as “association services,” solicitation of
members in and of itself is insufficient to constitute an offer of a
service without evidence as to what those prospective members
would be joining. As to the Red Hawk Casino Mark, the Tribe has
failed to present any evidence that Caballero used the mark in
connection with a good or service. On the present record, no
reasonable jury could conclude that Caballero offered or provided
any service in connection with his use of either the Tribal Marks or
the Red Hawk Casino Mark.
The Tribe also is not entitled to summary judgment on the
cybersquatting claims. There is no evidence in the record, not even
in Caballero’s brief exchange with the Tribe’s counsel at his
deposition, that Caballero intended to profit by using the domain
names involving the Tribal Marks or the domain names involving
the Red Hawk Casino Mark. The Tribe therefore has failed to
provide sufficient evidence on this statutory element of its claims
for cybersquatting. Reversed and remanded.
3.

Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida v. Cypress

No. 14–12115, 2015 WL 9310571 (11th Cir. Dec. 23, 2015).
Indian tribe brought action alleging that former tribal chairman,
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director of finance, chief financial officer, tribe’s former attorneys,
and investment firm violated Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO) and state law by embezzling tribal
funds for their personal use, charging excessive fees, and
managing tribe’s funds in manner allowing suspicious financial
transactions to occur. Investment firm moved to compel
arbitration. The District Court, 2013 WL 2158422, granted motion.
The remaining defendants moved to dismiss. The District Court,
975 F. Supp. 2d 1298, granted motion. Tribe appealed. The
appellate court held that: 1) alleged fraud upon authority of former
chairman of tribe was issue to be raised in arbitration; 2) intratribal dispute doctrine was not triggered, and federal question
jurisdiction existed; and 3) tribe failed to state RICO or RICO
conspiracy claim. Affirmed.
4.

U.S. v. Janis

No. 14–3888, 2016 WL 191934 (8th Cir. Jan. 15, 2016).
Following denial of his motion to dismiss indictment, 40 F. Supp.
3d 1133, and of his motion for reconsideration, 2014 WL 4384373,
defendant was convicted in the District Court of assault of federal
officer, and he appealed. The appellate court held that: (1) tribal
public safety officer was “federal officer”; (2) district court abused
its discretion when it instructed jury that victim was federal officer;
and (3) erroneous instruction was harmless. Affirmed.
5.

Hayes v. Delbert Servs. Corp.

No. 15-1170, No. 15-1217, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 1747, 811
F.3d 666 (4th Cir. Va. Feb. 2, 2016). James Hayes, the lead
plaintiff-appellant in this case, received a payday loan from a
lender called Western Sky Financial, LLC. Defendant-appellee
Delbert Services Corporation later became the servicing agent for
Hayes’s loan. Because Delbert’s debt collection practices allegedly
violated federal law, Hayes initiated a putative class action against
Delbert. Claiming that Hayes and his fellow plaintiffs agreed to
arbitrate any disputes related to their loans, Delbert moved to
compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”),
9 U.S.C. § 4. The district court granted Delbert’s motion.
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Our review of the record leads us to conclude that the
arbitration agreement in this case is unenforceable. The agreement
purportedly fashions a system of alternative dispute resolution
while simultaneously rendering that system all but impotent
through a categorical rejection of the requirements of state and
federal law. The FAA does not protect the sort of arbitration
agreement that unambiguously forbids an arbitrator from even
applying the applicable law.
The district court erred in ordering the parties to arbitration
because the arbitration agreement in the case was unenforceable;
the arbitration agreement fashioned a system of alternative dispute
resolution while simultaneously rendering that system all but
impotent through a categorical rejection of the requirements of
state and federal law, and the FAA did not protect arbitration
agreements that unambiguously forbade an arbitrator from even
applying the applicable law. We therefore reverse the district
court’s order compelling arbitration and remand for further
proceedings.
6.

U.S. v. Harlan

No. 15–1552, 815 F.3d 1100, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 2602 (8th
Cir. Feb. 16, 2016). Defendant was convicted in the District Court
of domestic assault in Indian country by habitual offender.
Defendant appealed. The appellate court held that: (1) defendant’s
prior tribal court simple-assault conviction could be used as
predicate offense in subsequent federal prosecution for domestic
assault in Indian country by habitual offender; (2) sufficient
evidence supported conviction; and (3) defendant’s sentence,
which was at the bottom of the advisory Guidelines range, was
substantively reasonable. Affirmed.
7.

Smith v. Western Sky Fin., LLC

No. 15-3639, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28452 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 4,
2016). This case presents an unusual and disconcerting collision
between federal consumer protection laws and the sovereignty of
Native American tribes and their courts. Defendants here make
“payday” loans across the United States through the Internet, and
they seek to have their loan agreements governed by tribal law and
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challenged only in certain tribal courts or arbitral forums. Given
the historic injustices visited upon Native Americans, the Supreme
Court has understandably admonished that federal courts should
tread lightly when it comes to intruding upon their sovereignty. See
Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 107 S. Ct.
971, 94 L. Ed. 2d 10 (1987). Defendants here invoke these
principles in moving to dismiss Plaintiff’s case. For the reasons set
forth below, I have concluded that Native American sovereignty is
not at stake in this case, and I agree with the Fourth Circuit (among
others) that Defendants seek “to avoid federal law and game the
system.” Hayes v. Delbert Servs. Corp., 811 F.3d 666, 2016 WL
386016, at *9 (4th Cir., 2016). Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss will
be denied.
8.

Cherokee Nation v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc.

No. 15-CV-280, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46421 (E. D. Okla.
Apr. 6, 2016). Plaintiff The Cherokee Nation (“Plaintiff”)
originally filed this action in the District Court of Sequoyah
County, Oklahoma, asserting claims against Defendants Johnson &
Johnson, Inc. and Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (together,
“Defendants”). Plaintiff asserted various state-law claims arising
from Defendants’ alleged misbranding of Risperdal, an atypical
antipsychotic drug.
On July 27, 2015, Defendants removed the case to this Court.
Defendants asserted this Court has jurisdiction over this action
pursuant to both 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332, because
(1) Plaintiff’s state-law claims necessarily raise disputed and
substantial federal questions and (2) the actual party-in-interest is
not The Cherokee Nation but the Cherokee Nation Businesses
and/or Cherokee Nation Healthcare Services, both of which are
citizens of Oklahoma that generate diversity jurisdiction. On
August 17, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Remand pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1447(c), contending this Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over this action. Defendants opposed remand.
On December 14, 2015, the Court determined that no federalquestion jurisdiction existed over Plaintiff’s state-law claims.
Defendants argued this Court has original jurisdiction over this
action based on 28 U.S.C. § 1332, which provides, “[t]he district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the
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matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000,
exclusive of interest and costs, and is between citizens of different
states.” The defendant seeking removal must establish the
existence of diversity jurisdiction by a preponderance of the
evidence.
Here, Plaintiff challenged the existence of complete diversity
because The Cherokee Nation, as an Indian tribe, is a sovereign
nation that has no “citizenship” for purposes of § 1332.1.
However, Defendants argued Plaintiff was not itself responsible
for operating healthcare services for tribal members. Rather,
Plaintiff allegedly incorporates separate entities—Cherokee
Nations Businesses and/or Cherokee Nation Healthcare Services—
to provide these services, including the purchase of Risperdal.
Defendants allege these corporate entities are the real party- or
parties-in-interest, and they may generate diversity jurisdiction
because they are citizens of Oklahoma.
The Court concluded Defendants have not satisfied their
burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that a separate
corporate entity, rather than The Cherokee Nation, was the real
party-in-interest in this case. Plaintiff has submitted sufficient
evidence to suggest the corporate entities were not responsible for
purchasing the Risperdal at issue. As the real party-in-interest, The
Cherokee Nation had no citizenship for diversity purposes and
cannot generate diversity jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).
Plaintiff’s Motion for Remand was granted. Plaintiff’s second
request for fees and costs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) was
denied.
9.

State v. Hill

No. A147778, 2016 Ore. App. LEXIS 483, 277 Ore. App. 751
(Or. Ct. App Apr. 20, 2016). Defendant was convicted of seconddegree disorderly conduct, ORS 166.025, and fourth-degree
assault, ORS 163.160, as a result of an incident at a casino owned
and operated by the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian
Reservation. In the trial court, defendant moved for dismissal of
the case, arguing that the trial court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction. On appeal, he offers a new rationale for his position:
because the incident occurred in Indian country (1) the state bore
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the burden, but failed, to present evidence regarding his non-Indian
status, which was necessary for the court to determine its subject
matter jurisdiction, and (2) even though he did not alert the court
that his non-Indian status was required for the court’s jurisdiction,
the court was required to dismiss the case. The state responded
that, properly understood, defendant’s challenge is to personal
jurisdiction over him and not the court’s subject matter jurisdiction
over the crimes charged and that, therefore, his current
jurisdictional argument cannot be considered because it is
unpreserved.
Contrary to the state’s position, the court concluded that
defendant raised a challenge to the court’s subject matter
jurisdiction as circumscribed under federal law and that defendant
correctly asserted that his non-Indian status was the determining
factor in whether the trial court had jurisdiction over the charged
crimes. However, although the record is silent regarding
defendant’s non-Indian status, we rejected defendant’s contention
that the proper disposition is an outright reversal. Rather, the court
decided, as a matter of first impression in Oregon, that the better
course is to vacate the judgment and remand to permit defendant
an opportunity to provide the trial court with evidence sufficient to
permit a conclusion that he is Indian. In this case, given the
arguments made to the trial court, the issue of subject matter
jurisdiction was not fully litigated. Defendant neither asserted that
the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because of his
Indian status nor submitted evidence of that status to the trial court.
Therefore, the court remanded for the trial court to permit
defendant to attempt to meet his burden of production concerning
his status as an Indian; and, if he did so, the court must conduct
proceedings to determine defendant’s status as an Indian, during
which the state will bear the burden of proof. If, on remand, the
trial court concludes that it has jurisdiction, then it should reinstate
the judgment. Vacated and remanded.
10.

Little River Band of Ottawa Indians v. Blue Cross Blue
Shield of Mich.

No. 15-13708, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55866 ( E.D. Mich. Apr.
27, 2016). This case was one of over thirty filed in this district in
which defendant Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan (Blue
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Cross) was being sued by various businesses to recover funds Blue
Cross illegally billed and retained in violation of its third-party
administrator (TPA) agreements and in breach of its fiduciary duty
under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. A unique aspect of this case,
however, was that the plaintiff, Little River Band of Ottawa
Indians, is a tribal government. ERISA does not apply to certain
governmental employee benefit plans. And Blue Cross insisted that
the plaintiffs have not alleged enough facts in its complaint to
establish that its plan falls within ERISA’s regulations.
Blue Cross has filed a motion under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss the counts of the complaint brought
under ERISA. The plaintiffs also alleged several state law claims,
which Blue Cross also moved to dismiss as preempted by ERISA,
if the former claims survive, and because a state intermediate
appellate decision favors dismissal. Blue Cross also argued that the
plaintiffs did not plead sufficient facts to support a specific theory
seeking damages because Blue Cross paid too much for hospital
services that were supposed to be capped at “Medicare-Like
Rates.”
The motion to dismiss will be denied with one exception. The
ERISA claims survive because the plaintiffs adequately alleged
that less than “substantially all” of its plan participants perform
commercial activities, thereby invoking a statutory exception to the
exclusion from ERISA coverage. The state law claims, therefore,
are preempted and will be dismissed, subject to revival if later in
these proceedings the plaintiffs fail to prove its allegations
concerning the census of its plan participants. The plaintiffs also
have pleaded sufficiently the allegations necessary to satisfy the
conditions precedent for recovery of damages for payments in
excess of “Medicare-Like Rates.” The plaintiffs have alleged
sufficient facts to establish a right to relief on their ERISA claims.
Accordingly, it is ordered that the defendant’s motion to dismiss is
granted in part and denied in part.
11.

Feller v. Narragansett Indian Tribal Historic Pres. Office

No. 5:16-cv-61, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61475 (D. Vt. May 10,
2016). Plaintiffs George Feller and Willow Feller filed an action in
Vermont Superior Court, Rutland Unit, Civil Division, against
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Defendant Narragansett Indian Tribal Historic Preservation Office
(NITHPO), alleging that NITHPO had failed to make payments
required by a commercial promissory note, and seeking to
foreclose upon a mortgage securing that note. NITHPO filed a
Notice of Removal in this court, asserting subject-matter
jurisdiction on the grounds that “there is a federal question arising
out of a dispute from a private party against a federally recognized
tribe, tribal governmental entity or agent, and under federal
common law regarding the jurisdiction of Indian Tribal court.”
Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Remand the case back to state court
under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), arguing that NITHPO has presented no
federal question and that NITHPO cannot rely on diversity
jurisdiction because the maximum amount in controversy is the
amount of the underlying note of $30,000. NITHPO opposed
remand.
NITHPO asserted that there is a federal question because
NITHPO is a federally-recognized tribe, tribal government, entity,
or agent. However, jurisdiction does not attach just because a case
involves an Indian party. NITHPO contended that there is a federal
question because this case “is about land now owned by an Indian
Tribal Government.” Again, federal court jurisdiction is not
created just because a case involves tribal property. NITHPO
further argued that there are federal jurisdiction because the case
involved “a non-governmental party attempting to attach the
federal contracts and federal contract support dollars of a tribal
government or tribal governmental entity for the purpose of
payment,” because Plaintiffs have failed to exhaust tribal remedies,
and because of immunity from suit.
In this case, NITHPO had not filed a motion to dismiss; the
only motion now pending was Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand. No
disputes about exhaustion or immunity appear on the face of
Plaintiffs’ Complaint. If there was an issue of federal common law
in this case, it did not provide a basis for Plaintiffs’ foreclosure
cause of action. The court therefore concluded that it lacks subjectmatter jurisdiction, and that remand under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) was
required. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand was granted, and this case
was remanded to the Vermont Superior Court, Rutland Unit, Civil
Division.
12.

United States v. Alvirez
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No. 11-10244, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 13966 (9th Cir. Aug. 1,
2016). Edgar Alvirez, Jr. appealed his jury conviction and sentence
for assault resulting in serious bodily injury on an Indian
reservation, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153 and 113(a)(6). The
court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to review the
district court’s judgment. The court concluded that the district
court abused its discretion when it admitted the unauthenticated
Certificate of Indian Blood as evidence to meet the elements of the
governing statute. Accordingly, the court reversed Alvirez’s
conviction and remand for further proceedings. In accordance with
our recent en banc decision in Zepeda, the court concluded that the
determination of federal recognition of a tribe was a question of
law to be resolved by the judge. The court also concluded that the
district court abused its discretion when it determined that the
Certificate of Indian Blood offered into evidence by the
government was a self-authenticating document under Federal
Rule of Evidence 902(1). Because the error was not harmless, the
court reversed the conviction.
13.

Bodi v. Shingle Springs Band of Miwok Indians

No. 14-16121, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 14514 (9th Cir. Aug. 8,
2016). This appeal required the court to decide whether a federally
recognized Indian tribe waives its sovereign immunity from suit by
exercising its right to remove to federal court a case filed against it
in state court. This question has divided the district courts, and it
has been reached by only one of the appellate court’s sister
circuits, which held that removal does not, standing alone, waive
tribal immunity. See Contour Spa at the Hard Rock, Inc. v.
Seminole Tribe of Fla., 692 F.3d 1200, 1206-08 (11th Cir. 2012).
The court followed the lead of the Eleventh Circuit and held that
the act of removal does not express the clear and unequivocal
waiver that is required for a tribe to relinquish its immunity from
suit. It was error to hold appellant tribe, when sued under the
Family and Medical Leave Act and California law, waived
sovereign immunity by removing the case to federal court because
it stated no such unequivocal intent, as nothing in the removal
statute, 28 U.S.C.S. § 1441, abrogated tribal sovereign immunity,
and it promptly asserted an immunity defense upon removal to
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federal court and voiced no intent to litigate on the merits,
invoking the court’s jurisdiction only to resolve its immunity
defense, and if it were possible to infer an intent to relinquish
immunity from the act of removal, immunity was not waived as
such an intent could not be implied. Holding the tribe’s removal
waived its sovereign immunity was unfair because it was not fair
to put tribes to a choice between asserting their right to removal
and asserting a tribal immunity defense. Judgment reversed.

14.

Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah & Ouray Reservation v.
Myton

No. 15-4080, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 14582 (10th Cir. Aug. 9,
2016). This appeal required the court to address once again the
status of the Uintah Valley Indian Reservation. In the district court,
the Ute Indian Tribe (“Tribe”) sought to obtain a permanent
injunction preventing the State of Utah, the counties of Duchesne
and Uintah, and the cities of Roosevelt and Duchesne (“state and
local defendants”) from exercising civil and criminal jurisdiction
on certain lands within the original exterior boundary of the Uintah
Valley Reservation in a manner inconsistent with the court’s en
banc opinion in Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 773 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir.
1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994, 107 S. Ct. 596, 93 L.
Ed. 2d 596 (1986). In opposing the injunction, the state and local
defendants rely on Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 114 S. Ct. 958,
127 L. Ed. 2d 252 (1994), in which the Supreme Court held that
the lands in question are not part of the Uintah Valley Reservation.
Notwithstanding Hagen, the district court held that it was
bound under the “law of the case” doctrine to follow the mandate
in Ute Indian Tribe and thus, that it was without authority to alter
the existing jurisdictional boundaries as set forth in Ute Indian
Tribe. The United States as amicus curiae urged the court to
modify the mandate in Ute Indian Tribe only to the extent that it
directly conflicts with Hagen. In 1985 this court resolved the issue
en banc in a case the parties call Ute III.
This court held that all lands encompassed within the original
Ute reservation boundaries established beginning in the 1860s —
including all those lands that passed to non-Indian settlers between
1905 and 1945 — remained Indian country subject to federal and
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tribal (not state and local) criminal jurisdiction. See Ute Indian
Tribe v. Utah (Ute III), 773 F.2d 1087, 1088-89, 1093 (10th Cir.
1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994, 107 S. Ct. 596, 93 L.
Ed. 2d 596 (1986). After the Supreme Court denied certiorari, that
might have seemed the end of it. After all, Ute III “disposed of all
boundary questions at issue on the merits” and “left nothing for the
district court to address [on remand] beyond the ministerial
dictates of the mandate.” Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah (Ute V), 114
F.3d 1513, 1521 (10th Cir. 1997).
The appellate court held that the district court erred in granting
a town’s motion to dismiss a tribe’s action alleging that local
officials sought to exercise criminal jurisdiction over tribal
members on lands that were restored to tribal jurisdiction because a
prior decision had determined that tribal reserves, remaining
allotments, and restored lands were Indian country. The town
included land that qualified as Indian country under the terms of
that decision.
Reassignment of the dispute was required to ensure just and
timely resolution because the district court had twice failed to
enforce the mandate of the court of appeals. The district court’s
order granting Myton’s motion to dismiss is reversed. This case
and all related matters shall be reassigned to a different district
judge. The court and parties are directed to proceed to a final
disposition both promptly and consistently with this court’s
mandates in Ute V, Ute VI, and this case.
15.

Chemehuevi Indian Tribe, et al. v. John McMahon, et al.

No. 15-01538 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2016). Plaintiffs filed a
complaint against County Sheriff John McMahon and Deputy
Sheriff Ronald Sindelar in their official capacities on the grounds
of: (1) violation of Public Law 280 by issuing motor vehicle
citations without jurisdiction on reservation land; (2) interference
with tribal self-government; (3) preemption of state authority; and
(4) violation of plaintiffs’ civil rights. Plaintiffs allege that
Defendants illegally enforced the California Motor Vehicle Code
on Reservation land, issuing citations for various state law
violations, including driving without a valid registration and
driving with a suspended license, resulting in impoundment of
Plaintiffs cars and significant expense in time and legal fees.
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The land where at least three of the citations were issued is a
one square mile plot of land known as Township 5N, Range 24E,
SBM, Section 36 (“Section 36”). Plaintiffs sought an injunction to
“enjoin Defendants from citing, arresting, impounding the vehicles
of, and prosecuting members of the Chemehuevi Tribe for
violations
of
the
California
Motor
Vehicle
Code
sections 4000(a)(1), 16028(a), 14601.1(a)” in Section 36. The
Court’s “pivotal question” was whether Section 36 was located
within the boundaries of the Chemehuevi Tribe’s Reservation.
Defendants argued that Section 36 is not in Indian country because
it is not a part of the Indian reservation. Plaintiffs argued that
Section 36 is within Indian country as it “lies within the boundaries
of the Reservation as established by Congress through enactment
of federal statutes and action of the President through issuance of a
Secretarial order.” Under Public Law 280, California has limited
jurisdiction over Indian country, depending on whether the state
law at issue prohibits or regulates conduct.
The Court concluded that Section 36 is not part of the
Chemehuevi Indian Reservation. However, 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a)
says that Indian Country includes “all land within the limits of any
Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States
Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and
including rights-of-way running through the reservation.” Indian
country includes non-Indian land within the exterior boundaries of
an Indian reservation, avoiding a “checkerboard jurisdiction”
situation. Section 36 is a landlocked parcel surrounded on all sides
by Chemehuevi Reservation land, a “near-perfect example of the
type of checkerboard jurisdiction the Supreme Court counseled
against.” Allowing Defendants to exercise state jurisdiction over
Chemehuevi Tribal members in Section 36 would lead to a
likelihood of “irreparable injury vis-à-vis the Tribe’s sovereignty.”
EEOC v. Karuk Tribe Hous. Auth., 260 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2001)
at 1077. The court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary
injunction and enjoined Defendants and their agents from citing,
arresting, impounding the vehicles of, and prosecuting
Chemehuevi tribal members for on-reservation violations of the
California Vehicle Code.
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Religious Freedom
Trapp v. Roden

No. 11863, 2015 WL 7356318 (Mass. Nov. 23, 2015). Inmates,
who were adherents of Native American religious practices,
brought action against Department of Correction challenging
closure of purification lodge at correctional center. Following
bench trial, the Superior Court, 2012 WL 6629681, entered
judgment. Department appealed. On transfer, the Supreme Judicial
Court held that: (1) closure violated the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000; (2) Department failed to
meet its burden of proof that closure decision was motivated by an
actual compelling health interest; and (3) closure violated
settlement agreement which resolved inmate’s prior lawsuit against
Department.
2.

Navajo Nation v. U.S. Dept. of Interior

Nos. 13–16517, 13–16519, 13–16520, 2016 WL 1359869 (9th
Cir. Apr. 6, 2016). Tribe filed suit against United States
Department of the Interior, National Park Service, and government
officials, seeking immediate return of human remains and
associated funerary objects taken from its reservation during
inventory of remains and objects pursuant to the Native American
Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA). The District
Court, 2013 WL 530302, dismissed action as barred by sovereign
immunity. Tribe appealed. The appellate court held that:
(1) decision to apply NAGPRA to inventory remains from sacred
site on reservation constituted final agency action, and (2) tribe’s
claims were ripe for review. Reversed and remanded.

3.

Oklevueha Native Am. Church of Haw., Inc. v. Lynch

No. 14-15143, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 6275 (9th Cir. Apr. 6,
2016). The government was properly granted summary judgment
on plaintiffs’ claim under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,
42 U.S.C.S. § 2000bb et seq., because even if plaintiffs’ use of
cannabis constituted an exercise of religion, no rational trier of fact
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could conclude on the record that a prohibition of cannabis use
imposed a substantial burden under 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000bb-1(a) as
nothing in the record demonstrated that a prohibition on cannabis
forced plaintiffs to choose between obedience to their religion and
criminal sanction, such that they were being coerced to act
contrary to their religious beliefs. The government was properly
granted summary judgment on plaintiffs’ claim under the
American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C.S. § 1996,
because the Act did not create a cause of action or any judicially
enforceable individual rights. Judgment affirmed.
J.
1.

Sovereign Immunity

Public Serv. Co. of N.M. v. Approximately 15.49 Acres of
Land in McKinley Cnty.

No. 15 CV 501, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174900 (D.N.M. Dec.
1, 2015). The Public Service Company of New Mexico (PNM)
filed a complaint for condemnation seeking a perpetual easement
for electrical transmission lines. PNM brought this action to
condemn a perpetual easement over five parcels of land owned by
members of the Navajo Nation (Nation): (1) Allotment 1160, (2)
Allotment 1204, (3) Allotment 1340, (4) Allotment 1392,
and (5) Allotment 1877 (the Five Allotments). The Nation owns an
undivided 13.6 % interest in Allotment 1160 and an undivided .14
% interest in Allotment 1392 (the Two Allotments). In its Motion
to Dismiss the Nation argued that the Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction and asked the Court to dismiss it as a defendant
because, as a sovereign nation, it is immune from suit. In addition,
the Nation asked the Court to dismiss the Two Allotments because
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19, the Nation is an indispensable party that
cannot be joined. The United States agreed that the Nation and the
Two Allotments should be dismissed from the action. The Court
dismissed without prejudice Plaintiff’s claims against the Navajo
Nation and against Allotment Numbers 1160 and 1392.
2.

Dillon v. BMO Harris Bank, N.A.

No. 16-5, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13433 (N.D. Okla. Feb. 4,
2016). Before the Court was non-party The Otoe-Missouria Tribe
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of Indians’ (“the Tribe”) Motion to Quash the Subpoena of John
Shotton and/or for Protective Order. Defendant BMO Harris Bank
has served a subpoena on John Shotton, Chairman of the Tribe
and Secretary/Treasurer of Great Plains Lending LLC (“Great
Plains”), which is wholly-owned by and serves as an economic
arm of the Tribe. BMO Harris subpoenaed Shotton to testify to the
authenticity of loan documents produced in the underlying
litigation. The Tribe asserted that the subpoena should be quashed
because the Tribe and, by extension, Great Plains have sovereign
immunity; thus, Shotton cannot be compelled to testify. BMO
Harris argueed that Shotton waived the tribe’s immunity by
signing, for use in the underlying litigation, declarations regarding
the authenticity of the loan documents. The Court found that the
Tribe had not waived sovereign immunity with respect to the loan
agreements at issue in Shotton’s declaration. While the Court
recognized that this ruling may hinder BMO Harris in the
underlying litigation, the “well-established doctrine” of tribal
sovereign immunity cannot be abridged, even if application of the
doctrine “works some inconvenience, or even injustice.” Alltel
Communications, LLC v. DeJordy, 675 F.3d 1100 (8th Cir. 2012)
at 1106. Therefore, the Tribe’s Motion to Quash was granted.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
3.

Lewis v. Clarke

No. 19464, 2016 WL 878893 (Conn. Mar. 15, 2016). Motor
vehicle driver and passenger brought action against Indian tribe
member, claiming member’s negligence and carelessness in
driving limousine, which was owned by tribal gaming authority,
caused motor vehicle accident. The superior court, 2014 WL
5354956, denied member’s motion to dismiss based on tribal
sovereign immunity. Member appealed. The Supreme Court held
that tribal sovereign immunity extended to claims. Reversed and
remanded with direction.
4.

Butler v. Barona Band of Mission Indians of Cal.

No. CV 16-00268 RSWL, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61304 (C.D.
Cal. May 9, 2016). Before the Court was Defendants Barona Band
of Mission Indians of California, Barona Tribal Gaming Agency,
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and Barona Resort & Casino’s (collectively “Defendants”) Motion
to Dismiss (“Motion”). The action arose out of Plaintiff Clarence
Butler’s (“Plaintiff”) alleged injury that occurred in the Barona
Resort and Casino. Defendant Barona Band of Mission Indians of
California (“the Tribe”) is a federally recognized Indian tribe with
jurisdiction over the Barona Indian Reservation. Defendant Barona
Tribal Gaming Agency, a.k.a. the Baron Tribal Gaming
Commission (“the Gaming Agency”) and the Barona Resort and
Casino (“the Casino”) are business entities.
At all relevant times, the Gaming Agency was the Tribe’s duly
authorized agent and employee that operated and was responsible
for the Tribe’s gaming, gambling, resort, and hotel operations. The
Casino is the Tribe and the Gaming Agency’s employee in
operating and maintaining the resort and Casino located on the
Barona Indian Reservation. Pursuant to the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act of 1988, codified in 18 U.S.C. § 1166 et seq.; 25
U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. (“the Act”), the Tribe entered into a compact
with the State of California (“the Compact”) in October 1999 to
allow it to operate gambling facilities within the State. In the
Compact, the Tribe agreed to comply with certain standards
relating to public health and safety at its facilities, to maintain
certain public insurance for personal injury claims by patrons
injured at the facilities, to adopt a tort liability ordinance setting
forth the terms and conditions under which it would waive its
sovereign immunity relating to such claims, and the procedures for
processing those claims. Accordingly, on December 22, 2009, the
Tribe adopted a tort claims ordinance (“Barona Tort Claims
Ordinance”). The Barona Tort Claims Ordinance clearly states that
it waives immunity from suit only in Tribal Court.
On February 16, 2016, Plaintiff was standing in line at the
Barona Casino to cash his gambling chips. Plaintiff was standing
with his back towards the crowd, second in line before the cashier,
when the stanchion holding the rope collapsed against Plaintiff’s
right knee, injuring him. “Plaintiff suffered short term, long term
and permanent physical injuries, pain, suffering, stress, anxiety,
insomnia, as well as loss of income.” On February 26, 2014,
Plaintiff filed his claim, notifying the Casino that he had suffered
an injury. The Casino mailed Plaintiff, by Certified Receipt, and
Plaintiff received through his counsel, a claim form and a copy of
the 1999 Tort Claims Ordinance.
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On May 4, 2015, the Tribe mailed a Notice of Rejection of Tort
Claim with the forms for appeal. On May 26, 2015, Plaintiff
appealed the Tribe’s rejection of his claim. Plaintiff alleges it has
heard no response on its appeal. When subject matter jurisdiction
was challenged under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule
12(b)(1), the plaintiff had the burden of proving jurisdiction in
order to survive the motion. Plaintiff has proffered no factual
support to warrant this Court’s jurisdiction. This Court found that
Plaintiff had failed to meet its burden to sufficiently allege this
Court’s jurisdiction, and accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss is granted without leave to amend.
5.

McVay v. Allied World Assur. Co.

No. 14-15975, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 9299 (9th Cir. May 11,
2016). Becky McVay appealed from the district court’s judgment
dismissing claims for breach of contract and breach of the duty of
good faith and fair dealing. McVay’s action arose from a slip and
fall in a gas station convenience store owned and operated by the
Fallon Tribal Development Corporation, which is owned by the
Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribe (collectively, “the Tribe”). McVay
sued the Tribe in an action that proceeded in tribal court until the
claims against the Tribe were dismissed on the basis of tribal
sovereign immunity. In the present separate lawsuit filed in federal
court, McVay asserted claims against the Tribe’s insurer, Allied
World Assurance Company (U.S.), Inc., and the company that
administered the insurance policy, York Risk Services Group, Inc.
(collectively, “Defendants”).
Under Nevada law, an individual who has no contractual
relationship with an insurance company lacks standing to sue the
insurance company for breach without evidence that the individual
“substantially relied on the insurance company’s representations
or . . . was a specific intended beneficiary of the insurance policy.”
Gunny v. Allstate Ins., 108 Nev. 344, 830 P.2d 1335, 1335-36
(Nev. 1992) (per curiam).
McVay did not allege that she has a contractual relationship
with Defendants or that she relied on any representations made by
Defendants. She did argue, however, that she has standing to sue
Defendants as an intended beneficiary of the Tribe’s insurance
policy with Defendants. This argument seems to be based on the
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language of the Tribe’s policy, defining “insured” as “any
person . . . to whom the Named Insured is obligated by virtue of a
written contract or oral agreement to provide insurance such as is
afforded by this policy.” McVay argued that there are two
documents that reflect the Tribe’s agreement to provide coverage
to her: (1) the Indian Self-Determination and Education Act, 25
U.S.C. § 450f(c) (“ISDEA”) and (2) the Tribe’s Corporate Charter.
To the extent McVay’s theory was that the ISDEA should prevent
the Tribe from asserting a sovereign immunity defense against her
tort claim, that argument would have had to have been made in the
proceeding in which the Tribe actually asserted sovereign
immunity.
Similarly, the existence of sovereign immunity does not
transform the general rule that an insured person may not sue an
insurer for a declaration of coverage until succeeding in litigation
against the insured person. Because McVay was neither a party to
nor a third-party beneficiary of the insurance contract between the
Tribe and Allied, the district court was correct to hold that she may
not proceed directly against Defendants for breach of contract or
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. The district court
was also correct to deny leave to amend, because it was clear that
McVay cannot cure the defects in her complaint. Affirmed.
6.

Johnson v. Wind Creek Casino, Hotel

No. 16-0052, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77804 (S.D. Ala. Jun. 15,
2016). This matter was before the Court on the defendant’s motion
to dismiss. The defendant had presented the affidavit of the Tribal
Chair of the Poarch Band of Creek Indians (“the Tribe”), which
established that the defendant, Wind Creek Casino, Hotel, was
owned by the Tribe and operated by the Poarch Band of Creek
Indians Gaming Authority (“the Authority”). The defendant argued
that the plaintiff’s lawsuit is thus barred by the doctrine of tribal
sovereign immunity.
Because the plaintiff has the burden of establishing subject
matter jurisdiction, she must show that the defendant has waived
its immunity. The plaintiff had not done so; indeed, she did not
even allege a waiver.
Instead, the plaintiff invoked Ex parte Young. That doctrine
provides “an exception to sovereign immunity in lawsuits against
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state officials for prospective declaratory or injunctive relief to
stop ongoing violations of federal law,” and the Eleventh Circuit
has “extended the Ex parte Young doctrine to tribal officials.” PCI
Gaming Authority, 801 F.3d at 1288. But the plaintiff had not sued
any tribal officials or any individuals of any description. Nor had
she sought prospective equitable relief; all her complaint
demanded is $3 million in damages. The doctrine therefore cannot
save her lawsuit.
“Tribal sovereign immunity is a jurisdictional issue.” Furry,
685 F.3d at 1228; accord Taylor v. Alabama Intertribal Council
Title IV J.T.P.A., 261 F.3d 1032, 1034 (11th Cir. 2001). Because
the defendant was covered by such immunity, which had been
neither abrogated nor waived, the Court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to entertain this action. The motion to dismiss was
granted.
7.

MMMG v. Seminole Tribe of Fla.

No. 4D15-235, 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 9263 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. June 15, 2016). Mobile Mike, a South Florida radio
personality, owns Mobile Mike Promotions, Inc. (the “Production
Company”). In 2011, the Production Company and the Seminole
Tribe of Florida, Inc. (“STOFI”), a corporate entity of the
Seminole Tribe (the “Tribe”), entered into an advertising joint
venture called MMMG, LLC (the “Joint Venture”). STOFI later
broke the Joint Venture agreement. The Production Company and
the Joint Venture together filed a ten-count complaint against
STOFI and other tribal members individually (collectively the
“Defendants”). STOFI moved to dismiss, asserting the trial court
lacked jurisdiction due to STOFI’s sovereign immunity. After a
five-day evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that STOFI was
protected by sovereign immunity, which it had not waived
pursuant to STOFI’s charter and bylaws, and dismissed STOFI as a
party. MMMG, LLC and Mobile Mike Promotions, Inc. appealed
the involuntary dismissal of their complaint against a federal tribal
corporation affiliated with the Seminole Tribe. We affirm the
dismissal because the tribal corporation enjoyed sovereign
immunity from suit, which was not effectively waived according to
the procedure required in the corporation’s charter and bylaws. The
order was affirmed.
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Hamaatsa, Inc. v. Pueblo of San Felipe

No. S-1-SC-34287, 2016 N.M. LEXIS 148 (N.M. Jun. 16,
2016). The Pueblo of San Felipe (Pueblo) appealed from an
opinion of the New Mexico Court of Appeals declining to extend
the Pueblo, an Indian tribe, immunity from suit. Hamaatsa, Inc.
(Hamaatsa) is a non-profit New Mexico corporation that owns land
in Sandoval County. Adjacent to Hamaatsa’s property is land
owned in fee by the Pueblo, a federally recognized Indian tribe.
The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) conveyed to the Pueblo,
in fee simple, the land at issue on December 13, 2001. The
property, albeit adjacent and contiguous with reservation land, is
not yet held in trust by the federal government as part of the
Pueblo’s reservation.
The United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian
Affairs (BIA), awaits resolution of the instant dispute prior to
taking the fee-simple parcel into trust. In its 2001 conveyance to
the Pueblo, “the BLM reserved ‘an easement and right-of-way
over, across, and upon a strip of land 40 feet wide along the
existing road . . . identified in NMNM 95818, for the full use as a
road by the United States for public purposes.’” Throughout this
opinion we refer to the NMNM 95818 easement as “Northern R.S.
2477.”
On September 19, 2002, the BLM purported to quitclaim its
interest in the Northern R.S. 2477 to the Pueblo. Access to
Northern R.S. 2477 forms the basis of Hamaatsa’s December 30,
2010, complaint against the Pueblo. Hamaatsa uses Northern R.S.
2477 on the Pueblo’s property to access its land. In August 2009
Hamaatsa received a letter from the then Governor of the Pueblo
stating that Hamaatsa had no legal right of access across the
Pueblo’s property and that Hamaatsa’s use of Northern R.S. 2477
was a trespass. Hamaatsa continued to use the road and filed suit
requesting that the district court declare that the Pueblo cannot so
restrict Hamaatsa’s use of the road.
After a hearing on the motion to dismiss the district court
denied the Pueblo’s motion, reasoning that the action was an in
rem proceeding not seeking damages, to which sovereign
immunity was no bar. The district court granted the Pueblo leave to
seek an interlocutory appeal which was then granted by the Court
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of Appeals on July 5, 2011. The district court stayed all
proceedings pending resolution of the appeal. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the district court’s denial of the Pueblo’s motion
to dismiss. Holdings:(1) Because it was settled federal law that
sovereign Indian tribes enjoyed immunity from suit in state and
federal court, absent waiver of abrogation by Congress, the
appellate court erred by affirming the denial of the Indian tribe’s
motion to dismiss a neighboring property owner’s action
requesting that the trial court declare that the Indian tribe could not
restrict the property owner’s use of a road on the Indian tribe’s
property. The court declined to deny the Indian tribe’s right to
sovereign immunity on equitable grounds. (2) The court held that
the Indian tribe properly raised its tribal sovereign immunity by a
N.M. R. Ann. 1-012(B) motion to dismiss. Judgment vacated and
case remanded to the trial court for dismissal for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.
9.

Seminole Tribe of Fla. V. Schinneller

No. 4D15-1704, 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 11411 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. Jul. 27, 2016). The Seminole Tribe of Florida appeals an
order denying its motion to dismiss based on sovereign immunity.
It argues the trial court erred in failing to grant its motion to
dismiss as a matter of law. The plaintiff filed a complaint against
the tribe for personal injuries resulting from a slip and fall in a
restroom at the Seminole Hard Rock Hotel and Casino. In her
amended complaint, the plaintiff admitted the tribe is not subject to
the civil jurisdiction of state courts unless its sovereign immunity
is waived. The plaintiff admitted the only way the tribe can waive
sovereign immunity is by a duly enacted resolution of the Tribal
Council in legal session. But, she maintained the tribe did so when
it adopted, and the National Indian Gaming Commission approved,
Resolution No. C-195-06 on July 10, 2006. The resolution did not
include a waiver of sovereign immunity. The appellate court found
that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law
when it denied the tribe’s motion to dismiss a personal injury
action on the basis of trial sovereign immunity, as a waiver of such
immunity had to be unequivocally expressed and the tribe had
established that no resolution, ordinance, or compact including a
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waiver of immunity was enforceable in 2009 when plaintiff’s
claim arose. Petition for certiorari granted.
10.

Findleton v. Coyote Valley Band of Pomo Indians

No. A142560, 2016 Cal. App. LEXIS 627 (Cal. Ct. App.
Jul. 29, 2016). Plaintiff filed a petition to compel mediation and
arbitration against the Coyote Valley Band of Pomo Indians,
seeking to enforce the mediation and arbitration clauses in a
construction agreement and an on-site rental contract. The trial
court granted the Tribe’s motion to quash service of summons and
dismissed the case. The trial court concluded that it lacked
jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claims because there had been no valid
waiver of the Tribe’s sovereign immunity. The Court of Appeal
reversed the order and remanded the case for further proceedings.
The court concluded that the Tribal Council was authorized to,
and did, waive the Tribe’s sovereign immunity for purposes of
arbitrating disputes arising under the Tribe’s contracts with
plaintiff. The court deferred to the interpretation of the Tribe’s
Constitution adopted by its General Council and Tribal Council,
and not to the Tribe’s current position in its briefing, which was
not an “interpretation” as contemplated by these authorities but a
position undertaken in litigation. The General Council validly
delegated its authority to waive tribal sovereign immunity to the
Tribal Council when it adopted two resolutions. The waiver of the
Tribe’s sovereign immunity extended to judicial enforcement of
the right to arbitrate and of any arbitration award. The trial court’s
order granting the Tribe’s motion to quash service of summons and
dismissing the case was reversed, and the case was remanded for
further proceedings.
11.

Navajo Nation v. Dalley

No.15-cv-00799, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103319 (D.N.M
Aug. 3, 2016). This case was before the Court following a routine
slip-and-fall lawsuit argued before the Honorable Bradford J.
Dalley in New Mexico District Court. Although the causes of
action in this lawsuit are relatively mundane, the jurisdictional
issues presented to this Court are not. In the tribal-state gaming
compact between the Navajo Nation and the State of New Mexico
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(“Tribal-State Compact”), the Navajo Nation and the State of New
Mexico agreed that tort actions related to Indian gaming that arose
on Navajo tribal land could be adjudicated in New Mexico district
court. In this declaratory judgment action, Plaintiffs had asked this
Court to state that the Navajo Nation lacked sufficient authority to
grant New Mexico district court’s jurisdiction over personal injury
actions arising in gaming facilities in Indian country when signing
the Tribal-State Compact.
The Honorable Bradford J. Dalley, the New Mexico District
Court Judge whom presides over the slip-and-fall action at issue, in
combination with the plaintiffs in that action, Harold and Michelle
McNeal, are the Defendants in this case. They assert, with the
assistance of the New Mexico Attorney General, that the Navajo
Nation did have sufficient authority to grant the State of New
Mexico jurisdiction over the slip-and-fall at issue here because the
Navajo Nation has both the inherent authority as a sovereign nation
to grant New Mexico jurisdiction and because Congress has
granted the Navajo Nation authority under the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act (“IGRA”) to negotiate the Tribal-State Compact.
The court found that Navajo Nation has inherent authority to
waive its sovereign immunity and waived its sovereign immunity
to the state-court action at issue here when it ratified the TribalState Compact. The Navajo Sovereign Immunity Act does not
prohibit this waiver. Instead, subsequent legislation and the
ratification of the Tribal-State Compact itself abrogated the Navajo
Nation’s sovereign immunity. As a result, the Plaintiffs cannot rely
on the Navajo Sovereign Immunity Act to invalidate Section 8 of
the Tribal-State Compact. The IGRA also does not prohibit the
Navajo Nation’s waiver of sovereign immunity. Instead, the IGRA
embodies contract-law principles that encourage the Tribes and
states to determine for themselves the appropriate allocation of
jurisdiction under IGRA. As a result, the Plaintiffs cannot rely on
IGRA to invalidate Section 8 of the Tribal-State Compact. The
Court reiterates that the Navajo Nation’s waiver of sovereign
immunity is based fundamentally on the Tribe’s consent to be sued
in New Mexico courts under Section 8 of the Tribal-State
Compact. it is therefore ordered that Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Summary Judgment is denied.
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Enable Okla. Intrastate Transmission v. A 25Foot Wide
Easement

No. CIV-15-1250-M, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109854 (W.D.
Okla. Aug. 18, 2016). This was a condemnation action to condemn
a twenty-five (25) foot wide natural gas pipeline easement through
an approximate 137-acre tract of land in Caddo County,
Oklahoma, which had originally been an Indian allotment, held in
trust by the United States Department of Interior, Bureau of Indian
Affairs (“BIA”). Thirty-eight (38) Indians and the Kiowa Indian
Tribe of Oklahoma (“Kiowa Tribe”) own undivided interests in the
tract. The Kiowa Tribe obtained its approximately 1.1% undivided
interest sometime after 2008, on the death of certain Indian owners
and by operation of the American Indian Probate Reform Act. The
original right of way expired in November 2000. On or about June
14, 2002, plaintiff’s predecessor-in-interest, Enogex, Inc.
(“Enogex”), submitted to the BIA an application for a new 20-year
term regarding the existing natural gas pipeline right-of-way which
was approved.
On March 23, 2010, the BIA vacated the acting
superintendent’s approval and remanded the case for further
negotiation and instructed that if approval of a right-of-way was
not timely secured that Enogex should be directed to move the
pipeline. Enogex brought this action. Defendant United States
contends that the tract at issue is tribal land and, as a result, the
Court has no subject matter jurisdiction to condemn the easement.
Additionally, all defendants contend that the Kiowa Tribe is a
required party to this action, that the Kiowa Tribe cannot be joined
in this action because it has sovereign immunity from suit, and
under the factors set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b),
equity and good conscience mandate that this action be dismissed.
Congressional legislation and Department of Interior regulations
treat tribal land and allotted land differently.
The Court found that the Kiowa Tribe is a required party.
Specifically, the Court found that because the Kiowa Tribe owns a
1.1% undivided interest in the tract at issue, Rule 71.1(c)(3)
requires that the Kiowa Tribe be joined as a defendant in this case.
While the Kiowa Tribe was a required party, the Court finds that
the Kiowa Tribe cannot be joined as a party in this action.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the Kiowa Tribe was a required
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party under Rule 19(a) and Rule 71.1, that in light of its sovereign
immunity, the Kiowa Tribe cannot be joined; and that under Rule
19(b), the Court, in equity and good conscience, must dismiss this
action. For the reasons set forth above, the Court grants the
Individual Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and defendant United
States’ Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and Failure to
Join a Necessary Party and dismisses this action.
K.
1.

Sovereignty, Tribal Inherent

C’Hair v. District Court of Ninth Judicial District

No. S–14–0198, 2015 WL 5037011 (Wyo. Aug. 26, 2015).
Motorist brought negligent operation and negligent entrustment
action against driver and owner of automobile, who were enrolled
members of Indian tribe, after driver struck motorist on state
highway within reservation. Motorist brought similar action in the
Shoshone and Arapaho Tribal Court after driver and owner
challenged jurisdiction of state court in their answers. The parties
agreed to stay the state court action, and the Tribal Court dismissed
motorist’s complaint on statute of limitations grounds. The District
Court denied driver and owner’s motion for summary judgment.
Driver and owner filed petition for writ of review, which was
granted. The Supreme Court, en banc, held that: (1) the District
Court had subject matter jurisdiction over matter, and (2) two-year
limitations period from tribal law and order code did not apply.
2.

Arrow Midstream Holdings, LLC v. 3 Bears Constr., LLC

No. 20150057, 2015 ND 302 (N.D. Dec. 29, 2015). Arrow
Midstream Holdings, LLC and Arrow Pipeline, LLC (collectively
Arrow) appealed, and Tesla Enterprises, LLC (Tesla) crossappealed, from a judgment dismissing without prejudice for lack of
jurisdiction its action against 3 Bears Construction, LLC (3 Bears)
and Tesla for breach of contract and a declaration that Tesla’s
pipeline construction lien is invalid. In 2013, Arrow, a Delaware
limited liability company, hired 3 Bears, a North Dakota limited
liability company, to be the general contractor for the construction
of a pipeline located on a right-of-way easement acquired by
Arrow from the Bureau of Indian Affairs over Indian trust land on
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the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation. The easement was “for the
purpose of installing oil, gas and water lines” and described the
right-of-way as “11,882.77 feet in length and 13.520 acres in area
(34.206 acres during construction), more or less, . . . and shall be
buried a sufficient depth below the surface of the land so as not to
interfere with cultivation.”
3 Bears, which has its principal place of business in New
Town, entered into a subcontract with Tesla, an Alaska limited
liability company, to supply materials and labor for the
construction. 3 Bears is owned by two members of the Three
Affiliated Tribes (Tribe) and is certified under the Tribal
Employment Rights Ordinance (TERO). 3 Bears claimed Arrow
was a covered employer who was required to comply with TERO
rules. After the pipeline was completed, a dispute arose between 3
Bears and Tesla concerning amounts Tesla claimed it was owed by
3 Bears for work Tesla performed. In mid-2014, Tesla sent Arrow
a notice of right to file a pipeline lien under N.D.C.C. ch. 35 24.
Tesla recorded the pipeline lien against Arrow in the Dunn County
recorder’s office in June 2014.
In July 2014, Arrow commenced this action in state district
court challenging the validity of the pipeline lien, seeking
indemnification, and claiming 3 Bears breached the parties’
contract. In August 2014, 3 Bears moved to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. In November 2014, 3 Bears filed a
complaint against Tesla and Arrow in Fort Berthold Tribal Court. 3
Bears sought a declaration that the pipeline lien was invalid,
alleged Arrow had breached the master service contract, and
requested an award of damages.
In December 2014, the state district court agreed with 3 Bears’
argument that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the lawsuit.
The court concluded “exercising jurisdiction over this action under
the circumstances presented here would infringe upon Tribal
sovereignty.” The court further concluded, “at the very least,
Arrow and Tesla, as a matter of comity, should be required to
exhaust their tribal court remedies before this Court exercises
jurisdiction.” The court dismissed the action “without prejudice to
allow any of the parties to re-open the case without payment of
another filing fee should it become necessary for purposes of
enforcing the Tribal Court action or for any other reason.”
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The appellate court held that appellate jurisdiction existed
where a dismissal order and judgment effectively foreclosed
litigation of a pipeline lien’s validity and breach of contract; the
first Montana exception did not apply where the general contractor
was an LLC formed under state law, not a member of the tribe, and
thus, there was no consensual relationship between nonmembers
and the tribe or its members; the district court erred in ruling that
the tribal court had jurisdiction under the second Montana
exception where the right-of-way pipeline easement was the
equivalent of non-Indian fee land, the Tribe had not intervened in
the action, and the case involved the validity of a pipeline
construction lien filed under state law resulting from a contractual
payment dispute between non-tribal members; state court
jurisdiction was not foreclosed by incompatible federal law.
Judgment reversed; case remanded.
3.

Kelsey v. Pope

No. 14-1537, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 28 (6th Cir. Jan. 5, 2016).
Member of the Little River Band of Ottawa Indians petitioned for
writ of habeas corpus after he had been convicted in tribal court of
misdemeanor sexual assault for inappropriately touching tribal
employee at Band’s community center, 2008 WL 6928233, and his
sentence was affirmed on appeal. The District Court, 2014 WL
1338170, granted the petition. Tribe appealed. The appellate court
held that: (1) tribe had inherent authority to prosecute tribal
member for offense substantially affecting tribal self-governance
interests, even when such offenses took place outside of Indian
country; (2) Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) extended due process
protections to member; (3) federal constitutional standards applied;
and (4) decision of tribal Court of Appeals to recognize jurisdiction
over conduct of member of Indian tribe in touching victim’s
breasts through her clothing at tribe’s off-reservation community
center did not violate due process as extended through ICRA.
Reversed and vacated.
4.
Wilson v. Doe
No. C15-629, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41543 (W.D. Wash.
Mar. 29, 2016). Before the court were Defendant Horton’s Motion
for Summary Judgment and Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
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Judgment. Plaintiff Curtiss Wilson was stopped by a Lummi Tribe
police officer while driving on the Lummi Reservation after
drinking at the Lummi Casino. Lummi Tribal Police Officer Grant
Austick stopped Plaintiff, searched his 1999 Dodge Ram Pickup,
and developed probable cause that Plaintiff was committing a DUI.
Officer Austick then called the Washington State Patrol and
Plaintiff was arrested. Plaintiff’s truck was towed by Defendant
Horton’s Towing and impounded at the direction of the
Washington State Trooper.
The following day, Lummi Tribal Police Officer Brandon
Gates presented a “Notice of Seizure and Intent to Institute
Forfeiture” (“Notice of Seizure”) from the Lummi Tribal Court to
Horton’s Towing. The seizure and intent to institute forfeiture of
Plaintiff’s vehicle was based on violations of the Lummi Nation
Code of Laws (“LNCL”) 5.09A.110(d)(2) (Possession of
Marijuana over 1 ounce), and authorized by LNCL
5.09B.040(5)(A) (Civil forfeiture section addressing Property
Subject to Forfeiture, specifically motor vehicles used, or intended
for use, to facilitate the possession of illegal substances.) Horton’s
Towing released the truck to the Lummi Tribe.
Plaintiff brought suit in Whatcom County Superior Court and
the case was removed. Plaintiff originally brought claims for
outrage, conversion, and relief under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988.
All of Plaintiff’s claims, save conversion, have been previously
dismissed either voluntarily or by Court order. Plaintiff’s
conversion claim against both Horton’s and the United States is
based on Horton’s release of the vehicle to the Lummi Tribe
pursuant to the order served by Gates. Defendant Horton’s moved
for summary judgment, claiming the release of the vehicle was
pursuant to the Notice of Seizure, and therefore with lawful
justification. Plaintiff argued in response that the Notice of Seizure
is invalid or not enforceable off the reservation.
The
United
States moved for summary judgment based on, inter alia,
Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. Plaintiff’s
cursory Motion for Summary Judgment and attached declaration
does nothing to rebut the appropriateness of summary judgment in
Defendants’ favor. Rather, Plaintiff repeats the circumstances of
his DUI and loss of his truck. The Court appreciates that the
temporary loss of his vehicle caused Mr. Wilson—who has a
limited, fixed income—great inconvenience, even distress.
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However, this does not establish a genuine dispute of material fact
in his case: rather, the facts are essentially undisputed. Not only
has Plaintiff not established that his truck was seized without legal
justification; he has not established that this Court has the
jurisdiction to hear his case. Defendants’ Motions for Summary
Judgment are granted and Plaintiff’s Motion is denied.
5.

Menominee Indian Tribe of Wis. v. DEA

No. 15-CV-1378, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67259 (E.D. Wis.
May 23, 2016). The Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin filed
this declaratory action against the United States Department of
Justice and its Drug Enforcement Administration (hereinafter “the
Government”) after federal agents raided reservation lands
and seized a crop of hemp grown pursuant to a 2015 tribal
ordinance legalizing the cultivation of hemp. The Tribe sought a
judgment declaring that its cultivation of industrial hemp for
agricultural or academic research purposes in connection with the
College of Menominee Nation is lawful under a 2014 federal law,
7 U.S.C. § 5940, which created an exemption to the Controlled
Substances Act for the cultivation of hemp in certain
circumstances.
Before the Court are the Government’s motion to dismiss and
the Tribe’s motion for summary judgment. In May 2015, the
Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin, a federally-recognized
Indian tribe, passed a tribal ordinance legalizing the cultivation of
industrial hemp on the Menominee Reservation by licensees of the
Tribe. Hemp has known uses in textiles, foods, papers, body
care products, detergents, plastics and building materials. On
October 23, 2015, federal agents entered the Menominee
Reservation, and seized and destroyed the Tribe’s industrial hemp
crop. The complaint states that the raid was conducted despite no
known THC test exceeding 0.3 percent.
On November 18, 2015, the Tribe filed this action for
declaratory relief. The Tribe sought a declaration from this Court
that its cultivation of industrial hemp for agricultural or academic
research purposes in conjunction with the College of Menominee
Nation is lawful under 7 U.S.C. § 5940. Specifically, the complaint
includes three “claims” for declaratory relief corresponding to the
statutory requirements for the exception: (1) that in passing a tribal
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law legalizing the cultivation of industrial hemp on the Menominee
Reservation, the Tribe acted as a ”State,” as required under § 5940;
or alternatively (2) that the cannabis laws of the State of Wisconsin
have no application to industrial hemp cultivation by the Tribe
within the exterior boundaries of the Menominee Reservation, and
that the cultivation of industrial hemp on the Menominee
Reservation is therefore “allowed” under the laws of the State of
Wisconsin, as required under § 5940; and (3) that the College of
Menominee Nation is an “institution of higher education” under
§ 5940. The Government responded to the complaint by filing a
motion to dismiss on numerous grounds. The Tribe responded with
a motion for summary judgment. The court granted the
Government’s motion to dismiss, and the Tribe’s motion for
summary judgment was denied.
6.

Pearson v. Dir. of the Dep’t of Licensing

No. C15-0731, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80133 (W.D. Wash.
Jun. 20, 2016). This matter was before the Court on the motions
for summary judgment by Defendants Director of the Department
of Licensing and Sergeant Andrew Thorne. On January 21, 2015,
Swinomish Police Department Officer Hans Kleinman pulled over
Plaintiff Susan Pearson for failing to obey a stop sign. Both the
traffic violation and the traffic stop occurred on tribal trust land
within the external boundaries of the Swinomish Reservation.
Officer Kleinman ran Pearson’s name through a driver’s check and
learned that her license was suspended three days earlier for unpaid
tickets. Officer Kleinman arrested Pearson. During the search
incident to arrest, Officer Kleinman found evidence of controlled
substances on Pearson’s person. The tribal police officers
subsequently seized Pearson’s 1999 GMC S-10 pickup truck.
Two days after Pearson’s arrest, Defendant Andrew Thorne, a
sergeant with the Swinomish Police Department, received a call
from Pearson asking where she should pick up her vehicle. Sgt.
Thorne responded that Pearson could not retrieve her vehicle
because the Swinomish Police Department was procuring a search
warrant. Pearson then asked when her vehicle would be returned.
Sgt. Thorne responded that the Tribe intended to initiate forfeiture
proceedings because the vehicle was used to transport illegal
narcotics on tribal land. Sgt. Thorne advised that Pearson would be
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receiving a seizure notice from the Swinomish Tribal Court with a
hearing date and that Pearson could retain an attorney if she
wished. Upon obtaining a warrant, the Swinomish Police
Department searched Pearson’s vehicle and discovered evidence of
controlled substances. Pearson was given notice of the proceeding
to forfeit her vehicle pursuant to tribal law. No attorney entered an
appearance on her behalf, and Pearson did not file an answer.
After 20 days, the Swinomish Tribal Court entered an order
forfeiting Pearson’s ownership pursuant to Swinomish tribal laws.
Meanwhile, Pearson requested that the Washington State
Department of Licensing (Department) place a hold on her
certificate of title. Based on this request, the Department flagged
Pearson’s certificate of title, indicating to the Department that
ownership of the vehicle could not be transferred without a request
by Pearson or a Washington State court order. The Department has
no records indicating that the Swinomish Tribe has attempted to
transfer title to Pearson’s vehicle. As of the time of filing of these
motions, Pearson’s truck was still in the custody of the Swinomish
Police Department. Pearson filed a complaint for damages and
declaratory and injunctive relief against the Director of the
Department in her official capacity and against several Swinomish
tribal police officers, including Sgt. Thorne. Pearson asked this
Court to enjoin the Department from transferring the certificate of
ownership to itself pursuant to the Swinomish Tribe’s forfeiture
order, and to award judgment against the tribal police officers for
damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court granted Defendants’
motions for summary judgment and dismissed with prejudice
Pearson’s claims against the Director of the Department of
Licensing and Sergeant Andrew Thorne.
7.

United States v. Bearcomesout

No. CR 16-13, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96117 (D. Mont.
Jul. 22, 2016). Before the Court was Defendant Tawnya
Bearcomesout’s Motion to Dismiss the Indictment based on
Double Jeopardy. Bearcomesout argued that the Northern
Cheyenne Tribe and the United States are no longer separate
sovereigns, so her prosecution in the Northern Cheyenne Tribal
Court and her prosecution in this Court are derived from the same
source, in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy
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Clause. The government argued that the Double Jeopardy Clause
does not apply.
Bearcomesout was charged by Indictment with voluntary
manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter, in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 1153(a) and 1112(a). Prior to the federal Indictment, the
Northern Cheyenne Tribal Court charged and sentenced
Bearcomesout with crimes arising out of the same events.
Bearcomesout accepted an Alford plea in tribal court. She was
sentenced to one year of incarceration with the Bureau of Indian
Affairs Law Enforcement Services and a $5,000 fine for the charge
of homicide as well as an additional one-year sentence and $2,000
fine for the charge of assault, with both periods of incarceration to
run consecutively. Citing decades of “schizophrenic” case law,
Bearcomesout argued that the law has evolved such that the
Northern Cheyenne Tribe’s concept of self-governance and
sovereignty has disappeared. As a result, Bearcomesout argued
that the Tribe was “subject to the external whim of the United
States” which inherently extinguishes the tribe’s sovereignty.
Because the Tribe is not sovereign, Bearcomesout argued that her
prosecution in Northern Cheyenne Tribal Court was in essence a
federal prosecution, in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Bearcomesout provided the Court with only conclusory allegations
and no specific [11] evidence that the Tribe had “little or no
independent volition” in the Bearcomesout’s tribal prosecution.
Zone, 403 F.3d at 1105. Accordingly, she does not meet the
standard for an evidentiary hearing. See United States v. Koon, 34
F.3d 1416, 1439 (9th Cir. 1994). (To qualify for an evidentiary
hearing, a defendant must, at the very least, “make more than
`conclusory allegations’ of collusion.”) Bearcomesout’s Motion to
Dismiss is denied.
8.

Acres v. Blue Lake Rancheria Tribal Court

No. 16-cv-02622, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105786 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 10, 2016). Plaintiff James Acres sought declaratory and
injunctive relief against defendants Blue Lake Casino & Hotel
(“BLC&H”), the Blue Lake Rancheria tribal court, tribal judge
Lester Marston, and Anita Huff (“Clerk Huff”), asserted that the
tribal court lacked jurisdiction over him in an underlying
contractual dispute and that the individual court employees
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exceeded their authority during the pendency of the tribal action.
Defendants moved to dismiss to require Acres to exhaust his tribal
remedies. Acres is an employee and president of Acres Bonusing,
Inc. (“ABI”), a California distributor for Talo, Inc. BLC&H sued
Acres and ABI in Tribal Court on January 12, 2016. That case
concerns an agreement into which ABI and Acres entered with
BLC&H for the purpose of providing BLC&H with the iSlot
Platform, a casino gaming platform developed by Talo, Inc. (the
“iSlot Agreement”). BLC&H’s complaint asserts claims for breach
of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, unjust enrichment, and fraudulent inducement.
On January 17, 2016, Acres was served with the summons and
complaint in the tribal action. On February 16, 2016 Judge
Marston issued an order rejecting special appearances and listing
the ways in which the filings did not conform to the tribal court’s
rules. The order provided Acres with 30 days to file an answer or
responsive pleading. On March 9, 2016, Acres and ABI filed the
instant action in federal court, alleging that it is “not possible for
the Tribal Court to provide due process to non-members Acres”
and that “because the tribal court answers to the Tribe’s Business
Council, and the Business Council derives significant revenue for
the Tribe from BLC&H, it is unreasonable to expect the Tribal
Court to be an impartial arbiter in [this] dispute.”
Acres also asserted that he never consented to tribal
jurisdiction and that “[b]y the Tribe’s own rules, [he] is clearly not
subject to the Tribe’s jurisdiction because he had never done
business with the Tribal Court’s territorial jurisdiction as a natural
person.” Acres’ complaint presents five claims for declaratory and
injunctive relief including a declaration that the iSlot Agreement
does not establish tribal jurisdiction over non-members of the tribe
and a declaration that the tribal court cannot provide due process in
cases involving tribal plaintiffs and non-tribal defendants.
Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter is granted.
L.
1.

Tax

Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Stranburg

No. 14-14524, 2015 WL 5023891 (11th Cir., Aug. 26, 2015).
Tribe filed suit against the State of Florida and the director of the
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Florida Department of Revenue seeking injunctive relief against
state Rental Tax and Utility Tax imposed on two non-Indian
corporations with 25-year leases to provide food-court operations
at two tribal casinos. The district court summary judgment was in
favor of the Tribe and the State appealed. The Court of Appeals
affirmed as to the Rental Tax, holding that 25 U.S.C. 465 bars the
tax in light of Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145
(1973). The court also affirmed on an issue of first impression –
the effect of BIA regulations providing that “activities under a
lease conducted on leased premises” are not subject to state
taxation. 25 CFR 162.017(c). While the court did not defer to the
Secretary’s determination of federal preemption, it agreed that the
Rental Tax is preempted by federal law under Bracker. However,
the court rejected the district court’s determination that the
incidence of the Utility Tax falls on the Tribe and ruled that the
Tribe has not established that the Utility Tax is generally
preempted as a matter of law.
2.

Automotive United Trades Organization v. State of
Washington

No. 89734-4, 2015 WL 5076289, __ Wash. 2d __ (Aug. 27,
2015). Trade association of Washington gasoline and automotive
service retailers brought action against the State alleging that fuel
tax compacts entered into with various Indian tribes which provide
for refunds of gas tax paid were unconstitutional. The Superior
Court, Grays Harbor County, dismissed for non-joinder of parties.
Trade association appealed. The Supreme Court reversed and held
that while Indian tribes were necessary parties, they were not
indispensable so as to warrant dismissal. 175 Wash. 2d 214,
285 P.3d 52 (2012). On remand, the court dismissed on the merits
and trade association appealed again. The Supreme Court, Justice
Gonzales for a unanimous court, affirmed. Art. II, Sec. 40 of the
Constitution expressly allows for refunds authorized by law for
taxes paid on motor vehicle fuels. The then-applicable statutes
(since repealed) authorized compacts that provide for refunds.
3.

Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe v. Gerlach
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No. 14-4171, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16682 (D.S.D. Feb. 11,
2016). Pursuant to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), the
Tribe and the State have in place a Tribal-State gaming compact
(Compact), which controls the Tribe’s gaming operations. The
Compact contemplates neither explicitly nor impliedly the State’s
authority to apply its alcohol regulatory laws to the Tribe’s
“gaming facility,” nor does it contemplate a State’s authority to
impose its use taxes on nonmember activity made at the Casino,
nor does it contemplate the State’s requirement that the Tribe
collect and remit the use taxes from nonmember activities or
purchases.
Irrespective of residential or tribal status, the Tribe offers its
patrons “goods and services,” which include “bowling, shows and
other live entertainment, lodging, food, beverages, package
cigarettes, and other sundry items.” It is undisputed that the Tribe
sold these various goods and services to nonmembers at the
Casino. The Tribe has not remitted the relevant use taxes on
nonmember sales to the State. The State has issued the Tribe three
alcohol licenses, one for each of the three Casino encompassed
businesses. These licenses are conditioned on the Tribe’s
remittance of the State use tax pursuant to S.D.C.L. § 35-2-24. In
2009 and 2010, the Tribe sought from the State a renewal of its
three alcohol licenses. Based on S.D.C.L. § 35-2-24, both requests
were denied by the State as the statute directs that licenses are not
to be reissued until use taxes incurred by nonmembers have been
remitted.
The Tribe requested a hearing before the South Dakota Office
of Hearing Examiners to review the State’s alcohol license denial.
At the hearing, the Hearing Examiner concluded that all
nonmember purchases at the Casino are subject to the use tax
scheme, that the Tribe failed to remit the use taxes, and, therefore,
the Tribe was not entitled to alcohol license renewal. Prior to the
Hearing Examiner’s decision becoming final, the Tribe filed this
action in federal court and simultaneously moved the Court for
preliminary injunction enjoining state action pursuant to the
Hearing Examiner’s decision. The Tribe and State made the
motion for preliminary injunction moot by entering into a
stipulation whereby the State recognized the three alcohol licenses’
continuing validity pending a decision on the merits in this case.
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The Tribe did not appeal the Hearing Examiner’s decision to South
Dakota state court.
The Tribe alleged that the State lacks authority to impose its
use tax scheme on reservation land against nonmember Casino
patrons and that IGRA preempts the field of taxation thereby
barring the State’s imposition. The Tribe argued that all activity
engaged in under the Royal River Casino name is “gaming
activity” untaxable by the State by virtue of IGRA. Outside of
IGRA, the Tribe maintains that the use tax and remittance
requirements are preempted by the Indian Commerce Clause of the
Federal Constitution, federal common law, and infringe on
inherent tribal sovereignty; that the State’s tax imposition is
unlawfully discriminatory as applied to the Tribe; that, as a
predicate to funds contained in an escrow account pursuant to a
1994 Deposit Agreement between the Tribe and State being
disbursed to the Tribe, the State is without power to impose its
taxation scheme on the Tribe’s Casino; and that the alcohol
licenses are conditioned on the S.D.C.L. § 35-2-24 tax remittance
requirement is violative of 18 U.S.C. § 1161.
Before the Court was the Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe’s (the
Tribe) motion for judgment on the pleadings. In its motion, the
Tribe asked the Court to declare that the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act (the IGRA) is broad enough in scope to cover sales
of goods and services beyond that of just pure gameplay on a
casino floor. In addition, the Tribe moved to dismiss the State’s
counterclaim related to a 1994 deposit agreement (the “Deposit
Agreement”) that the Tribe and State are parties to. The Deposit
Agreement established an escrow account into which the Tribe was
to pay a disputed tax amount pending the final resolution of a
federal action pending in South Dakota District Court at the time.
The Tribe’s motion is granted.
4.

Cypress v. United States

No. 15-10132, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 5390 (11th Cir. Mar. 23,
2016). This appeal arose out of a dispute between sixteen members
of the Miccosukee Tribe of Florida (the “Tribe members”) and the
United States, the United States Department of the Interior, the
United States Department of the Treasury, and the Secretaries of
the Treasury and of the Interior (collectively, “the Government”).
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The Tribe members sought declaratory relief to avoid paying
federal income taxes on distributions, including gaming proceeds,
paid out of the Tribe’s trust account. The district court dismissed
the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that
the United States had not waived sovereign immunity for suits
brought by individual Tribe members. The Tribe members now
appeal the dismissal. The court agreed with the district court that
the Government did not waive sovereign immunity. Accordingly,
the court affirm the district court’s dismissal of this matter.
5.

White v. Schneiderman

2016 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4429 (N.Y. App. Div. Jun. 10,
2016). Plaintiffs commenced this declaratory judgment action,
alleging that the enactment and enforcement of Tax Law § 471,
which imposes requirements on plaintiffs to pre-pay the amount of
the tax to be assessed on the sale of cigarettes to non-Indians and
non-members of the Seneca Nation (collectively, non-Indians),
violates Indian Law § 6 and certain treaties between the Seneca
Nation and the United States of America, particularly the Treaty of
1842 (7 US Stat 586).
Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction enjoining
enforcement of the Tax Law, and Supreme Court granted
defendants’ cross motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) and
dismissed the complaint. Plaintiffs contend that we erred in
determining in Matter of New York State Dept. of Taxation & Fin.
v Bramhall (235 A.D. 2d 75, 667 N.Y.S. 2d 141, appeal dismissed
91 N.Y. 2d 849, 690 N.E. 2d 493, 667 N.Y.S. 2d 684) that the
Treaty of 1842 and Indian Law § 6 bar the taxation of reservation
land, but do not bar the imposition of, inter alia, “sales taxes on
cigarettes . . . sold to non-Indians on the Seneca Nation’s
reservations,” and request that we reconsider our determination.
We adhere to our determination in Bramhall. It is well established
that “the States have a valid interest in ensuring compliance with
lawful taxes that might easily be evaded through purchases of taxexempt cigarettes on reservations . . .. States may impose on
reservation retailers minimal burdens reasonably tailored to the
collection of valid taxes from non-Indians” (Department of
Taxation & Fin. of N.Y. v Milhelm Attea & Bros., Inc., 512 U.S.
61, 73, 114 S. Ct. 2028, 129 L. Ed. 2d 52).
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Although plaintiffs are obligated to pay the amount due as tax
from non-Indians who have the tax liability, and from whom the
amount is collected at the time of the sale, “this burden is not,
strictly speaking, a tax at all” (Moe v Confederated Salish &
Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463, 483, 96 S.
Ct. 1634, 48 L. Ed. 2d 96). Judgment modified. As modified,
judgment affirmed. Declaratory judgment entered. It is adjudged
and declared that Tax Law § 471 is not inconsistent with Indian
Law § 6, the Treaty of 1842 (7 US Stat 586), or the Due Process or
Commerce Clauses of the United States Constitution, and as
modified the judgment is affirmed without costs.
6.

Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. Hildreth

No. 15-13400, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 12666 (11th Cir. Jul. 11,
2016). The Poarch Band of Creek Indians (“Poarch Band”) sued
James Hildreth, Tax Assessor of Escambia County, Alabama, for
declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the assessment of
property taxes on lands owned by the Poarch Band in Escambia
County, Alabama, and held in trust by the United States (“Trust
Property”). The Poarch Band maintains the Trust Property is
exempt from taxation pursuant to the Indian Reorganization Act of
1934 (“IRA”). See 25 U.S.C. § 465.1. The district court granted
injunctive relief barring the tax assessment efforts during the
pendency of the case, and Hildreth appeals. Finding no abuse of
discretion and no error of law, we affirm.
7.

New York v. Mt. Tobacco Co.

No. 12-CV-6276, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95329 (E.D. N.Y.
Jul. 21, 2016). Before the Court was defendant Mountain Tobacco
Company’s (“King Mountain”) motion for partial summary
judgment and plaintiff State of New York’s (the “State”) cross
motion for summary judgment. King Mountain, a for-profit
corporation formed and operating under the laws of the Yakama
Indian Nation, manufactures and sells its own brand of cigarettes.
King Mountain’s principal place of business is located on the
Yakama Indian Nation Reservation. Delbert Wheeler, Sr., an
enrolled member of the Yakama Nation, is the sole owner of King
Mountain.

2017]

Case Law on American Indians: 2015-2016

496

The State alleged that King Mountain has marketed,
distributed, and sold its cigarettes in New York since at least June
1, 2010. King Mountain denied that allegation, but alleged that it
“sells its cigarettes to Indian Nations, and to companies owned by
a member of an Indian Nation, that are situated on Indian Nations,
some of which are located within the boundaries of the State of
New York[,]” It is undisputed that King Mountain has not filed
reports or registrations with the New York State Department of
Taxation and Finance (“DTF”). King Mountain moved for
summary judgment with respect to the State’s claims under the
CCTA, PACT Act, and New York Tax Law (“NYTL”).
King Mountain argued that the State’s CCTA claim must fail
because, inter alia, it is exempt as an “Indian in Indian country.”
King Mountain alleged that it is entitled to summary judgment on
the PACT Act claim because its sale of cigarettes to Native
Americans did not take place in “interstate commerce” as defined
by the Act. King Mountain argued that the PACT Act’s definition
of “State” does not encompass “Indian Country” and cites to the
distinct definitions provided for each term. Although King
Mountain conceded that it sold cigarettes to Valvo Candies on one
occasion, it alleged that was an isolated sale that predated the
effective date of the PACT Act. King Mountain alleged that the
State’s third cause of action is barred by res judicata based on the
prior Tax Proceeding. King Mountain argued that it is not liable
under NYTL Sections 471 and 471-e because: (1) it did not
possess unstamped cigarettes in New York State; and (2) Section
471 does not impose liability on a lawful out-of-state cigarette
manufacturer because it is not an “agent” or “consumer” as defined
by the statute.
With respect to the CCTA, the State argued that the “Indian in
Indian Country” exemption is not applicable to King Mountain.
Particularly, the State argues that the CCTA’s use of the term
“Indian” refers to an individual member of a tribe, not an Indianowned business. Additionally, the State alleged that even if King
Mountain is an “Indian in Indian Country,” the CCTA exemption
still does not apply because that exemption was meant to protect
tribal governments and tribal sovereignty. The State argued that
King Mountain’s arguments regarding the PACT Act are founded
in a misreading of the statute. The State alleged that the term
“state” in the PACT Act does not exclude Indian reservations
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because pursuant to federal common law, “Indian country is
ordinarily considered a part of a state’s territory.”
The State also argued that res judicata does not bar its claim
because: (1) the underlying facts of the Tax Proceeding do not
arise out of the same series of transactions as the underlying facts
in this case; (2) the Tax Department and Attorney General are not
in privity; and (3) King Mountain waived any res judicata defense
by failing to assert it in its Answer.
The Court granted in part and denied in part, King Mountain’s
motion for summary judgment and granted in part and denied in
part the State’s motion for summary judgment. Summary judgment
is granted in favor of King Mountain on the State’s first claim
under the CCTA. Summary judgment on the second claim under
the PACT Act is denied regarding the 2010 sale to Valvo Candies
and granted in favor of King Mountain as to the balance of the
State’s PACT Act claim. With respect to the State’s third claim
under NYTL Sections 471 and 471-e, summary judgment is
granted in favor of King Mountain regarding King Mountain’s
alleged possession of unstamped cigarettes in New York State and
granted in favor of the State regarding King Mountain’s failure to
sell its unstamped cigarettes to licensed stamping agents. Summary
judgment is granted in favor of the State on its fourth claim
pursuant to Section 480-b. With respect to the State’s fifth claim,
summary judgment is granted in favor of the State regarding its
claim that King Mountain failed to file certifications pursuant to
New York Executive Law Section 156-c.

8.

Comenout v. Wash. State Liquor Control Bd.

No. 74842-4-I, 2016 Wash. App. LEXIS 1878 (Wash. Ct. App.
Aug. 8, 2016). In State v. Comenout, our Supreme Court upheld
the State’s exercise of nonconsensual criminal jurisdiction over
tribal members selling unstamped cigarettes from an unlicensed
store located on trust allotment property lying outside the borders
of an Indian reservation. Edward Comenout challenged that
decision in this administrative forfeiture action appeal arising out
of the same seized cigarettes at issue in Comenout. He claimed
Comenout is not binding because the case was remanded and
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ultimately dismissed. But the court was bound by that decision
unless and until the Washington Supreme Court or the United
States Supreme Court rules otherwise. Neither court has done so.
And under Comenout, it was clear the State court had personal and
subject matter jurisdiction in this administrative forfeiture action
and that Comenout was not exempt from the State’s cigarette tax
as an “Indian retailer.” Because Comenout failed to establish any
error of law or arbitrary and capricious action under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) standards, we affirm.
M.
1.

Trust Breach and Claims

Sisseton Wahpeton Oyate of the Lake Traverse Reservation
v. Jewell

No. 13-00601, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124483 (D.D.C. Sept.
17, 2015). Pending before the Court was Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss, which sought dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) based on lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. This lawsuit was filed by four
federally-recognized American Indian tribes seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief against the Secretary of the Interior and the
Secretary of the Treasury (“Defendants”) for their alleged breaches
of fiduciary duties relating to tribal trust accounts. Plaintiffs
amended their Complaint to add additional American Indian tribes,
bringing the total number of Plaintiff-tribes to ten. Defendants
moved to dismiss the Plaintiffs’ Complaint based on lack of
jurisdiction. Defendants contended that the Court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction because the government has not waived its
sovereign immunity from the Plaintiffs’ claims.
The federal government has held funds and assets in trust for
American Indian tribe beneficiaries for well over a century.
Unfortunately, the federal government has failed to discharge its
fiduciary duties in its role as trustee for the tribes, and those trust
accounts have been mismanaged for almost as long as they have
been in existence. See Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081, 1086,
345 U.S. App. D.C. 141 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Plaintiffs sought
declaratory relief that certain previous attempts to reconcile the
trust accounts did not satisfy the government’s responsibility to
provide a complete and accurate accounting of those accounts.
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Plaintiffs also sought injunctive relief compelling Defendants to
perform their duties to provide complete and accurate accountings,
preserve any and all documents concerning Plaintiffs’ trust
accounts, and make their accounts whole. Finally, Plaintiffs sought
judicial review of the agencies’ actions under the Administrative
Procedures Act (“APA”).
Defendants argued that Plaintiffs’ claims were improperly
based on the “inherent fiduciary duty” between the federal
government and Plaintiff-tribes, and that Plaintiffs have failed to
properly identify the statute or regulation on which their claims are
based. Defendants also argued that Plaintiffs did not sufficiently
allege that the “complete and accurate trust accounting” they seek
is demanded by law, which means that Plaintiffs failed to properly
invoke the APA’s waiver of sovereign immunity. Defendants
further contended that (1) Plaintiffs sought broad structural relief
which is not proper under the APA, (2) Plaintiffs’ claims were
impermissible programmatic challenges, (3) Plaintiffs’ claims
related to recordkeeping should be dismissed because there is no
private right of action, and (4) Plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive
relief were actually seeking monetary damages which is outside
the scope of the waiver of sovereign immunity and not within the
Court’s jurisdiction. Finally, Defendants argued that Plaintiffs’
claims are time-barred under the applicable statute of limitations.
As a threshold matter, the Court noted that it has jurisdiction in
the matter because the prospective relief Plaintiffs seek is a “civil
action[ ] arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Because the government
challenged whether it has waived sovereign immunity for
Plaintiffs’ claims, this does not end the jurisdictional inquiry. The
Court denied the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.
2.

Cobell v. Jewell

No. 14-5119, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 16625 (D.C. Cir. Sept.
18, 2015). Plaintiffs’ appeal from the district court’s denial of
additional compensation for expenses for the lead plaintiff was
timely, and the order appealed from was both final under 28
U.S.C.S. § 1291 and ripe under U.S. Const. art. III. The district
court properly denied the denial of additional compensation for
expenses for the lead plaintiff because it expressly wrapped those
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costs into an incentive award given to her earlier. The district court
erred in categorically rejecting as procedurally barred the class
representatives’ claim for the recovery of third-party payments.
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. Case remanded.
3.

Quapaw Tribe of Okla. v. United States

No. 12-592L, 2015 U.S. Claims LEXIS 1275 (Fed. Cl. Oct. 1,
2015). This case involved the claims of the Quapaw Indian Tribe
of Oklahoma for breach of fiduciary duty and breach of trust
obligations. On April 6, 2015, the Quapaw Tribe filed a motion for
partial summary judgment on three grounds: (1) that the
Government is liable for annual educational payments of $1,000
from 1932 to the present under the Treaty of 1833; (2) that the
Government is liable for $31,680.80 in unauthorized
disbursements from the Quapaw Tribe’s trust accounts, as found in
the 1995 Tribal Trust Funds Reconciliation Project Report
prepared by Arthur Andersen LLP; and (3) that the Government
is liable for $70,330.71 in transactions that should have been
credited to the Quapaw Tribe’s trust accounts but were not, as
reported in the 2010 Quapaw Analysis.
I. Educational Payments. The Treaty of May 13, 1833 between
the United States and the Quapaw Indians contained terms under
which the Quapaw Tribe would move to new lands and resolve
past disputes with the Government. Among a host of terms
describing what the Quapaw Tribe would receive, one provision
provided for the United States to make an annual educational
payment to the Quapaw Tribe. From 1932 through 2015, despite
inquiries and demands from the Quapaw Tribe, the United States
did not make this annual treaty payment of $1,000, and the
President has never deemed the payment unnecessary. The
Quapaw Tribe asserts that the Government’s failure to meet its
treaty responsibility is a breach of a fiduciary obligation. The
Quapaw Tribe claims damages of $1,000 per year from 1932 to
2015 ($83,000), plus investment income the funds would have
earned had they been timely deposited. The accounting review
known as “the Quapaw Analysis,” performed during 2004-2010,
found no record that any educational payments required by the
1833 Treaty had been made from 1932 to the present. Defendant
does not accept Plaintiff’s educational payments claim, and has
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raised a number of defenses. However, none of the defenses has
any merit.
II. Unauthorized Disbursements. As a second basis for partial
summary judgment, Plaintiff asserted that the congressionally
authorized Tribal Trust Funds Reconciliation, which culminated in
a December 31, 1995 report by Arthur Andersen LLP, identified
three disbursements from the Quapaw Tribe’s trust accounts,
totaling $31,680.80, that were not authorized. The 2010 Quapaw
Analysis confirmed this total, and also calculated that, had those
funds been kept in the trust account, they would have accumulated
$903.00 in statutorily required interest as of September 30, 1992.
III. Transactions That Should Have Been Credited. As its third
basis for partial summary judgment, Plaintiff claimed $70,330.71
in unauthorized transactions. The Quapaw Analysis refers to these
amounts as “transactions posted to the Tribal Trust Accounts and
transactions in which monies should have been received, or were
received, but that cannot be verified (as posted) to the Tribal Trust
Accounts. . . . The total dollar amounts unaccounted for before
interest accrual is $70,331.” The Government has stated in
discovery that it has no information regarding these transactions,
but the Government updated its discovery response on October 24,
2014 to say that it now has information to contest these amounts,
i.e., eight ledger sheets for account Q-32. As noted in Section II
above, finality must attach to the Quapaw Analysis.
The Court will not permit Defendant to impeach this detailed
report, when it could have produced documents or raised its
concerns at a much earlier time. The Quapaw Analysis is binding
upon the United States. Based upon the foregoing, the Court grants
Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment on its educational
payments claim ($83,000), its unauthorized disbursements claim
($31,680.80), and its unauthorized transactions claim ($70,331),
together with investment income that would have been earned if
these amounts had been timely credited to the Quapaw Tribe’s
account.
4.

Goodeagle v. United States

Nos. 12-431L, 12-592L, 13-51X1, 2015 U.S. Claims LEXIS
1312 (Fed. Cl. Oct. 16, 2015). (Grace M. Goodeagle, et al. v.
United States; Quapaw Tribe Of Oklahoma v. United States;
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Thomas Charles Bear et al. v. United States) In these Indian Tribe
cases involving significant claims against the United States for
breach of fiduciary duty, among other things, Plaintiffs filed a
motion for discovery relief seeking an order in their favor on the
following grounds: (1) the Government failed substantially and in
multiple ways to produce documents in compliance with Rule 34
of the Court of Federal Claims Rules (“RCFC”); and (2) the
Government failed to produce a witness or witnesses under RCFC
30(b)(6) who could respond to designated subjects listed in the
deposition notice.
Plaintiffs also requested the imposition of sanctions, and the
reimbursement for costs and fees associated with this motion under
RCFC 37. Plaintiffs asserted that, at the beginning of discovery,
they served the Government with reasonable requests for
production of documents identifying specific topics relating to the
relevant issues in these cases. Plaintiffs complained that, in
violation of RCFC 34, the Government refused to organize its
responsive documents by the requested topics. Also, Plaintiffs
alleged that the Government procrastinated in its document
production, producing 75 percent of the requested documents in
the final six weeks of the discovery period without any
organization or labeling. Plaintiffs argued that disorganized and
unusable “data dumps” like this one are precisely an outcome that
RCFC 34 is intended to avoid. Plaintiffs asked the Court to require
the Government to re-produce its documents organized and labeled
to correspond to the categories of documents contained in
Plaintiffs’ requests.
The Government opposed Plaintiffs’ motion by arguing that its
document production substantially complied with RCFC 34, and
that many of Plaintiffs’ requests were overly broad and not
amenable to the categorization requirement of the rule. The
Government also asserted that it is not required to label and
categorize publicly available documents, and that it produced some
of the documents as they are kept in the usual course of business,
thus negating a need to label and categorize.
Under the circumstances, the Court found that the Government
failed to comply with RCFC 34 and its fiduciary trust obligations.
Despite the expense that may be involved, the Government is
directed to produce its responsive documents again, organized and
labeled in a way that complies with Rule 34. Discovery has been
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extended for three months to allow the completion of this effort.
The only exception to this requirement is for documents that are
available to the public, which need not be separately organized and
labeled. Plaintiffs served on the Government a notice of deposition
under RCFC 30(b)(6), identifying fifteen topics for examination.
For six of these topics, the Government refused to produce a
witness. For four other topics, the Government refused to produce
a witness for the time period prior to 2007. For eight topics, the
Government designated a witness, Mr. Paul Yates, Superintendent
of the Miami Agency, but he was unable to provide answers on
many of the eight topics for which he had been designated.
Plaintiffs asked for the imposition of sanctions due to the
Government’s failure to designate a proper witness under RCFC
30(b)(6). In Plaintiffs’ view, the Government should be prohibited
from offering evidence at trial for any subject where its RCFC
30(b)(6) deponent failed to give testimony at the deposition.
The Court declined to impose such a severe sanction where
there is no indication that the Government acted with willful
neglect or bad faith. Also, there is no prior discovery order that has
been violated. The better course, in the interest of full development
of the facts, is to allow the Government a second chance to comply
with Plaintiffs’ RCFC 30(b)(6) deposition notice. As with the
Court’s reading of Plaintiffs’ document requests, the topics listed
in the deposition notice were comprehensive, but not overly broad.
Therefore, the Government is directed to produce knowledgeable
persons who can respond under oath in a RCFC 30(b)(6)
deposition on behalf of the United States. On October 15, 2015, the
Court entered an order granting the parties’ joint motion to amend
the pretrial schedule by adding three months to the remaining
discovery tasks. Under the amended schedule, the parties will have
until July 14, 2016 to complete all discovery. During this period,
the parties will have opportunities to cure the discovery
shortcomings that have occurred thus far. Accordingly, the Court
will denied Plaintiffs’ claim for recovery of fees and costs without
prejudice, subject to Plaintiffs reasserting the claim if the
forthcoming discovery efforts are still unsatisfactory. Based upon
the foregoing, Plaintiffs’ motion for discovery relief was granted in
part and denied in part.
5.

Flute v. U.S.
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No. 14–1405, 2015 WL 9298089 (10th Cir. Dec. 23, 2015).
Descendants of victims of United States Army’s 1864 massacre of
certain bands of Cheyenne and Arapaho Indian tribes brought
putative class action against federal government, Department of
Interior (DOI), and Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), alleging
breach of trust and seeking accounting of reparation payments
promised to their ancestors by treaty and award of funds found still
owing. The District Court, 67 F. Supp. 3d 1178, dismissed the
action. Descendants appealed. The appellate court held that: (1)
Department of Interior Appropriations Act of 2009 that tolled
running of applicable statute of limitations for claims “concerning
losses to or mismanagement of trust funds” did not relieve
descendants of independent obligation to identify unequivocal
waiver of immunity or express consent to be sued; (2) Treaty of
Little Arkansas and 1866 Appropriations Act did not create
ongoing fiduciary obligations to descendants; and (3) descendants
were not entitled to accounting. Affirmed.
6.

Fletcher v. United States

No. 02-CV-427, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172877 (N.D. Okla.
Dec. 30, 2015). In the early twentieth century, large quantities of
oil and gas were discovered on lands belonging to the Osage
Nation. Shortly thereafter, Congress enacted the Osage Allotment
Act of 1906, Act of June 28, 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-321, 34 Stat.
539 (Osage Allotment Act or 1906 Act), which severed the mineral
estate underlying Osage lands from the surface estate, placed the
mineral estate in trust, and directed the Secretary of Interior to
collect and distribute royalty income every quarter to persons on
the 1906 tribal membership roll. The right to receive such royalty
payments is called a “headright.” The sole remaining claim in this
long-running case concerns the federal government’s duty to
account to individual Osage headright owners. Certified as a class
in 2014, plaintiffs are Osage Indians who receive headright
payments pursuant to the 1906 Act. They brought this claim
pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) seeking an
accounting of tribal trust funds held on their behalf. In particular,
plaintiffs requested an accounting of the Osage tribal trust account,
an account within the United States Treasury which holds Osage
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royalty income prior to its distribution to the headright owners.
The government maintained that the account at issue is held in
trust for the Osage Nation only and that, as such, plaintiffs are not
entitled to the accounting they seek.
The court held that the plaintiffs are entitled to accounting of
the Osage tribal trust account in accordance with the requirements
set forth herein and ordered that the government provide plaintiffs
with an accounting of the Osage tribal trust account in accordance
with the following requirements: (1) The accounting must run from
the first quarter of 2002 until the last available quarter; (2) the
accounting must be divided and organized either by month or
by quarter; (3) The accounting must state the date and dollar
amount of each receipt and distribution; (4) The accounting must
briefly identify and describe the source of each trust receipt (i.e.,
the name of the payer/lessee and the contract number for the oil
and/or gas lease on which the payment is made); (5) The
accounting must state the name of the individual or organization to
whom each trust distribution was made; (6) For headright
distributions, the accounting must state the headright interest that
each beneficiary possessed at the time of distribution; (7) The
accounting must state the amount of interest income generated
from the tribal trust account and the date on which such interest
was credited to the account.
7.

Wyandot Nation v. United States

No. 15-560C, 2016 U.S. Claims LEXIS 1 (Fed. Cl. Jan 4,
2016). Plaintiff, the Wyandot Nation of Kansas (Wyandot Nation),
is an Indian tribe whose members trace their ancestry to the
Historic Wyandott Nation and the Wyandotte Tribe of Indians. The
Historic Wyandott Nation’s government-to-government relations
with the United States were dissolved and terminated 160 years
ago by the Treaty of January 31, 1855, 10 Stat. 1159 (1855
Treaty). Following the Historic Wyandott Nation’s termination, the
Wyandotte Tribe of Indians was established as a reorganized tribe
under Article 13 of the Treaty of February 23, 1867 (1867 Treaty).
Plaintiff claimed to be both a successor-in-interest to all of the
treaties entered into by the Historic Wyandott Nation with the
United States and a part of the reorganized Wyandotte Tribe of
Indians. The Wyandot Nation’s claims involve treaty trust funds
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and trust land that the Government allegedly holds in trust for the
Wyandot Nation. The funds Plaintiff claimed the Government
holds in trust for it fall into two categories. Plaintiff’s “Category
One trust funds are those funds described in Schedule A of the
1867 Treaty.” According to Plaintiff, its Category One funds “ . . .
were derived from the sale of Historic Wyandott Nation lands that
were placed in United States Treasury trust accounts.” Plaintiff’s
“Category Two trust funds are derived from easements for grants
of rights-of-way for the use of two tracts of the Huron Cemetery
trust land for Kansas City, Kansas streets since 1857.”
The Wyandot Nation filed a complaint against the United
States for money damages arising from the Government’s alleged
breach of trust and fiduciary obligations owed to the Wyandot
Nation. The complaint contained four causes of action: (1) breach
of fiduciary duties based on a failure to provide a full, accurate,
and timely accounting of Category One treaty trust funds; (2)
breach of fiduciary trust responsibilities based on a failure to
collect, deposit, account for, and invest trust funds that should have
been collected for use of Huron Cemetery trust lands by the City of
Kansas City, Kansas; (3) mismanagement of Category One treaty
trust funds and accounts; and (4) mismanagement of Category Two
Huron Cemetery trust funds. Plaintiff requested full trust fund
accountings from the United States based on the allegations in its
first and second claims, and monetary damages from the
Government based on the alleged mismanagement of Plaintiff’s
funds and property in its third and fourth claims. Defendant filed a
motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint contending that Plaintiff’s
claims should be dismissed as untimely, for failure to allege
sufficient jurisdictional facts, or for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. Additionally, Defendant argued that
Plaintiff lacks standing to assert any claims regarding the Huron
Cemetery. The Court granted the Government’s motion to dismiss
Plaintiff’s claims.

8.

Alabama-Quassarte Tribal Town v. United States
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No. CIV-06-558, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1620 (E.D. Okla. Jan.
7, 2016). Before the court was the Creek Nation’s motion
to dismiss the First Amended Complaint. The Creek Nation argued
that the court has no jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims against the
Creek Nation absent an express waiver of the Creek Nation’s
sovereign immunity. The Creek Nation further argued that
Plaintiff’s claims regarding the Wetumka Project lands are
untimely and barred by doctrines of estoppel and preclusion. The
Alabama-Quassarte Tribal Town (hereinafter Plaintiff or AQTT)
filed this case against the United States, the Secretary and the
Associate Deputy Secretary of the United States Department of the
Interior (hereinafter DOI), and the Secretary of the United States
Department of the Treasury, alleging that certain lands known as
the Wetumka Project lands were purchased for the benefit of
Plaintiff.
The AQTT requested a declaratory judgment that the
Defendants failed to fulfill their legal obligations and duties as
trustees and an order compelling Defendants: (1) to assign the
Wetumka Project lands to the AQTT, and (2) to provide the AQTT
with a full and complete accounting of all the AQTT’s trust funds
and assets. On November 17, 2008, in ruling on the Defendants’
motion for partial judgment on the pleadings, the court entered an
Order & Opinion dismissing all claims related to the Wetumka
Project lands.
The court found that the Wetumka Project lands were never
placed in trust for the AQTT, the AQTT’s claims related to the
Wetumka Project lands accrued on or before April 29, 1942, and
thus those claims were time barred. The court further found that
the Creek Nation is a necessary party to any claim regarding the
Wetumka Project lands and could not be joined. Plaintiff’s claims
related to the alleged tribal trust account, the “Surface Lease
Income Trust,” remained.
On September 21, 2010, the court denied Defendants’ motion
to dismiss and the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment. In
that Order & Opinion, the court noted that from 1961 to 1976
income from surface leases on the Wetumka Project lands was
deposited into an IIM account in the AQTT’s name. At some point,
the funds in that account were moved into a Proceeds of Labor
(hereinafter PL) account. The court continued to refer to those
funds as the “Surface Lease Income Trust.” The court found that
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Defendants ignored substantial evidence demonstrating that the
Surface Lease Income Trust was created for the benefit of the
AQTT and that Defendants’ conclusion on the ownership of the
Surface Lease Income Trust was arbitrary and capricious.
The court remanded this action to Defendants for additional
investigation and explanation. The court directed Defendants to
assemble a full administrative record to include all of the evidence
they possess with regard to the Surface Lease Income Trust and to
reconsider their decision on the matter of ownership of that Trust.
On remand, this action was referred to the Interior Board of Indian
Appeals (IBIA). The Creek Nation entered an appearance in the
matter and submitted a brief on the issues, “request(ing) the
Interior Board of Indian Appeals to find and order that the Surface
Lease Income Trust is the beneficial property of (the Creek Nation)
and not AQTT.”
On October 23, 2014, the IBIA issued its final reconsidered
decision on referral from the Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs.
The IBIA determined that the Surface Lease Income Trust was not
held for the AQTT. Plaintiff filed its First Amended Complaint,
adding the Creek Nation as a Defendant and adding a claim for
appeal of the IBIA’s decision as again being arbitrary and
capricious. Plaintiff also added a claim for assignment of the
Wetumka Project lands, stating that on remand it discovered that
the Creek Nation had passed a resolution assigning the Wetumka
Project lands to the AQTT. The Court granted the Creek Nation’s
motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint.
9.

Tanner-Brown v. Jewell

No. 14-1065, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9333 (D.D.C. Jan. 27,
2016). Plaintiffs Leatrice Tanner-Brown and the Harvest Institute
Freedman Federation, LLC (HIFF) filed this class action against
Defendants Sally Jewell, the Secretary of the United States
Department of the Interior, and Kevin Washburn, the Assistant
Secretary for Indian Affairs at the Department of the Interior, in
their official capacities seeking an accounting relating to alleged
breaches of fiduciary duties concerning land allotted to the minor
children of former slaves of Native American tribes. Defendants
have filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint in its entirety on a
variety of grounds. The Court finds that Plaintiffs lack standing
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under Article III of the Constitution and will therefore grant
Defendants’ motion and dismiss the Complaint for lack of
jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
10.

Inter-Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc. v. United States

No. 15-342L, 2016 U.S. Claims LEXIS 99 (Fed. Cl. Feb. 22,
2016). Before the court was a motion filed by defendant the United
States (“government”) to dismiss this action filed by plaintiff InterTribal Council of Arizona, Inc. (“ITCA”) for breach of tribal trust
obligations. The ITCA, which represents nineteen Arizona tribes
claims that the government is liable for a breach of trust by failing
to fulfill its obligations under the Arizona-Idaho Conservation Act
of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-696, 102 Stat. 4571, 4577-93 (1988)
(“the Act”); 25 U.S.C. § 162a; and the American Indian Trust Fund
Management Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-412, 108 Stat.
4239 (1994) (“the Trust Fund Reform Act”). Title IV of the Act,
which is sometimes referred to as the Arizona-Florida Land
Exchange Act, ratified an agreement between the government and
the Barron Collier Company, Collier Development Corporation,
and Collier Enterprises (together “Collier”) to exchange federally
owned property in Arizona for wetlands in Florida owned by
Collier.
The ITCA alleged that under the Act the government is
required to make payments into a trust that was established for the
benefit of the ITCA’s member tribes and for ensuring a lump sum
payment to the ITCA’s trust fund at the end of a 30-year payment
period. Under the Act, the trust was held by the government and
maintained by annual payments from Collier. Under the terms of
the trust agreement, Collier was also obligated to pay into an
annuity fund designed to ensure a lump sum payment at the end of
30 years. The trust agreement gave the government a security
interest in land owned by Collier as collateral on the 30-year
payment obligation. Collier stopped making payments into the
trust and into the annuity fund in 2012. The ITCA alleged that the
government has breached its trust obligations by failing to make
the payments itself when Collier stopped paying. Finally, the ITCA
claims that the government breached its trust obligations by failing
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to prudently invest the trust funds and by failing to provide a
proper accounting of the funds.
The government has filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on
the grounds that the government does not have any obligation
under the Act to make up Collier’s missed payments to either the
trust fund or the annuity. The government further argues that it has
no trust obligation under the Act to monitor or supplement the
value of the collateral or security obtained from Collier. In this
connection, the government also argues that to the extent the
ITCA’s breach of trust claims relate to the release of collateral
more than six years ago, this portion of the claim is barred by the
6-year statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2501. In addition, the
government asserted that the ITCA’s claims with regard to the
collateral are not ripe because the government is in ongoing
litigation against Collier in United States District Court for the
District of Arizona (“the district court”) to resolve the collateral
issues. The government further argued that the ITCA has failed to
state a claim with regard to the government’s management of the
trust fund. The government stated that the Act gave the
government unreviewable discretion in making investment
decisions and that there is no allegation of facts to show
mismanagement. Finally, the government asserted that the court
lacks jurisdiction to grant the ITCA’s claim for an accounting on
the grounds that the ITCA cannot establish a claim for money
damages based on management of the trust fund. In such
circumstances, the government argues that the ITCA must go to
the district court for an accounting. Based on these arguments, the
government asks the court to dismiss the ITCA’s claims for lack of
jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Rules of the United
States Court of Federal Claims (“RCFC”) and for failure to state a
claim pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(6).
The court agreed with the government that the court does not
have jurisdiction over the ITCA’s claims based on the
government’s failure to make up Collier’s missed payments. These
claims fail for lack of jurisdiction on the grounds that the ITCA has
not established a fiduciary obligation to make the payments under
the Act and thus the ITCA has failed to establish a moneymandating breach of trust claim. However, the court found that the
ITCA has identified potential money-mandating breach of trust
claims with regard to the government’s alleged failure to monitor
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and maintain adequate collateral to ensure the final payment into
the fund. Yet, a portion of the collateral-related claims may be
barred by the 6-year statute of limitations.
Thus, the court found that a final decision on its jurisdiction to
hear those claims must await a determination of the merits. In
addition, the court found that the ITCA has failed to state a claim
to the extent that it argues the government breached its trust
obligations by failing to hold the trust fund payments security in
trust at the Department of Treasury rather than in a private annuity
and certain interests in real property. Finally, the court agreed with
the government that plaintiff has not stated a claim with regard to
mismanagement of the trust fund and as such this court does not
have jurisdiction to order an accounting. Accordingly, the
government’s motion to dismiss is granted-in-part and denied-inpart.
11.

Fredericks v. United States

No. 14-296L, 2016 U.S. Claims LEXIS 110 (Fed. Cl. Feb. 24,
2016). Five Indian heirs to their deceased father’s allotted lands
have filed this breach of trust case, contesting actions taken by the
Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”)
regarding the estate’s lands and assets. After the death of plaintiffs’
father in 2006, BIA began probate proceedings, which lasted until
2013. The plaintiffs allege that during probate, and continuing to
this day, the United States improperly granted and approved leases
of their father’s land in violation of trust duties imposed by the
Fort Berthold Mineral Leasing Act, Pub. L. No. 105-188, 112 Stat.
620 (1998), as amended by Pub. L. No. 106-67, 113 Stat. 979
(1999), and the American Indian Agricultural Resource
Management Act (“AIARMA”), Pub. L. No. 103-177, 107 Stat.
2011 (1993) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 3701-46). They
also allege a taking of property without just compensation in
contravention of the Fifth Amendment. Pending before the court is
the United States’ (“government’s”) motion to dismiss under Rules
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Rules of the Court of Federal Claims
(“RCFC”). The government’s principal arguments are that the
Indian heirs lack standing because they had no property interests
until the conclusion of probate, and that pertinent statutes impose
no money-mandating duties on the government in favor of the
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heirs. The government’s motion to dismiss is denied in part and
otherwise deferred for prudential reasons, awaiting resolution of
pending administrative proceedings. On or before March 11, 2016,
defendant shall file an answer to plaintiffs’ amended complaint.
12.

Ramah Navajo Chapter v. Jewell

No. 90 CV 957, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27624 (D.N.M. Mar. 2,
2016). On September 30, 2015, the Court granted preliminary
approval of the final settlement agreement (FSA) in this class
action and ordered that notice be sent to all class members. The
Court has ruled on the sole objection to the FSA in which the
United South Eastern Tribes, Inc. argued that it was improperly
excluded from the Class members listed in Appendix 2 of the FSA.
The Court sustained in part and overruled in part the Objection. On
January 8, 2016, the parties filed their Motion for Final Approval.
The same day, Class Counsel filed their Consent Motion for
Approval of Attorneys’ Fees. Class Counsel had filed their Class
Counsel Application For Award Of Attorney Fees And Costs on
September 29, 2015. The Court considered the FSA, the evidence,
the arguments of the parties, including affidavits of Class Counsel
and the Class Representatives. In addition, the Court heard
arguments by Class Counsel, by other attorneys representing the
Class, and by Counsel for the Government. During the hearing, the
Court concluded that the FSA is in the best interest of the Class
and should be approved. As to the Consent Motion for Approval of
Attorneys’ Fees, during the January 20, 2016 hearing the Court
asked whether the notice to the Class members clearly stated how
the New Mexico Gross Receipts Taxes (NMGRT) on the
attorneys’ fees would be paid. Class Counsel, Class
Representatives, and Counsel for the Government conferred and
reached an agreement clarifying responsibility for the payment of
NMGRT on attorneys’ fees and said they would submit a written
stipulation memorializing their agreement.
The Court found that the Joint Stipulation clarified the
obligations regarding payment of the New Mexico Gross Receipts
Taxes. On February 19, 2016, the Court entered an Order adopting
the Joint Stipulation as a supplement to the FSA and approving the
Joint Stipulation. The Application describes the work of Class
Counsel, and by other attorneys in their law firms and by attorneys
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specializing in Indian Law and in Supreme Court litigation. No
objections to the Application were filed. The Government, in its
role as trustee for all tribes and tribal organizations, supports the
requested fee and agrees that an award of 8.5% of the amount paid
from the Judgment Fund as defined in the FSA is fair and
reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. The Court
concludes that the requested attorneys’ fee of 8.5% of the amount
paid from the Judgment Fund as defined in the FSA is fair and
reasonable. Hence, the Court will grant the Consent Motion for
Approval of Attorneys’ Fees and will approve the Application.
13.

Two Shields v. United States

No. 2015-5069, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 7610 (Fed. Cir.
Apr. 27, 2016). Indians’ claims that the government mismanaged
oil-and-gas leases on Indian allotment land were precluded since a
settlement in a prior action released all accrued land administration
claims against the government, and the Indians did not exercise
their right to opt out of the settlement which negated any inference
that the Indians considered the settlement unfair. The statute
authorizing the government to manage mineral leases on Indian
allotment land did not include a general duty to disclose all
information related to the administration of Indian trusts to support
the Indians’ claim of a breach of a duty to disclose information
concerning the Indians’ specific claims. No unconstitutional taking
occurred through the settlement since the Indians elected not to opt
out of the settlement and thus voluntarily forfeited their claims
against the government. Decision affirmed.
14.

Angasan v. United States

No. 3:15-cv-00195, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60636 (D. Alaska
May 4, 2016). Defendant United States of America, Department of
the Interior, National Park Service (“the Park Service”) moved to
dismiss the complaint of plaintiffs Ralph Angasan, Sr.; Vera
Angasan; Fred T. Angasan, Sr.; Mary Jane Nielsen; Trefon
Angasan, Jr.; Lydia Emory; Viola Savo; Val Angasan, Sr.; Martin
Angasan, Sr.; Steven Angasan, Sr.; and Anishia Elbie (collectively,
“Plaintiffs”) pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)
and (6). This case presented a dispute concerning the construction
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of a road at Brooks Camp in the Katmai National Park and
Preserve. Plaintiffs are the heirs of Palagia Melgenak, who
established first use of land in the vicinity of Brooks Camp in the
late 1800s. Following litigation with the United States, Plaintiffs
were granted the land identified as United States Survey No. 7623
as a Native allotment under the Alaska Native Allotment Act.
Pursuant to a sales agreement (“Sales Agreement”), Plaintiffs
then sold a portion of their allotment back to the United States (Lot
1) and granted the United States a conservation easement
(“Conservation Easement” or “Easement”) over the remaining land
(Lots 2 and 3). The land subject to the Conservation Easement is
referred to as the “Protected Property.” A portion of the Protected
Property (Lot 2) is designated as the “Exclusive Use Area,” over
which Plaintiffs have retained the right of “exclusive, noncommercial use.” The Conservation Easement has three stated
purposes: (1) “to preserve and protect the predominantly natural
landscape and the wildlife and other park resources and values on
the Protected Property;” (2) “to limit the impacts on the
surrounding park lands and resources as a result of the use of the
Protected Property;” and (3) “to increase opportunities for access
by park visitors.” Section 2 of the Easement outlines the specific
rights that Plaintiffs conveyed to the United States. The United
States’ ability to develop the land is restricted under the parties’
agreements. With regard to Lot 1, Section (2)(a)(iv) of the Sales
Agreement provides that the Park Service must “first consult with
[Plaintiffs] concerning all proposed developments [and]
improvements.” This restriction resembles the Lot 3 restriction
found in Section 2(D)(2) of the Easement, which states that “new
development” in Lot 3 shall not occur without the Park Service
“first consulting and obtaining and considering the views of the”
Plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs alleged that the Park Service violated the two above
restrictions when it built a road that commences on Lot 1 “and
passes through [Lot 3] to a barge loading zone directly adjacent to
Lot 3” without first contacting or consulting with Plaintiffs. Their
three causes of action seek the following relief: (1) a declaratory
judgment stating that the Park Service’s conduct is wrongful;
(2) an injunction prohibiting the Park Service from “using or
entering upon the road” and requiring it to “promptly comply in all
respects [with] the Conservation Easement;” and (3) restitution
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damages. Additionally, the complaint’s prayer for relief sought an
injunction requiring the Park Service to restore the Protected
Property at its own expense. The Park Service’s motion to dismiss
is granted in part and denied in part as follows: Plaintiffs’ first
cause of action is dismissed to the extent it alleges a violation of
the Alaska Native Allotment Act (the alleged violations of the
Conservation Easement and 25 C.F.R. § 169.3(b) remain).
Plaintiffs’ complaint is dismissed to the extent it states claims that
arise out of the Park Service’s activities on Lot 1, the motion is
denied in all other respects.
15.

Wolfchild v. Redwood Cnty.

No. 15-1580, No. 15-2375, No. 15-3225, No. 153277, 2016
U.S. App. LEXIS 9976 (8th Cir. Jun. 1, 2016). Appellantsplaintiffs filed this purported class action claiming the right to title
and possession of twelve square miles of land in southern
Minnesota (“twelve square miles”). Specifically, Appellants
alleged they are lineal descendants of the Mdewakanton band of
the Sioux tribe who were loyal to the United States during the 1862
uprising (“loyal Mdewakanton”). Appellants claimed the Secretary
of the Interior set apart the twelve square miles for the loyal
Mdewakanton and their descendants and, thereby, the loyal
Mdewakanton have the exclusive right to title, use, and possession
of the twelve square miles. Appellees physically possess or claim a
property interest in the twelve square miles. The issues underlying
this case are complex, requiring interpretation of over 150-year-old
statutes, regulations, and legislative history, understanding of past
mistreatment of Indian tribes by the United States, and a
complicated area of the law.
The appellate court held that: (1) The district court correctly
held the Indians failed to state a claim under the federal common
law as set forth in the Oneida Indian Nation progeny. (2) In
contrast to a claim of aboriginal title, they directly asserted the 12
square miles vested in the loyal Mdewakanton band of the Sioux
tribe pursuant to the Act of February 16, 1863 (Act). (3) The
language of the Act directly contradicted any claim that the loyal
Mdewakanton had aboriginal title to the 12 square miles. (4) The
lawsuit concerned lands allocated to individual Indians, not tribal
rights to lands. (5) It did not fall into the federal common law
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articulated in the Oneida progeny. (6) The district court abused its
discretion by imposing $281,906.34 in sanctions. (7) Remand was
appropriate for the district court to consider the municipalities’
motion for costs pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d) and 28 U.S.C.S.
§ 1920. The motion to dismiss was affirmed, the imposition of
sanctions vacated, and the case was remanded.
N.
1.

Miscellaneous

Kelii Akina, et al. v. The State of Hawaii, et al.

No. 15–00322, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146995 (D. Haw.
Oct. 29, 2015). Defendant Nai Aupuni was conducting an election
of Native Hawaiian delegates to a proposed convention of Native
Hawaiians to discuss, and perhaps to organize, a Native Hawaiian
governing entity. Delegate candidates had been announced, and
voting was to run from November 1, 2015 to November 30, 2015.
Plaintiffs had filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction seeking,
among other relief, to halt this election. The voters and delegates in
this election were based on a “Roll” of “qualified Native
Hawaiians” as set forth in Act 195, 2011 Haw. Sess. Laws, as
amended (the “Native Hawaiian Roll” or “Roll”). A “qualified
Native Hawaiian” is defined as an individual, age eighteen or
older, who certifies that they (1) are “a descendant of the
aboriginal peoples who, prior to 1778, occupied and exercised
sovereignty in the Hawaiian islands, the area that now constitutes
the State of Hawaii,” Haw. Rev. Stat. (“HRS”) § 10H-3(a)(2)(A),
and (2) have “maintained a significant cultural, social, or civic
connection to the Native Hawaiian community and wishes to
participate in the organization of the Native Hawaiian governing
entity.” HRS § 10H–3(a)(2)(B).
Through a registration process, the Native Hawaiian Roll
Commission (the “commission”) asked or required prospective
registrants to the Roll to make the following three declarations:
Declaration One. I affirm the unrelinquished sovereignty of the
Native Hawaiian people, and my intent to participate in the process
of self-governance. Declaration Two. I have a significant cultural,
social or civic connection to the Native Hawaiian community.
Declaration Three. I am a Native Hawaiian: a lineal descendant of
the people who lived and exercised sovereignty in the Hawaiian
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Islands prior to 1778, or a person who is eligible for the programs
of the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, 1920, or a direct lineal
descendant of that person. Separately, the Roll also includes as
qualified Native Hawaiians “all individuals already registered with
the State as verified Hawaiians or Native Hawaiians through the
Office of Hawaiian Affairs (“OHA”) as demonstrated by the
production of relevant [OHA] records[.]” HRS § 10H–3(a)(4).
Those on the Roll through an OHA registry do not have to affirm
Declarations One or Two.
Plaintiffs filed suit on August 13, 2015, alleging that these
“restrictions on registering for the Roll” violate the U.S.
Constitution and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 52 U.S.C. §
10301. As to the constitutional claims, they allege violations of
(1) the Fifteenth Amendment; (2) the Equal Protection and Due
Process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment; and (3) the First
Amendment. They further alleged that Nai Aupuni is acting “under
color of state law” for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and is acting
jointly with other state actors. The Complaint sought to enjoin
Defendants “from requiring prospective applicants for any voter
roll to confirm Declaration One, Declaration Two, or Declaration
Three, or to verify their ancestry.” The Complaint also sought to
enjoin “the use of the Roll that has been developed using these
procedures, and the calling, holding, or certifying of any election
utilizing the Roll.” Plaintiffs have moved for a preliminary
injunction, seeking an Order preventing Defendants “from
undertaking certain voter registration activities and from calling or
holding racially-exclusive elections for Native Hawaiians, as
explained in Plaintiffs’ Complaint.” They seek to stop the election
of delegates, and thereby halt the proposed convention. Plaintiffs’
Motion for Preliminary Injunction was denied.
2.

Navajo Nation v. San Juan Cnty.

No. 2:12-cv-00039, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20533 (D. Utah
Feb. 19, 2016). This case was about voting rights and the election
districts in San Juan County, Utah. Plaintiffs are Navajo Nation—a
federally recognized Indian tribe—and several individual Tribe
members. Navajo Nation sued the County shortly after the County
Commission redistricted in 2011, and directed two of its four
claims for relief to the County’s three Commission election
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districts. Navajo Nation alleged in its first claim for relief that the
County Commission’s 2011 redistricting and its present three
districts violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Fifteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. It asserted in its second claim for relief that the same
election districts violate § 2 of the Voting Rights Act.
Before the court are the parties’ cross-motions for summary
judgment on Navajo Nation’s first claim. Navajo Nation pointed
specifically to the Commission’s District Three, which the County
established in 1986 to be majority Native American in the wake of
a lawsuit brought against it by the United States Department of
Justice. The District Three boundaries remain unchanged since
they were drawn three decades ago. Navajo Nation claimed that
the County Commission relied on race in its decision to maintain
the District Three boundaries as part of the County’s redistricting
in 2011. Navajo Nation urged the court to conclude under the strict
scrutiny analysis that must follow that the County’s race-based
decision-making was not narrowly tailored to further a compelling
governmental interest, and is thus unconstitutional in violation of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
San Juan County responded that it had a compelling
government interest in maintaining the decades-old District Three
boundaries when it redistricted in 2011. It contended that it was
legally required to do so to comply with the terms of a Consent
Decree and a Settlement and Order entered when the County
resolved the Department of Justice lawsuit against it in the 1980s.
The court found that the County’s position is unsupported by
the language of the Consent Decree and Settlement and Order.
These documents did not require the County to draw and
maintain—in perpetuity—the 1986 District Three boundaries. The
court concluded that the County lacked a compelling government
interest in its racially-motivated districting decisions. As drawn in
1986 and maintained in 2011, the County’s Commission Districts
violated the Equal Protection Clause and were unconstitutional.
The court therefore granted summary judgment in favor of Navajo
Nation, and denied the County’s cross-motion.
3.

Kitras v. Town of Aquinnah
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No. SJC-11885, 2016 Mass. LEXIS 246 (Mass. Apr. 19, 2016).
Landlocked property owners’ (LPOs) declaratory judgment action,
seeking a determination that they had easements by necessity over
lot owners’ (LOs) land as a result of a partition of Native American
common land, lacked merit because the LOs presented sufficient
evidence to rebut the presumption that there was an intent to
include rights of access at the time of the partition, which was over
100 years ago. The LPOs showed unity of title, a subsequent
severance of that unity, and that the properties were landlocked
despite agreed access, such that they established the presumption
of an intent to create an easement by necessity. However, the LOs
sufficiently rebutted the presumed intent through evidence of tribal
custom and usage which provided free access rights, that other
easements were created, and that the land was in poor condition at
the time of partition. Judgment affirmed.
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